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ABSTRACT

Interstate Alliances of the Fourth-Century BCE Greek World: A Socio-Cultural Perspective
by
Nicholas D. Cross

Adviser: Professor Jennifer Roberts

This dissertation offers a reassessment of interstate alliances (συµµαχία) in the fourth-century
BCE Greek world from a socio-cultural perspective. Although there are a number of studies of
ancient and modern alliances that approach the topic from a politico-military perspective, this is
the first to apply a socio-cultural perspective to classical Greek alliances. By considering the
subject in its own context, from the primary literary and epigraphic sources rather than modern
theoretical models, this study aims to identify how contemporaries understood and represented
their collaborative activities with other poleis. This approach leads to insights that challenge the
widespread notion that classical Greek alliances were temporary affiliations designed for nothing
more than political and military objectives. On the contrary, even though alliances materialized
within the context of warfare, they were reifications of the ideational, cultural, religious, and
economic interactions between individuals in each polis. The overall endeavor, therefore, can be
considered a socio-cultural history of Greek alliances in the fourth century BCE.
Part I shows how the practice of constructing an interstate alliance was a social activity that grew
out of historical interactions on the interpersonal level. It also examines the constitutive element
behind the legislative and religious activities in alliance negotiations, which strengthened old ties
and developed new ones in a common cause and towards a common identity. Part II reviews the
principal Athenian, Spartan, and Theban bilateral alliances of the fourth century BCE. It
emphasizes their distinct alliance experiences and practices, while also noting the prevalent
importance of socio-cultural factors for their success or failure. Part III reexamines the end of
alliances and offers an alternative interpretation of that phase based upon contemporary
perceptions. It also highlights the innovative and important contributions which this project
offers to the wider academic community. Although this study seeks out contemporary
perceptions, its conclusions engage with the current debates in history, classics, and international
relations studies.
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PART I:

INTRODUCTION TO ANCIENT GREEK ALLIANCE STUDIES

1

Chapter I
Models and Definitions

The practice of constructing formal interstate alliances in the fourth-century BCE Greek
world was a social activity.1 Alliances emerged out of the historical interactions between the
parties in the social, ideational, religious, and economic spheres. The shared alliance experience,
in turn, reinforced these associations and created further common interests, ideas, and goals. The
alliance process, therefore, was a transformative one for the participants. Although they were
generally concluded within the context of warfare and defined in political terms, at their core
alliances were manifestations of the socio-cultural features of the Greek interstate society. This is
not a typical representation of interstate alliances. International Relations (IR) scholars generally
approach the topic from a politico-military perspective, seeing alliances as only defense
mechanisms to obstruct a mutual enemy or as tools to increase geopolitical power. This negative
characterization has long had an impact on historians of classical Greece, especially those with
an eye for the military and political narratives. The current project, the first full-length inquiry
into alliances in classical Greece, challenges the widespread notion that alliances were nothing
more than isolated affiliations designed for purposes of Realpolitik and offers in its place a
reassessment of the bilateral alliances of the Athenians, Spartans, and Thebans from a sociocultural perspective.2

1

All dates are BCE unless otherwise noted.

2

Appendix A lists all of the primary Athenian, Spartan, and Theban alliances from 403 to
338 with their provisions and source references. Multilateral institutions have a different
2

The use of this perspective is the most valuable contribution that this dissertation makes
to the study of interstate alliances. A socio-cultural perspective considers the topic from a
horizontal rather than a vertical vantage point. It emphasizes the impact that historical
interactions and connections on the micro-level had on the larger political decisions of the polis.
Examples to be discussed at length in this study include the role of interstate personal contacts,
shared social traditions, ideas and beliefs, and economic interactions – all of which had the
potential to tie the participants together into a closely aligned network and to create an
environment for a formal interstate alliance. In other words, alliances were formal manifestations
of the broader phenomenon of traditional interstate alignments. This is a unique perspective. The
dominant explanatory IR model today is Realism, which views the world in a condition of
endemic conflict and competition. Every other state, therefore, is a potential rival and not to be
trusted. In this atomistic scenario, states, acting according to pragmatism and self-interest, only
reluctantly enter into interstate alliances and then only for political or military purposes. Realists
dismiss ideological or moral concerns as irrelevant to the actual operation of international
affairs.3
Not seeking so much to completely deny as to modify (and to temper) the traditional
politico-military account, this study argues that there is a need to devote more attention to the
non-political and non-military determinants. It seeks answers to questions such as: how useful

administrative apparatus from bilateral alliances (Figueira and Jensen 2013, 480-496; Beck and
Funke 2015), and thus are not discussed at length in this study.
3

Some Realists consider Thucydides to be their intellectual founder (Lebow and Strauss
1991; Crane 1998; McCann and Strauss 2001; Eckstein 2006, 48-57; Platias and Koliopoulos
2010; Forde 2012, 178-196), but many others dispute that distinction (Johnson Bagby 1994, 131153; Rahe 1996, 105-141; Ober 2001, 273-306; Lebow 2007, 351-378).
3

are modern models for the study of ancient Greek alliances? Would the Greeks confirm today’s
interpretations of their interstate activity? What did they believe they were doing when they
entered into an alliance? Were socio-cultural factors as important as the political and military
ones? How genuine were the justifications which they put forth in their historical records? The
answers which this study offers to such questions are valuable to the subject of interstate
alliances as well as to other topics in historical and IR studies.
The methodology followed here is also distinctive, indeed, completely opposite to that of
modern scholarship. Because most scholars view ancient Greek IR through the lens of
generalized theoretical models, the specialized study of alliances has not made much headway in
academia. Polly Low perhaps speaks for many when she explains why her treatment of classical
Greek IR ignores this topic: “This book has (deliberately) attempted to avoid many practical
aspects of interstate relations – the technicalities of specific alliances and treaties, the realities of
battles, campaigns and wars. . . . A complete picture of interstate relations cannot be achieved by
focusing only on these details of ‘what really happened.’”4 Low does, in fact, address specific
alliances at certain points in her work, but it is the larger theoretical issues that are of the most
concern to her and other likeminded scholars. The current study, however, deliberately focuses
on alliances – a practical aspect of interstate relations – in the belief that a proper understanding
of them can generate new material and perspectives for the broader interpretations of interstate
activity. Seen in this light, anyone in this field who ignores alliances runs a risk. In the words of

4

Low 2007, 257.
4

George Liska, one of the fathers of modern alliance studies, “it is impossible to speak of
international relations without reference to alliances; the two merge in all but name.”5
Applying a socio-cultural perspective specifically to interstate alliances, of course,
involves a close look at the primary source material. Since this subject lends itself easily to
interdisciplinary research, it is tempting for historians, lacking any complete IR manual from
antiquity, to look to modern IR scholars for an interpretive lens through which to explain the
conduct of the Greek poleis.6 When necessary this study engages with modern IR scholarship,
but in general the findings come from the contemporary literary, epigraphical, and, at times,
material record. It seeks primarily to recontextualize the subject and to uncover the motives for
interstate activity as contemporaries perceived them. The conclusions, therefore, are based as
closely as possible to an emic interpretation of the alliances. This approach provides an
important corrective to the popular Realist narrative. As political institutions the Greek poleis
engaged in power politics; yet, it is important to recognize that the ancients themselves saw their
political and military activities within a socio-cultural framework.
But why the fourth century, from 403 to 338, between the end of the Peloponnesian War
and the intervention of Philip II of Macedon into southern Greek political affairs? Most scholars
concentrate on the previous century, especially the Peloponnesian War years, or on the
Hellenistic period afterwards.7 Why, then, choose these relatively overlooked years in between?

5

Liska 1962, 3.

6

It is not known for certain that Demetrius of Phalerum wrote a treatise on interstate
relations at the end of the fourth century. The oldest manual for alliance practices is Book 7
(“The End of the Six-Fold Policy”) of the late fourth-century Indian philosopher Kautilya’s
Arthashastra.
5

The data presented later in this chapter and in the appendices on the number of alliances should
be some justification for these chronological limits. But for now, compare the frequency of
alliance formation at these different times. The number of known alliances from the first one in
the epigraphical record in the mid-sixth century down to 404 is only 33. The frequency of
alliances over this roughly 150-year period is approximately one every four-and-a-half years. But
over the 66 years (403-338) under review in this study, the number of alliances jumps
significantly to 78. That is a new alliance approximately every ten months, a 530-percent
increase in frequency over the previous period. Conversely, after the Battle of Chaeronea in 338,
there is a precipitous reduction in the number of bilateral alliances. Philip’s institutional
arrangements in the League of Corinth curtailed the practice for the southern Greeks. This
dramatic decrease indicates that there was also a drastic change in the nature of alliance
dynamics. The epigraphist Stephen Lambert notes that there were “significant modifications in
foreign policy objectives in response to the new circumstances and a marked shift of emphasis
from the interstate level of operation to a focus on achieving those objectives through relations
with individual foreigners.”8 Because of the lack of evidence and of the change in the character
of Greek IR, the year 338 is a quite natural terminus. In terms of recorded diplomatic activity,
therefore, 403 to 338 is a period that is incredibly rich in evidence, and it is ironic that scholars

7

Neglect of the fourth century by the leading expert on ancient interstate relations,
Eckstein 2006, 79 (“if we now turn from the fifth century B.C. to the third century B.C.”), is not
unique. Tritle 1997, 3-4 comments on earlier scholars’ perceptions of a “decadent” fourth
century that was in “decline.”
8

Lambert 2012a, 384-385; cf. Tracy 1995, 7-23; Green 2003, 1-7; Chaniotis 2005, 20.
The continuation of Boeotian, Achaean, and Arcadian Leagues, however, indicates that the
Macedonians did not require the dissolution of all multilateral organizations.
6

neglect it as much as they do. Furthermore, this decision is dialectical: this period provides many
and varied examples for the discourse of ancient Greek IR, which has of late stagnated with its
focus on the political and military activities in the fifth century and Hellenistic period. But a shift
to the intervening years adds fresh material and reveals more variety in alliance dynamics than
the conventional approaches often allow.
With the perspective, methodology, and chronological delimitations established, this
introductory chapter begins with a review of the modern literature on interstate alliances in IR
and in historical studies. The traditional view of scholarship in both fields holds to the balanceof-power (BOP) interpretation, which asserts that ancient Greek alliances, like modern ones,
were military defense pacts designed to obstruct any one state from acquiring disproportional
power and to maintain geopolitical stability. But in recent decades the state of alliance studies
has grown much larger and now includes a variety of alternative models to BOP, few of which
have gained much currency among scholars of antiquity, who continue to espouse the BOP
interpretation of alliances. This chapter offers a critique of both traditional and alternative
models as interpretative lenses for viewing ancient Greek alliances.
The second half of the chapter looks at the definitions of and motivations for alliances.
Throughout their history the Greeks made use of different vocabulary to describe their alliances,
until they settled in the fourth century upon συµµαχία (fighting together). Although a prima facie
military term, συµµαχία held both practical and ideological connotations. And the primary
thematic justifications (reciprocity, helping friends, helping the wronged, kinship), which the
Greeks themselves posed for military action, reinforce the point that they engaged in interstate
activity on the basis of both political and non-political considerations. Thus, by considering the
matter in its own context, in the perceptions of contemporaries, a more variable scenario of
7

alliance dynamics emerges than what is traditionally allowed in the politics-only paradigm. This
chapter closes with a summary of the following chapters which continue to build on these points.

Modern Scholarship on Interstate Alliances

Alliance studies took off in the twentieth century, but one can trace their intellectual
descent back much earlier to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Early political thinkers,
such as Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, conceived of alliances in terms of a balance of
power (BOP) theory. By BOP they meant that stability in international affairs is dependent upon
a roughly equal distribution of power (among the larger European states, that is).9 Whenever the
power of one state grows disproportionately and endangers the existing geopolitical equilibrium,
then those who are directly threatened will enter into a formal military alliance in order to
obstruct that state and restore the status quo. The Scottish philosopher David Hume built on these
ideas in his essay “On the Balance of Power,” which traces the influence of BOP upon interstate
alliances across Western history. Convinced that BOP represents a natural condition, he began
with the assumption that the ancient Greeks were also cognizant of its presence – “the maxim of
preserving the balance of power is founded so much on common sense and obvious reasoning,
that it is impossible it could altogether have escaped antiquity.”10 Through anecdotal evidence –
anti-Athenian alliances during the Peloponnesian War and the Athenian-Theban alliances in the

9

History of BOP: Sheehan 1996, 24-52; Haslam 2002, 89-127. Kaufman, Little, and
Wohlforth 2007, a product of a World History perspective, challenges BOP’s transcultural
relevance.
10

Reprinted in Hume 1987, 339-348.
8

fourth century, for example – he determined that the Greeks not only acknowledged BOP but
actively sought to preserve it through their many interstate alliances. Of course, in writing this
essay he had his contemporary context in mind and expected that BOP would exert its
moderating influence upon the European affairs of his day just as it did, so he thought, for a time
on the Greek world.11
To jump ahead a couple of centuries, these ideas became guides for early Realist
scholars. Realism posits that pragmatism and self-interest direct foreign policy decisions. Being
in a naturally competitive environment, state actors intervene in international affairs only to
maximize their geopolitical standing (relative to all others) and to ensure their national security –
which makes one question how, in these zero-sum conditions, true collective action can ever
come about. Hans Morgenthau, the father of “Classical” Realism, recognized this conceptual
hurdle and, building upon Hume’s ideas with a greater degree of theoretical refinement and a
distinct emphasis on power politics, devoted a full chapter in his Politics Among Nations to BOP
and alliances. BOP, “a natural and inevitable outgrowth of the struggle for power . . . [serves as]
a protective device of an alliance of nations, anxious for their independence, against another
nation’s designs for world domination.”12 This was a view that harmonized with the Cold War
environment that shaped and was shaped by Morgenthau’s Realist ideas.

11

Subsequent treatments of Greek alliances (Brougham [reprinted in Forsyth, KeensSoper, and Savigear 2008, 260-274]; Philipson 1911, 102-108; Jaeger 1938, 218 n. 2) rested
more on the authority of Hume than ancient sources.
12

Morgenthau 1948, 137. Morgenthau and Classical Realism: Guilhot 2008, 281-304;
Scheuerman 2009; Jackson and Sørensen 2016, 62-71. Carr 1946 predates Morgenthau’s Politics
and was written from a British perspective. History of BOP as political theory: Sheehan 1996;
Little 2007a.
9

Later Realists perpetuated Morgenthau’s “iron laws” of BOP. George Liska,
Morgenthau’s associate at the University of Chicago and author of Nations in Alliance, the first
full-length monograph on this topic, also underscored the regulatory influence of BOP – “an
alliance is a means of reducing the impact of antagonistic power, perceived as pressure, which
threatens one’s independence.”13 Although Liska broadened the subject to include the
management and dissolution phases of the alliance life-cycle, his fundamental hermeneutical
insight was the same as Morgenthau’s, the influence of power politics on alliance dynamics.
BOP survived and became more distinct in Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics, a
reformulation of Classical Realism which has come to be known as Neorealism (or Structural
Realism). Because he adds the systemic attribute of anarchy (the absence of any supranational
regulatory institution to supervise the behavior of individual states), Waltz at the same time
elevates the indispensability of BOP, a natural, predictable course correction to any destabilizing
element in the international structure. In this scenario, alliances are nothing more than temporary
defense mechanisms to preserve BOP and are thus no longer necessary to maintain once the
mutual threat has passed and balance has been restored.14 This narrative of power dynamics in
the alliance process is what has permeated modern scholarship of ancient Greece.
With abundant anecdotal and theoretical support, Realist scholars inextricably
intertwined the concept of BOP with the study of alliances, until their correlation became
axiomatic. It was predictable, therefore, that this allegedly ahistorical principle would capture the

13

Liska 1962, 26-27; cf. 1998 passim.

14

Waltz 1979, 102-128. Little 2007a critiques Morgenthau’s and Watz’s BOP models.
Nexon 2009, 330-359 reviews more recent scholarship.
10

imaginations of those studying ancient Greek IR. Piero Treves and Robin Seager, for example,
make great use of BOP in their respective publications.15 The concept saturates Frank E. Adcock
and D. J. Mosley’s Diplomacy in Ancient Greece, as reflected in the following excerpt.
“The defensive treaties which were signed by Athens and Corcyra in 433 and by Athens and
Boeotia in 395, whilst they mentioned no specific enemy, were conceived specifically to counter
the activities of Corinth and Sparta respectively and so could not be expected to persist. The great
Athenian naval alliances of the fifth and fourth centuries were, in origin, specifically directed
against Persia and Sparta respectively; they were not conceived between friends as alliances
which were to cover a variety of contingencies, although Athens sought in practice to take
advantage of the alliances for other purposes.”16

This passage echoes the Realist insistence that alliances are products of unifying threats and
therefore negative agreements – as in Liska’s famous remark that “alliances are against, and only
derivatively for, someone or something.”17 Likewise, in two articles devoted specifically to
classical Greek alliances, the historian Barry Strauss argues that, except in very few cases, the
Greeks routinely entered into alliances to maintain BOP:
“On any reading, the vast majority of poleis which sought allies did so for the purpose of
balancing. In case after case, the sources state that polis A sought an alliance with polis B to
protect it against the threat of polis C.”18

Similar assessments can be found throughout the works of Philip Harding (“balance-of-power
politics was Athens’ preferred method of dealing with the Greek states on the mainland”), Arthur
Eckstein (alliances are results of “shifting and complex balances of power between ferociously
independent polities”), Peter Hunt (“balance-of-power considerations often required shifts of

15

Treves 1970; Seager 1974, 36-63.

16

Adcock and Mosley 1975, 137.

17

Liska 1962, 12.

18

Strauss 1991, 196; cf. 1997, 127-140.
11

alignment even at the expense of treaty obligations and the friendships they often formalized”),
and many others.19 Clearly, there is a general agreement among scholars as to the applicability of
the BOP concept to classical Greek alliances.
In spite of this consensus, however, the present study begins by questioning whether the
theory of BOP, which was never articulated in print before the fifteenth century, is indeed
appropriate for an emic appreciation of the Greek alliances.20 Did the Greeks, as Hume
maintained, recognize BOP’s invisible hand in their alliances? Did they, as Realists suppose,
take into account systemic features and acknowledge the potential of alliances to correct
imbalances in the international structure? If so, what evidence is there in the ancient sources?
In response to these questions, many scholars point to a passage in Demosthenes’ For the
Megalopolitans. Part of the Athenian orator’s case for an anti-Spartan alliance with the
Megalopolitans in 353 rests on reasoning that comes very close to BOP:
“Surely then no one would dispute that it is for the advantage of the city that both the Spartans
and these Thebans are weak. Therefore, if one should judge from the words which you have oft
spoken, the state of affairs now lies in such an opportunity as this: the Thebans will become weak
when Orchomenus, Thespiae and Plataea are refounded, but if the Spartans put Arcadia under
their power and destroy Megalopolis, they will become strong again.”21
οὐκοῦν οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς ἀντείποι ὡς οὐ συµφέρει τῇ πόλει καὶ Λακεδαιµονίους ἀσθενεῖς εἶναι καὶ
Θηβαίους τουτουσί. ἔστι τοίνυν ἔν τινι τοιούτῳ καιρῷ τὰ πράγµατα νῦν, εἴ τι δεῖ τοῖς εἰρηµένοις
πολλάκις παρ᾽ ὑµῖν λόγοις τεκµήρασθαι, ὥστε Θηβαίους µὲν Ὀρχοµενοῦ καὶ Θεσπιῶν καὶ
Πλαταιῶν οἰκισθεισῶν ἀσθενεῖς γενέσθαι, Λακεδαιµονίους δ᾽, εἰ ποιήσονται τὴν Ἀρκαδίαν ὑφ᾽
ἑαυτοῖς καὶ Μεγάλην πόλιν ἀναιρήσουσι, πάλιν ἰσχυροὺς γενήσεσθαι.

19

Harding 1995, 108-109 (reiterated in Harding 2015, 36-37); Eckstein 2006, 75-76 (cf.
Eckstein 2008); Hunt 2010, 162; cf. Christ 2012, 118-125.
20

Lendon 2002, 375-394 reviews the “primitivist vs. modernist” debate over the
compatibility of modern theory and ancient history. Malchow 2016, 115-122 discusses the “tooeasy application” of anecdotes from classical Greece as “historical ‘evidence’ for many
conflicting, indeed contradictory, schools of IR thought.”
21

Dem. 16.4. All translations are the author’s unless otherwise noted.
12

This passage contains a complex plan of alliances with multiple small powers in Boeotia and in
the Peloponnesus, in order to obstruct the encroachment of the larger powers in those same areas.
This sounds very much like a BOP strategy. Taking the speech as a whole, however, there are
apparent inconsistencies and incompatible suggestions. Later, Demosthenes, the proxenos of the
Thebans, reverses his policy with respect to Boeotia and advocates collaboration with the
Thebans against the Spartans, even recommending that the Athenians abandon their claims to
Oropus, an old bone of contention with their northern neighbors.22 Then, in the final sentence of
a case that has been built largely on concerns of Realpolitik, he concludes with an appeal to the
social norm of helping the weak:
“Therefore, men of Athens, by the gods, I have spoken, with no affection or hatred in me for
either side, what I consider advantageous to you; I advise you not to give up the Megalopolitans,
and besides never to sacrifice any of the lesser to the greater.”23

ἐγὼ µὲν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, µὰ τοὺς θεοὺς οὔτε φιλῶν οὐδετέρους οὔτε µισῶν ἰδίᾳ
εἴρηκα, ἀλλ᾽ ἃ νοµίζω συµφέρειν ὑµῖν: καὶ παραινῶ µὴ προέσθαι Μεγαλοπολίτας, µηδ᾽
ἄλλον ἁπλῶς µηδένα τῶν ἐλαττόνων τῷ µείζονι.
If Demosthenes had any conception of BOP, it was indistinct. Rather than confirming an
appreciation of the principle, his speech complicates the matter by raising a variety of political
and non-political issues. The orator advocates paths of competition and collaboration with
political rivals. At one point he stresses political advantage, at another the justice of supporting
weak states. And yet, these are not necessarily contradictory policies: helping a weaker polis, for

22

Lane Fox 1997, 181 smartly calls this a strategy of “balance of weakness.” Trevett
2011, 276 and Worthington 2013, 101-103 comment on the practical flaws in Dem. 16. Samotta
2010, 28, 32 employs the imagery of Walt’s balance of threat (see note 28) to interpret
Demosthenes’ geopolitics. Demosthenes and Thebes: Trevett 1999, 184-202; Mack 2015, 114117.
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Dem. 16.32.
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example, places the beneficiary in the position of a debtor and thus works to the political
advantage of the Athenians. In any event, Demosthenes’ case for an alliance with the
Megalopolitans is not indisputable proof of BOP strategy in ancient Greece and rather confirms
the bearing which both political and moral concerns had in alliance choices of the fourth century.
On this point of the possibility of BOP’s operation in ancient history, Herbert Butterfield
once remarked, “more than most of our basic political formulas, this one seems to come from the
modern world’s reflections of its own experience.”24 In Balance of Power: History & Theory,
Michael Sheehan can only concede that “while one can detect behaviour in the ancient Greek
system which is analogous to balance of power behaviour, it was not self-consciously done for
that purpose.”25 And historian Andrew Wolpert agrees: “no doubt there is a certain overlap
between such concerns and the logic of power politics. Yet these internal concerns and
constraints prevented the Greek cities from creating a system resembling balance of power.”26 As
a political theory, therefore, BOP, if it existed at all, went unacknowledged in ancient Greece.
And if the actors themselves were unaware of its presence, then one should question how
germane it is as one – not to mention the only – interpretative theory for ancient Greek alliances.
Fortunately, in recent decades there have appeared, even within the Realist (or Neorealist) camp,
a number of nuanced alternatives to the traditional paradigm.
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Wolpert 2001, 79. Wight 1973, 86-87 observed the same structural constraints. Little
2007b, 47-66 disputes the applicability of BOP to fifth-century Greece. Murnane 2002, 101-111
makes the same objections to BOP in ancient Egypt.
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In The Origins of Alliances, Stephen Walt, although a student of Kenneth Waltz, disputes
BOP and introduces a “balance of threat” model, which sees alliances as responses to perceived
aggression from other states. “Although power is an important part of the equation,” Walt
observes of alliances in the Middle East from 1955 to 1979, “it is not the only one. It is more
accurate to say that states tend to ally with or against the foreign power that poses the greatest
threat.”27 Since a threat need not have any correlation to actual capabilities and resources, it is on
the basis of perceptions that threatened states form alliances. Despite this theoretical refinement,
Walt’s model still supports the Realist reading of interstate behavior according to the concerns of
national security and relative political advancement. Glen Snyder also challenges BOP and its
inherent pessimism. Depicting alliances as formal expressions of informal alignments that may
or may not be military in nature, Snyder’s Alliance Politics makes a case that alliances “are often
very durable; as relationships they are certainly more durable than the interactions by which they
‘form and dissolve.’”28 Instead of isolated military defense pacts that are discarded once the
limited objective has been accomplished, Snyder insists that alliance relationships can persist
because, through the entire alliance experience, the participating states develop new, common
interests, which in turn provide a basis for future collaboration.
More directly opposed to BOP are the models of bandwagoning and chain-ganging. A
representative of the former is Randall Schweller, who considers an alliance to be an
opportunistic tool by which states, with no concern for the equal distribution of power, can make
geopolitical advances. He argues that the act of bandwagoning, aligning with a stronger power, is
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Walt 1987, 21. Weitsman 2003 follows Walt but argues that the threats are more often
from within the alliances than from without.
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Snyder 1997, 22.
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a less expensive way to make those advances – on a stronger power’s coattails, as it were – than
balancing against that same power and putting the very survival of the state at risk.29 Examples
of this phenomenon include the eastern European states that joined Nazi Germany in World War
II, or the many Greek poleis that medized during the Persian Wars. Chain-ganging explains
situations in which one state’s existing alliance partners determine its foreign policy decisions.
This happens mostly within multilateral alliances, such as was the case for the alliance choices of
the European nations in the prelude to World War I or of the Aegean members in the Second
Athenian Confederacy who agreed to certain alliances based on the example of their hegemon.30
Although each of these alternative approaches have distinctive emphases, at their most
fundamental reading, they all share the view that it is political power considerations that
determine the essential character of alliances. Socio-cultural concerns are of little or no
importance.
Outside of the Realist school, however, stand Liberalism (or Liberal Institutionalism) and
Constructivism. The former criticizes Realism’s inability to explain collective action which takes
place outside of the realm of conflict. If Waltz’s Neorealism, for example, encompassed all
aspects of relations between states, Liberal Robert O. Keohane objects, “alliance cooperation
would be easy to explain as a result of the operation of a balance of power, but system-wide
patterns of cooperation that benefit many countries without being tied to an alliance system
directed against an adversary would not.”31 Liberals pose that not all alliances arise because of
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Schweller 1994, 93.

30

Christensen and Snyder 1990, 137-168.
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Keohane 1984, 7; cf. Keohane and Nye 1977; 2000.
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fears of a political or military menace. There are formal alliances which materialize on the basis
of mutual and absolute (rather than relative) advantages extending from interstate cooperation,
especially but not exclusively in the economic sphere. In other words, the activity of microactors on the domestic level and of nongovernmental institutions play a large part in determining
a state’s foreign alignments. This bottom-up approach to IR diminishes BOP’s relevance as a
comprehensive explanation for alliances.
Constructivism, on the other hand, sees alliances not in terms of BOP determinism or of
the potential of mutual advantage but of historical interactions and social relations between
states.32 Constructivists resist representations of a static international structure (“Anarchy is what
states make of it” is the title of a well-known article by Constructivist Alexander Wendt) and
assert that the fundamental nature of international relations is social not material. Dynamic
networks of informal relationships – in the social as well as the political sphere – and how they
are represented have the capacity to construct common ideas and identities, which in turn create
formal alliances.33 Constructivists can agree with Realists that national interests play a role in
alliance formation, but they add that those interests are malleable and can be transformed from
individual state interests into collective ones through the alliance process – in the way the
alliance is represented in words and in images, the performance of traditional rituals, and the
shared political and military activities.34
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Onuf 1989; Fierke and Jorgensen. 2015. Constructivism and classical Greece: Lebow
2007, 351-378; Zumbrunnen 2015, 296-312. Constructivism and ancient Rome: Burton 2011.
The peer-polity interaction model, like Constructivism, emphasizes “structural homologies,”
products of concrete and symbolic interstate interactions (Ma 2003, 9-39; Mack 2015, 190-232).
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Recently, a number of scholars of ancient Greece have employed these alternative models
in their works. In Les relations entre états dans le Grèce antique du temps d'Homère à
l'intervention romaine (ca. 700-200 av. J.-C.), the Swiss historian Adalberto Giovannini
downgrades the alleged impact of constant warfare and hegemonic threats, focusing instead on
the general (social, moral, religious) and practical (diplomatic) aspects of interstate activity. He
regards these as fundamental contributors to the creation of un système d'Etats pluraliste, a
complex system of accepted rules and principles governing ancient Greek IR.35 Similarly, Polly
Low’s Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power places a great deal of
emphasis on a “normative framework,” which shaped the conduct of interstate activity in the
classical Greek period. Despite the absence of any straightforward articulations of IR principles
from any ancient Greek writer, Low still extrapolates from the historical and epigraphical record
a set of normative guidelines which, she maintains, the Greeks consciously observed. In place of
a cutthroat environment dominated solely by power grabs, Low highlights the force of social and
moral considerations, such as reciprocity and justice, on how poleis interacted.36
Moving away from these attempts to uncover some proto-IR model in ancient Greece,
Peter Hunt’s War, Peace, and Alliance in Demosthenes’ Athens examines the surviving speeches
delivered in the Athenian assembly in the mid-fourth century for indications of what the Greeks
thought they were doing when they engaged in interstate activity. He avoids the cynical
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Suh 2007 uses the United States-Korean military alliance as a test case to argue that an
alliance has the power to define the identity of both allies and enemies.
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Giovannini 2007. Van Wees 2004, 6-18 also employs the concept of a “society of
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Low 2007.

states.”
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methodologies common in modern scholarship that “seek to unmask, to debunk, the stated
grounds for war . . . and locate the real causes of war elsewhere: for example, in amoral
calculations of interest, in economic advantage, or in a militaristic culture.”37 Because he accepts
at face-value the arguments put forth in the contemporary speeches, he is not so absolute in his
reading of Greek interstate behavior. Instead, he is able to take into account, as the Athenian
orators did, both moral and political motives for the alliances, the approach closest to the one for
the current study.
The bibliographical review of the last few pages illustrates the futility of a one-size-fitsall approach to alliances. The topic is too extensive for there to be some unified field theory.
Although each model has its own positive contribution, it is inconceivable that each would be
universally applicable. The rigid imposition of one theory to the exclusion of all others fails to
capture the variety from case to case. Nor do the majority of modern models sufficiently
acknowledge the non-political determinants which the ancient records often highlight. Power
politics certainly played a part in the fourth-century Greek alliances, but so also did social,
moral, ideational, and religious features. This study, therefore, seeks rather to problematize (or to
rectify) the matter by following a more eclectic, Weberian style of inquiry that reintegrates the
political and non-political aspects of alliance dynamics.38

Defining Alliances
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Hunt 2010, 3.
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Notice the recent trend to amalgamate theories such as in the Realist-Constructivist
model of Jackson et al. 2004; Barkin 2010.
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But what is an interstate alliance? There should be a relatively simple answer to this
question. Yet, despite all of the work that has already been done, modern scholars are unable to
agree on a concise and cogent definition.39 The ancient Greeks, too, it turns out, lacked a
comprehensive definition or consistent titular designation. In the fourth century, they used almost
exclusively the military word συµµαχία (fighting together), but earlier they reached for domestic
and religious metaphors as well. A brief overview of alliance terminology exposes the embedded
socio-cultural features in the alliances.
Homer, like his Near Eastern predecessors, characterizes alliances with a variety of terms
from συνθεσία (covenant) to φιλότης (friendship) or ὁρκία τάµνειν (to cut oaths).40 In the
epigraphical record, the earliest alliances were designated as φιλία (friendship), such as the one
from the mid-sixth century between the Anaitoi and the Metapioi, two otherwise unknown
communities:
The agreement between the Anaitoi and the Metapioi: friendship for fifty years. And if either side
violates the compact, let both the protectors and the priests expel them from the altar. If they
41
transgress the oath, judgment shall belong to the priest at Olympia.
Ἀ ϝράτρα τὸς Ἀναίτο[ς] καὶ τὸ[ς] Μεταπίος. φιλίαν πεντάκοντα
ϝέτεα. κ᾽ ὀπόπαροι µἐνπεδέοιαν ἀπὸ το̂ βοµο̂ ἀποϝελέοιάν κα τοὶ
39

Whereas Morgenthau 1948 posed multiple meanings, Liska 1962 proffered not even
one. Walt 1987, 12-13 follows a broad representation of both “a formal or informal arrangement
of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.” Snyder 1997, 4 limits his
definition to “formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military force.” Bergsmann
2001, 25-26 notes at least thirty-five different definitions.
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Hom. Od. 16.427 uses ἄρθµιοι (united in friendship; cf. Bauslaugh 1991, 59-60) for the
union between the Ithacans and Thesprotians. Taillardat 1982, 1-14; Karavites 1992, 48-81;
Panessa 1999, 23-30; Cohen 2001, 27-30. Zaccagnini 2002, 141-153 and Podany 2010
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πρόξενοι καὶ τοὶ µάντιερ̣· αἰ τὸ[ν] ὄρκον παρβαίνοιαν, γνο̂µαν τὸρ
ἰα[ρ]οµάορ̣ τ᾽ Ὀλυνπίαι.

The articles of this φιλία-alliance, even in their rudimentary form, resemble elements of later,
fourth-century συµµαχίαι-alliances: a duration (fifty years) and a clause specifying the
punishment of religious exclusion for any transgressions of the unrecorded terms. Also, the
treaty was recorded on a bronze tablet and placed at a sacred site (Olympia). Unfortunately, the
text gives no indication of the responsibilities expected of the allies.
There is also a contemporary φιλότης-alliance between the Sybarites and their allies
(σύνµαχοι) with the Serdaioi:
The Sybarites and their allies and the Serdaioi agreed to friendship faithful and without deceit
forever. The protectors are Zeus, Apollo, the other gods, and the city of Poseidonia.42
ἀρµόχθεν οἱ Συβαρίται κ' oἱ σύνµαχοι κ' oἱ
Σερδαίοι ἐπὶ φιλότατι πιστᾶι κ᾽ἀδόλοι ἀείδιον· πρόξενοι ὀ Ζεὺς κ᾽ Ὀπόλον κ᾽ὀλλοι θεοὶ καὶ πόλις Ποσειδανία.

This text, also recorded on a bronze tablet and deposited at Olympia, is not quite as detailed as
the earlier one. There is an explicit mention of the alliance’s duration – in this case, forever
(ἀείδιον) – and an implicit mention of a religious punishment from the πρόξενοι gods for any
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SdA 120 (= ML10; cf. Bauslaugh 1991, 56-57; Panessa 1999, 92-101; Bolmarcich
2010, 117-119). Lombardo 2008, 49-60 reviews possible dates for the treaty. Wheeler 1984, 254255 (reiterated in 2008, 57-84 and supported by Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 199-201)
considers the inclusion of ἀδόλως, which he calls an “anti-deceit clause,” to be a reaction to
sophistic interpretations of the treaties. Gazzano 2002, 12-13; 2005, 1-33, however,
incorporating literary evidence as well as epigraphical, replies that the Greeks relied on more
practical measures than oaths to guarantee loyalty. Bolmarcich 2007a, 31-36 thinks the oaths
were flexible, allowing for unforeseen circumstances that might necessitate noncompliance with
an alliance.
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violation of the treaty. This text also fails to mention the expected duties of the new allies, and it
is impossible to determine how they might be different for the Sybarites’ new φιλότης-ally than
for their preexisting but unspecified σύνµαχοι.43 As for the latter relationship, the inscription for
the late sixth-century alliance between the Eleans and Heraeans mentions it for the first time in a
state document in the lexical form of συνµαχία:
The agreement of the Eleans and the Heraeans. There will be an alliance for one hundred years. It
will begin from this year. If there is any need, either in word or in deed, they shall stand together
in all things, especially in war. If they do not stand together, the wrong-doers shall pay a talent of
silver to Olympian Zeus for dedication. If anyone does harm to this writing, whether the
community or an official or private citizen, he shall be liable to the sacred penalty which here is
44
written down.
ἀ ϝράτρα τοῖρ Ϝαλείοις ∶ καὶ τοῖς Ἐρϝαό¯ιοις ∶ συνµαχία κ’ ἔα ἐκατὸν ϝέτεα ∶
ἄρχοι δέ κα τοΐ ∶ αἰ δέ τι δέοι ∶ αἴτε ϝέπος αἴτε ϝάργον ∶ συνέαν κ’ ἀλ(λ)άλοις ∶ τά τ’ ἄλ(λ)<α> καὶ παρ πολέµο¯ ∶ αἰ δὲ µὰ συνέαν ∶ τάλαντόν κ’
ἀργύρο¯ ∶ ἀποτίνοιαν ∶ τοῖ Δὶ Ὀλυνπίοι ∶ τοὶ κα(δ)δαλέ¯µενοι ∶ λατρειό¯µενον ∶ αἰ δέ τιρ τὰ γράφεα ∶ ταῒ κα(δ)δαλέοιτο ∶ αἴτε ϝέτας αἴτε τελεστὰ ∶ αἴτε δᾶµος ∶ ἐν τἐ¯πιάροι κ’ ἐνέχοιτο τοἰνταυτ’ ἐγραµ(µ)ένοι.

This agreement retains the earlier clauses designating the duration (100 years), a monetary fine
for violating the treaty, and a religious punishment for defacing the inscription – which was also
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Bauslaugh 1991, 60-64 suggests that a φιλία, unlike a συµµαχία, did not express clear
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on a bronze tablet, with nail holes for its display on a temple wall at Olympia. But there is a new
feature that will become a principal element of fourth-century alliance treaties. This is the
generalized mutual defense clause (“if there is any need, either in word or in deed, they shall
stand together in all things, especially in war”), which highlights collaboration in war (παρ
πολέµο¯) but leaves open the possibility for other unspecified cooperative activities (τά τ’ ἄλλα).
The wide range indicates that the signatories considered their συνµαχία to be more than just a
military pact and saw it embracing collaboration in any activity – social, economic, religious, or
otherwise. Although συνµαχία is a noun associated with military imagery, it still evidently
contained deep socio-cultural meaning.
Nor did these features disappear from fifth-century records. Herodotus, for example, calls
the Lydian king Croesus a φίλος καὶ σύµµαχος (or ξένος καὶ σύµµαχος) of the Spartans and the
Egyptian king Amasis the same of the Cyrenaeans, and adds that these relationships rested on
traditional practices such as gift-exchange in the former and a marriage alliance in the latter.45 In
the epigraphical record, φιλία καὶ συµµαχία characterizes Athenian alliances with the Bottiaeans
(422), Halicyaeans (418), Perdiccas of Macedon (sometime between the 430s and 413), and the
Carthaginians (406).46 Others are identified as ὅρκος καὶ συµµαχία, as in the Athenian alliances
with the Rhegians and the Leontinians in 433. Both treaties reflect the strong religious character
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Croesus and Spartans: Hdt. 1.69.2-70.1; cf. Panessa 1999, 76-81. Amasis and
Cyrenaeans: Hdt. 2.181.1; cf. Panessa 1999, 73-75. Alliance terminology: Adcock and Mosley
1975, 122, 186-193; Bederman 2001, 159-165; Orsi 2002, 71-109; Bolmarcich 2010, 115-125.
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Bottiaeans: IG I3 76, line 17; cf. Panessa 1999, 257-263. Halicyaeans: 12, line 3; cf.
Panessa 1999, 237-239. Perdiccas: 89, line 58; cf. Panessa 1999, 250-253. Carthage: 123, line
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of Athenian alliances. The one with the Rhegians, for example, opens with a traditional
invocation of the gods (θεοἱ) and contains instructions for the swearing of an oath along with
what looks like the beginning of a mutual defense clause: “as allies we shall be trustworthy and
just and strong and innocuous forever to the Rhegians and we shall be bound if . . . [χσύµµ̣αχοι
ἐσόµεθα πιστοὶ καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ ἰσχυροὶ καὶ ἀβλαβε͂ς ἐς ἀίδιον Ῥεγίνοις καὶ ὀφελέσοµεν ἐάν τ].”47 Language such as this highlights the strong association between the new allies. It is hard to
interpret these alliances as only provisional military pacts. Other fifth-century alliances are called
χσυνθέκας καὶ χσυµµαχίαν καὶ ℎόρκος (compact and alliance and oath) (Athenian-Halieian
alliance in 424?) or χσυµµαχίαν καὶ χσυνθέκας (Athenian-Argive alliance in 416).48
Most alliances prior to the fourth century, therefore, had a dual characterization that
juxtaposed military and non-military aspects. The obligations, however, if spelled out at all in the
treaties, were usually ambiguous or unspecified. The one exception to this is ἐπιµαχία, a purely
defensive alliance. Thucydides writes that in 433 the Athenians felt justified in entering an
ἐπιµαχία with the Corycraeans because, not requiring joint participation in any Corcyraean
offensive attack on the Corinthians, it respected their earlier peace treaty (σπονδαί) with the
Peloponnesians. Under the terms of an ἐπιµαχία, both the Athenians and Corcyraeans would be
mutually obligated only “to help each other if someone went against Corcyra, Athens, or any of
their allies [τῇ ἀλλήλων βοηθεῖν, ἐάν τις ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν ἴῃ ἢ Ἀθήνας ἢ τοὺς τούτων
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Rhegians: IG I3 53 (= ML 63). Leontinians: 54 (= ML 64); cf. Egestans: 11 (= ML 37).
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Halieians: IG I3 75. Argives: 86.
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ξυµµάχους].”49 A συµµαχία, on the other hand, being an offensive and defensive alliance, would
have required collaborative action in an ally’s offensive attacks on an enemy.
This fine distinction became obscure in the fourth century, when even the strictly
defensive alliances were called συµµαχία.50 No one has explained why this was the case. Perhaps
the growing standardization of treaty content (see Chapter II) made abundantly clear the precise
nature of each particular alliance and thus eliminated the need for distinct titular terminology. All
the same, in most cases συµµαχία, no longer attended by another noun, was the regular
descriptor. In Hermann Bengtson’s extensive collection of state documents, Die Staatsverträge
des Altertums (SdA), between 403 and 338 there are sixty-six interstate alliances (Bündnisse). Of
those sixty-six, fifty-three are συµµαχία, four συνθήκη καὶ συµµαχία, four συνθήκη, three φιλία
καὶ συµµαχία, one εἰρήνη καὶ φιλία, and one φιλία.51 Philip Harding’s compilation From the End
of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsus includes only one more, the Athenian-Thasian
συµµαχία of 390. Neither Marcus Tod’s earlier Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, John
Wickersham and Gerald Verbrugghe’s The Fourth Century B.C., nor Peter J. Rhodes and Robin
Osborne’s more recent Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 BC add any other examples.
These volumes, however, are not exhaustive. To their catalogues others can be added
from Appendix A: ten more of συµµαχία (A7, A8, A14, A15, S1, S3, S4, S8, S10, and S11) and
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Thuc. 1.44.1; cf. Ste. Croix 1972, 328; Adcock and Mosley 1975, 191-193; Karavites
1982, 30-32; Bederman 2001, 161-165. In Thuc. 5.48.2 the Corinthians say that their ἐπιµαχία
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3.1280b27; [Dem.] 12.7).
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two of φιλία καὶ συµµαχία (A5, A6). These raise the overall number of known alliances at this
time to seventy-eight: sixty-three of συµµαχία, five of φιλία καὶ συµµαχία, four of συνθήκη καὶ
συµµαχία, four of συνθήκη, one of εἰρήνη καὶ φιλία, and one of φιλία. The high relative
percentage of συµµαχία’s appearance for fourth-century alliances is illustrated in the following
chart:
Figure 1: Greek Words for Interstate Alliances (403-338)

Although there was a clear nomenclatural preference, this does not suggest that nonpolitical aspects were completely absent from how the Greeks in the fourth century understood a
συµµαχία. Those aspects continued to play a principal role but now they were embedded within
the word συµµαχία. The word as well as the phenomenon contained nuance. Although prima
facie συµµαχία is associated as a military term and its English translation, “interstate alliance,”
raises political imagery, the Greeks understood that it was more than just a temporary politicomilitary pact. A closer look in the next few pages at a few of the thematic justifications voiced by
contemporaries for their συµµαχίαι, in the next chapter at the content of the alliance treaties, and
26

in the remaining chapters at the specific operation of alliance relationships reveals the deep
appreciation which the Greeks had for the social and cultural factors in their alliances.

Justifying Alliances

Upon what grounds, then, did the poleis justify their alliance choices? Perhaps the most
pervasive influence was reciprocity, a principle that governed the social and political interactions
of the Greeks in their domestic and interstate spheres. “The dominant ordering principle of the
interstate interactions of the classical period,” writes Polly Low, “is bilateral relations formed on
a basis of reciprocity.”52 This dominant principle, however, was rarely articulated in specific
terms. Richard Seaford opens the volume Reciprocity in Ancient Greece with a working
definition: “Reciprocity is the principle and practice of voluntary requital, of benefit for benefit
(positive reciprocity) or harm for harm (negative reciprocity).”53 The obligations were simple yet
profound. For this give-and-take practice created tangible as well as sentimental ties between the
poleis that lasted beyond the initial act of beneficence. The voluntary requital, in the form of gifts
or services, was not terminal but created further obligations (prestations), thus perpetuating the
cycle of giving and receiving. That is, an initial good turn placed the receiver in the position of a
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Low 2007, 36-37; cf. Blundell 1989, 26-59; Gill, Postlethwaite and Seaford 1998; Hunt
2010, 185-214.
53

Gill, Postlethwaite, and Seaford 1998, 1. Gould 2001, 283-303 thinks the Greeks
understood the “grammar” of reciprocity. Braund 1998, 159-180, however, sees reciprocity
being more problematic and frequently misinterpreted.
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debtor who was then required by convention to repay that debt with another good turn, and so
on.
Nearly every alliance discussed in this study exhibits reciprocity in some form or another.
For example, when the Athenians accepted an alliance proposal from the Boeotians in 395 (A1),
the Athenian Thrasybulus of Steiria announced that “they would run the risk to return a favor to
them greater than the one they received [in 404]. ‘For you,’ he said, ‘did not join in the [Spartan]
campaign against us [in 403], but we will fight with you against them if they should come
against you.’ [παρακινδυνεύσοιεν χάριτα αὐτοῖς ἀποδοῦναι µείζονα ἢ ἔλαβον. ὑµεῖς µὲν γάρ,
ἔφη, οὐ συνεστρατεύσατε ἐφ᾽ ἡµᾶς, ἡµεῖς δέ γε µεθ᾽ ὑµῶν µαχούµεθα ἐκείνοις, ἂν ἴωσιν ἐφ᾽
ὑµᾶς].”54 Similar considerations lie behind the two later Athenian-Theban alliances (A12, A23).
The long Spartan alliance with Dionysius I of Syracuse (S1) began and continued with the
reciprocal exchange of money, manpower, and other services. The Spartan alliance with the
Persian satrap Ariobarzanes in 366 (S7) operated on the exchange of money (from Ariobarzanes)
and manpower (from the Spartans). Some treaties (A15, A18, A20) declare that the Athenians
agreed to an alliance because a certain citizen from the other polis was a “good man” (ἀνὴρ
ἀγαθὸς) to the Athenians, moral terminology that goes back to Homer – whatever the precise
nature of that good man’s act, the Athenians considered it worthy of a return in the form of an
alliance.55 The mutuality of the ubiquitous defense clauses (see Chapter II), moreover, indicates
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Xen. Hell. 3.5.16. A1 refers to the alliance number found in Appendix A.

55

Low 2007, 143-145; Engen 2010, 121-123. Other examples of ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς include the
Second Athenian Confederacy’s joint alliance with the Corcyraeans, Acarnanians, and
Cephallenians in 375 (IG II² 96, line 7-9) and the Athenians’ συµβολαί agreements with Strato of
Sidon (141, line 6) and the Armenian satrap Orontes (207, line 5).
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that reciprocity continued to play a primary role in the operation and maintenance of alliances.
As a result of such exchanges, there existed among the allies a state of equilibrium, a kind of
balance which the Greeks did recognize and seek to preserve.56
The traditional system of reciprocity was adapted to the creation of alliances through the
agency of interpersonal relationships. Unlike modern diplomacy with its professional specialists
and formal institutions, diplomacy in ancient Greece was a much more personal affair. The
relationships of friendship (φιλία), guest-friendship (ξένια), and proxenia (προξενία) created
personal networks between the poleis.57 These in turn could be exploited when there was a need
for a more binding agreement such as an alliance. In 394, the Athenian Cimon proposed to
include on an alliance embassy to Syracuse a certain Eunomus, a guest-friend of Dionysius I.
Callias, the proxenos of the Spartans in Athens, participated in a number of embassies to Sparta.
Two of the Athenian ambassadors to Thebes in the early 370s, Pyrrhandrus of Anaphlystus and
Thrasybulus of Collytus, were well-known Theban sympathizers (βοιωτιάζοντες).58 Callistratus
of Aphidna, a leading laconophile in Athens, was the principal advocate of an alliance with the
Spartans in 369 (A13). In 339, Demosthenes, a proxenos of the Thebans, was the loudest
advocate for an alliance with the Thebans against Philip (A23). The Chian ambassadors who
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Aeschin. 3.138; cf. APF 239; Steinbock 2013, 257-258. Mitchell 1997, 94 lists all of the known
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arranged the alliance with the Athenians in 384 (A8) were those who shared the intellectual and
political principles of the Athenians. The Byzantines chose a certain Cydon, who was close with
the Athenians, to lead an embassy seeking an alliance with the Athenians (A10).59 The following
chapters discuss many other examples.
Because the parties possessed such intimate contacts, there was a level of trust and
understanding between them that supported the development of their alliances. Demosthenes
indicates this when he speaks of the individuals who “in a private capacity . . . brought whole
poleis, their own native cities, into alliance with us in the war against the Spartans [i.e., the
Corinthian War], both speaking and doing what is in the interest of your polis [ἰδίᾳ . . . οἳ πόλεις
ὅλας, τὰς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδας, συµµάχους ὑµῖν ἐπὶ τοῦ πρὸς Λακεδαιµονίους πολέµου παρέσχον
καὶ λέγοντες ἃ συµφέρει τῇ πόλει τῇ ὑµετέρᾳ καὶ πράττοντες].”60 In fact, there are instances,
albeit few and anomalous, in which prominent individuals concluded alliances without
submitting them to the proper political channels. In the campaign against the Persians from 396
to 394, the Spartan king Agesilaus formed alliances with two of his new friends, Spithridates
(S2) and Otys (S3), without seeking approval from his assembly. In the campaign in northern
Greece and the Aegean in 390 and 389, the Athenian general Thrasybulus made contact with old
friends and associates in the region and arranged alliances with them on his own authority (A4A7). In 366, the Theban Epaminondas, without consulting the Theban authorities, concluded an
alliance with the Achaeans (T6). This level of independence was acceptable to a point because of
the importance of personal diplomacy. Yet, because of factional domestic politics, arranging
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alliances in this manner could be risky business. Thrasybulus’ enemies at home brought him up
on charges, which, even though not directly related to his alliances, threatened to undo all of his
diplomatic achievements.61 Agesilaus, too, seems to have met some resistance at home, but there
is no word of any alliances overturned because of it.62 The Theban assembly overruled
Epaminondas’ alliance with the Achaeans, but in this case, as argued in Chapter V, the failure
was due to the fact that it was not built on a strong foundation of personal contacts. Nevertheless,
the vast majority of Greek alliances passed through the political institutions and thus were
recognized as communal agreements (see Chapter II).
Since the conduct of interstate relations was such a personal activity with a deep respect
for the responsibilities of reciprocity, the Greeks took moral considerations into account much
more seriously than modern states do. One that appears regularly, and has already been
mentioned in the context of Demosthenes’ advocacy for an alliance with the Megalopolitans, is
the obligation to help the wronged (βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουµένοις). Some today dismiss the
possibility of this serving as a genuine motivation for interstate behavior, preferring to view it as
propaganda or, worse, as jiggery-pokery, like the modern promotion of democratic ideals as a
justification for interventionism.63 Whether genuine or manipulative, the frequent appearance of
βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουµένοις in the fourth-century record makes it hard to deny that it was a
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Low 2007, 175-211 believes that social norms permitted intervention in the domestic
affairs of others. Hunt 2010, 95-97 argues the opposite. Christ 2012, 118-176 sees “helping the
wronged” as instrumental only in shaping Athenian civic ideology.
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recognized consideration for alliances. The orator Andocides, for example, says that the
Athenians agreed to the Boeotian alliance in 395 (A1) because “we ourselves were both suffering
a wrong and helping the Boeotians who had been wronged [ἡµεῖς τοίνυν αὐτοί τε ἠδικούµεθα
Βοιωτοῖς τε ἀδικουµένοις ἐβοηθοῦµεν].”64 Demosthenes says that the Athenian alliances with
the Thebans in 378 (A12), the Spartans in 369 (A13), the Euboeans in 357 (cf. A22), and the
Thebans (again) in 339 (A23) were all made with the same object in mind: to save the wronged
(τοὺς ἀδικουµένους σῴζειν).65 Not all testimony is retrospective. The mutual defense clauses,
which appear in the contemporary legal inscriptions, are by definition in line with this behavioral
norm. The clause in the treaty for the Athenian alliance with the Arcadians, Achaeans, Eleans,
and Phliasians in 362 (A17) even includes the phrase βοηθεῖν . . . ἀδικούµενοι.
It also appears to have served as a general policy. Andocides indicates that the Athenians
had the “habitual fault of always setting aside powerful friends and preferring the weak [τὸ
εἰθισµένον κακόν, ὅτι τοὺς κρείττους φίλους ἀφιέντες ἀεὶ τοὺς ἥττους αἱρούµεθα].”66 In the
Panegyricus Isocrates says his countrymen routinely followed a policy of helping the weak, even
when greater alliances were available (µείζους τῶν συµµαχιῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν):
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“But knowing much more precisely than others what comes from such a policy, we nevertheless
were preferring to help the weaker even against our own advantage rather than to do wrong with
the stronger for our own advantage.”67
ἀλλὰ πολὺ τῶν ἄλλων ἀκριβέστερον εἰδότες τὰ συµβαίνοντ᾽ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ὅµως ᾑρούµεθα
τοῖς ἀσθενεστέροις καὶ παρὰ τὸ συµφέρον βοηθεῖν µᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς κρείττοσι τοῦ λυσιτελοῦντος
ἕνεκα συναδικεῖν.

Plato and Demosthenes make similar observations.68 Of course, it is for rhetorical effect that the
orators place such stress on this reputation of the Athenians, but the point is not mute: in the
articulation of their alliances, the Greeks put an accent on moral obligations. The evidence is
abundant for Athenian alliances but there are also indications that other poleis followed the same
principle.69
Claims to kinship (συγγένεια) could also be interpreted as a manipulative device to flatter
and attract another polis to agree to an alliance. But the fact that one polis would base its petition
on such a point, authentic or fictive, and that another would accept it is a strong case for the
significance of kinship diplomacy in alliance choices. “Because there is no parallel for kinship
between states in the modern world,” writes Hans van Wees, “we too may feel skeptical about it
as a motive in war, and we may even be tempted to deny kinship any real role at all. But we
would be wrong.”70 A few examples from the fourth century bear this out. The Chian
ambassadors appealing to the Athenians for an alliance in 384 made no mention to the assembly
of a military threat to their island but rather rested part of their case on their belief in a shared
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ancestry. Whatever the truth of the claim, the Athenians agreed to the alliance (A8). Likewise,
Ephorus (via Diodorus Siculus) says that in 346 the Tarentines sought out an alliance with the
Spartans (S10) and the latter agreed to it because of their kinship ties (διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν
προθύµως ἔχοντες συµµαχῆσαι).71 It is noteworthy that the Tarentines sought out assistance from
their metropolis, even though by midcentury the Spartans had lost a great deal of their political
and military influence in Greek affairs. The extent of one’s capabilities and resources apparently
was not always the sole concern in the selection of alliance partners.
The part which these intersubjective factors (reciprocity, interpersonal relationships,
helping wronged, kinship) played does not harmonize with the traditional paradigm of power
politics. Indeed, Realist-inspired interpretations have difficulty explaining how non-rational
considerations could match or even eclipse rational calculations.72 Of course, it would be a
mistake to think that every alliance rested on nothing more than such noble purposes. Practical,
political concerns existed as well – and this study does not intend to expunge them completely
from the alliance process. But the aggregate of testimony in the contemporary historical
accounts, speeches, and alliance treaties shows that socio-cultural matters played as much a
factor in the Greeks’ alliance calculations as power politics did. It is curious, therefore, that many
today highlight nothing but the political concerns, such as BOP which does not appear in the
ancient texts, and reject the socio-cultural factors which do. In any attempt to understand the
perspective of the ancient Greeks, one should be hesitant to dismiss their voices, especially the
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statements that reappear frequently, as disinformation. “Even if we incline to view many of the
moral pronouncements of the Greeks as propaganda,” cautions Peter Karavites, “we should not
forget that propaganda need not necessarily be always misleading to historians. . . . If the facts
and ideas are irrelevant to the traditions and ideals of the people, alert and socially conscious
people will tend to be wary of them or ignore them, and the effort at persuasion will be doomed
to failure.” Polly Low, too, reasons that “the truth-value of such claims does not have any
necessary bearing on their potential impact on the practical conduct of interstate relations.”73 In
other words, it is important to seek out the perceptions of contemporaries, the method followed
in this study, rather than continuing on the path of following anachronistic models designed more
for the modern world.
The next chapter begins this examination with a review of the general procedures of the
alliance process from conception to conclusion: the proposal, the negotiation and the articulation
of the alliance conditions, and the public display of the agreements. Socio-cultural elements
imbued the legislative procedures involved in creating an alliance. By including the participation
of all citizens, not just one political faction, the matter became one of communal interest. Being
an interstate activity, it also brought the communities of the two poleis together. Through the
work of the ambassadors as well as the performance of ritualistic activities that accompanied the
political procedures, moreover, creating an alliance became a transformative experience for the
participants, bringing them into an even closer state of solidarity.
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Part II covers specific case studies. Since the fourth century saw a great number of
alliances between so many different poleis across the Greek world, for the sake of interpretive
coherence these chapters deliberately concentrate on the bilateral alliances of the Athenians,
Spartans, and Thebans. Although the majority of the epigraphical evidence is from the Athenian
context and the perspective of the ancient historians is patently Athenocentric, it would be a
mistake to consider the same practices and considerations to apply universally.74 Therefore, by
incorporating Spartan and Theban alliances, these chapters present a broader picture of alliance
activity in Greece than might otherwise have been expected.
Chapter III examines the Athenian alliances. It is by far the longest chapter and is
therefore divided into two parts. Part A discusses the alliances from the first one with the
Boeotians in 395 to the bilateral alliances that eventually came to form the nucleus of the Second
Athenian Confederacy in 377. Until recently scholars, concentrating on the political and military
aspects alone, saw this period in a negative light, interpreting these alliances as products of the
imperialistic ambitions of the Athenians. By shifting the focus onto the socio-cultural aspects of
those alliances, this part offers a more nuanced perspective that sees the alliances as
manifestations of deep socio-cultural ties between the Athenians and their allies. Part B considers
Athenian alliances from the one with the Spartans in 369 to the final one with the Thebans in
339, a period in which Athenian foreign policy became increasingly defined by opposition to
Philip II of Macedon. Finding it hard to reject any appeal, the Athenians overextended their
diplomatic reach, until things fell apart in 338 at the Battle of Chaeronea. Nonetheless, at the
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same time the Athenians maintained their practice of constructing alliance relationships on the
basis of personal interactions between the poleis.
Chapter IV looks at Spartan alliances. Because of the paucity of epigraphical evidence for
the Spartans, this chapter follows a more speculative approach than the others. Nevertheless,
through a close examination of what is available in the literary record as well as a judicious use
of comparative analysis, this chapter shows how Spartan alliances functioned along the same
lines as their interpersonal friendships, in observation of the obligations of reciprocity and in the
expectation of mutual benefit. The results of this varied whether the alliance was with the Greeks
or non-Greeks. In the case of the latter, the chapter emphasizes how cross-cultural confusion
regarding the precise expectations of friendship and reciprocity led to the failure of the alliances.
Chapter V covers Theban alliances from 371 to 362. The so-called Theban hegemony
offers a counterexample to the Athenian and Spartan experiences. They imitated their
predecessors by constructing a large alliance network, but they did not follow them in all
particulars. They neglected to clearly define leadership roles, put in place formal institutions for
the operation of the many alliances, and, most importantly, cultivate any new social connections
with their allies. Instead, the obsession with matters of Realpolitik blinded them to the need for
forming relationships that would outlast the temporary politico-military objectives. By
underscoring the negative example of Theban alliances, this chapter reinforces the importance of
socio-cultural elements for alliance studies and challenges the effectiveness of a strict Realist
paradigm for the classical Greek context.
Part III, Conclusions, reexamines the dissolution of Athenian alliances and how
contemporaries may have perceived them. This study does not pretend that Greek allies were
altruistic and their alliances ideal. The fact is that alliances did come to an end, though not
37

always for nefarious reasons or simply because the immediate military purposes had been
achieved. There were alliances that persisted. Some were renegotiated at a later date. Still others
came to an end because of external exigencies. Nevertheless, because of the strong social and
religious character of those agreements, the Athenians did not construct alliances in the
anticipation that they would dissolve quickly. Nor did they instantly discard an alliance if there
was a violation of terms of the agreement. Even after alliances collapsed, their commemorative
stelai remained standing on the Acropolis. Each stage of the alliance life-cycle, even the
dissolution, demonstrates the importance of socio-cultural factors.
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Chapter II
Procedures and Protocols
Having covered the broader theoretical and thematic issues of interstate alliances in the
first chapter, it is now time to turn to the conventional procedures and protocols in the creation of
an alliance. This chapter follows the roughly sequential path from the initial proposal and
negotiations in the political institutions of the participating poleis, to the articulation of the
alliance provisions in an official decree, and finally to the public display of the agreement in the
medium of a stone stele. This is not to say that the Greeks made their alliances in a mechanistic,
inflexible fashion, merely following a template, with the only variation being the identity of the
new ally, but the examples in this chapter show that in the fourth century there was a general
path which they followed in carrying an alliance from conception to conclusion.
There are a number of themes that emerge from this examination. First, the process of
constructing and legitimizing an interstate alliance was a communal activity. It involved all of
the citizenry, not just one individual or faction. After passing through the political organs of the
council and the assembly, the alliance took on a collective persona. This was the case in both
poleis – which raises the second theme, the social nature of the alliance process. This was an
interstate activity, incorporating citizens from both sides. The ambassadors were generally ones
who possessed traditional interpersonal relationships with the new allies. The process was
conducted through public debate among various groups; negotiating an alliance involved the
exchange of ideas and compromise. As a result, the experience became transformative in the
domestic context by bringing all of the polis together, as well as in the interstate context by
bringing the two poleis closer together. Thirdly, the alliance process was filled with religious
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practices – sacrifices, prayers, oaths, shared meals, festivals, and the display of the alliance stelai
in sacred locations – which reinforced its solemn character. These customs also strengthened the
constitutive aspect of the whole experience. For by working together in the legislative, religious,
and military activities, the two came into a closer form of solidarity.

Initiating an Alliance

Bringing an interstate alliance to full term involved the participation of the whole
community – statesmen and stonemasons, secular and religious authorities, rival political
factions and social classes – of two different poleis. It was not achieved by one individual’s
dictate but through public debate and dialogue. The final product was a communal achievement.
But initiating that process, the moment when an inchoate idea germinated into a concrete
proposal, was the prerogative of the probouleutic institution of the polis, that which considered
foreign policy matters in advance of the citizenry at large. In Athens this was the council
(βουλή), 500 members chosen by lot annually; in Sparta it was the five ephors; and in Thebes the
seven (or eleven) boeotarchs.1 Whenever these members in session were convinced that
circumstances required an alliance, they would submit the matter for further discussion in their
assembly (ἐκκλησία), the larger legislative body composed of all eligible citizens. For this
preliminary stage there are no surviving records better than Demosthenes’ remarkably detailed
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Athenian council: Rhodes 1972; Hansen 1991, 246-265. Spartan ephors: Kelly 1981,
47-61; Cartledge 1987, 125-129; Kennell 2010, 102-109. Theban boeotarchs: Buckler 1980b, 2431; Hammond 2000, 80-93. Probouleutic institutions in other Greek poleis: Mitchell 2010, 373374; Wallace 2013, 191-204.
40

account of the activities in Athens in November 339, when he proposed to make an alliance with
the Thebans against Philip II of Macedon.2
Philip had just moved south into central Greece and seized the Phocian town of Elateia,
the northern entrance to Boeotia and only a three days’ march from Attica, causing great
consternation in Athens.3 A messenger (ἄγγελος) carrying news of Philip’s proximate position
arrived in Athens late at night to find the welcoming party, the fifty presidents of the council
(πρυτάνεις), eating dinner in the Tholos building on the southwest side of the Agora.
Recognizing the need for a rapid response, the presidents immediately summoned the other 450
council members to their meeting place, the Bouleuterion, and disclosed the messenger’s
intelligence to them.4 Once they came to agreement that action was necessary, they drafted a
provisional resolution (προβούλευµα) for the assembly’s consideration, but in this case, since
they could not determine which form that action should take, they merely presented a simple
introduction of the topic without a specific proposal.5 Meanwhile, the presidents called for fires
to be lit in the Agora, signals that an emergency meeting of the assembly (ἐκκλησία σύγκλητος)
would convene at daybreak.
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Dem. 18.160-251. Other testimony is in Aeschin. 3.137-141; Hyp. Against Diondas
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It was necessary for the matter to be passed through the assembly because, as Aristotle
says, only that corporate body could authorize actions concerning war, peace, and alliances
(κύριον δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ βουλευόµενον περὶ πολέµου καὶ εἰρήνης, καὶ συµµαχίας).6 So, while the
council drafted its open resolution and selected nine men from among its membership to act as
presidents (πρόεδροι) of the assembly meeting, the rest of the citizenry, numbering several
thousand, filed into the Pnyx, the hill south of the Agora. The decisions taken here would be
from the people as a whole. The participants sat in rows undistinguished by political faction or
socio-economic class.7 The opening ceremonies reminded all present of their sacred obligation to
act in accordance with the good of the polis. After the religious officials sacrificed a piglet and
sprinkled its blood around the area for purification, a herald (κῆρυξ), an office occupied by
descendants of Hermes and associated with sacred rites, offered a prayer and a curse.8 Alan
Sommerstein extrapolates the latter’s fundamental elements from a variety of literary references:
the prayers consisted of an expectation that the members of the assembly would consider what is
best for the whole community and the curses called for divine retribution on those who might
work against the communal interests (e.g., by cooperating with the Persians, promoting a
tyranny, accepting bribes, or debasing the coinage).9 These rituals created a psychological sense
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Aeschin. 1.23; Dem. 19.70; Din. 2.14, 16. Mythic origins of heralds: Karavites 1987,
44-47. Blessings and curses: Faraone 2006, 139-156. Strauss 1985, 74-75 emphasizes “the ritual
and performative elements that served both to legitimate the body’s decisions and to foster a
sense of group solidarity.” Bonnechere 2013, 366-369 comments on the influence of religion in
political decisions.
42

of solemnity and solidarity that infused the subsequent political discussion. Additionally,
because of these pervasive religious features, as the alliance took on a more concrete form, all
would perceive it having a much deeper significance than just a politico-military agreement.
But for the moment the immediate practical matters of national security loomed large
among the anxious audience. Demosthenes relates the tense atmosphere:
“The council arrived and the presidents reported what had been announced to them, and this man
[i.e., the messenger], after being introduced, spoke to those present. Then the herald asked, ‘who
wishes to speak?’ But no one came forward. Although the herald asked many times, still no one
stood up.”10
ἦλθεν ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ἀπήγγειλαν οἱ πρυτάνεις τὰ προσηγγελµέν᾽ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τὸν ἥκοντα παρήγαγον
κἀκεῖνος εἶπεν, ἠρώτα µὲν ὁ κῆρυξ ‘τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται’ παρῄει δ᾽ οὐδείς. πολλάκις δὲ τοῦ
κήρυκος ἐρωτῶντος οὐδὲν µᾶλλον ἀνίστατ᾽ οὐδείς,

Since this time the council proffered only an open resolution, the herald invited to the speaker’s
platform (τὸ βῆµα) whomever wished to offer a proposal of his own for how to address Philip’s
threatening presence. At long last, Demosthenes, alone, stood up and proposed that they station
the military at Eleusis, closer to Boeotian territory, keeping it in a state of high alert, and dispatch
ten ambassadors, including himself, to Thebes for the purpose of concluding an alliance.11 When
he finished, the presidents put his proposal to a vote by a show of hands (χειροτονία), and in this
way, through the vox populi, it received the force of law. The decision was written up into a
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decree (ψήφισµα), of which the original was deposited in the archives (see more below) and a
copy given to the ambassadors for a reference guide in their negotiations with the other polis.12
For this particular embassy to Thebes, Demosthenes mentions some of the ambassadors
by name (Demosthenes, Hyperides, Mnesitheides, Democrates, and Callaeschrus) but he does
not relate upon which criteria they were elected.13 Although there were no pools of
professionally trained diplomats and, technically, any citizen was eligible to serve as an
ambassador, the ones elected usually possessed a certain set of characteristics and skills,
including experience, eloquence, and interstate connections.14 By and large, ambassadors were
men of a mature age – the original meaning of the Greek word for ambassador (πρέσβις) was
“old man, elder” – suggesting that they had a great deal of political experience and authority.15
For an embassy seeking an alliance with the Thebans in 378 (A12), the Athenian assembly chose
their most highly respected citizens (πρέσβεις τοὺς ἀξιολογωτάτους). In 339, Demosthenes,
forty-five years old, had already served on at least five embassies, most concerning the
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Beekes 2010, 1231-1232 (sv. πρέσβις). Ambassadors in the Homeric world: Karavites
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enactment of an alliance.16 Increasingly in the fourth century, the path to political prominence
was through public speaking. Since the fundamental object of an alliance embassy was to
convince another polis to conjoin military action, it was of great importance that the ambassadors
be articulate and persuasive. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the great majority of the
politically active Greeks in the fourth century were rhetores.17 With experience and eloquence
being desirable in ambassadors, such posts were largely reserved for those of the privileged
class, who had the time and money to cultivate those qualities and skills.18 The elite, moreover,
were already involved in larger Greek affairs through their traditional interstate connections. It
would be senseless for a petitioning polis not to call upon a citizen with friends and contacts in
the other polis to act as an ambassador. Many examples of this were given in Chapter I. Be that
as it may, it was also common for embassies to be mixed, composed of members of competing
political factions. While this may have served a political check on the ambitions of one
individual or group, it also ensured that constructing an interstate alliance was larger than one
individual or political faction; it was a communal endeavor.
Considering the centrifugal forces which might inhibit extensive interstate activity, the
commission to arrange an alliance was one of the most demanding of an embassy. As difficult as
it was, modern scholarship makes it appear nearly impossible by underestimating the powers of
the ambassadors, characterizing their role as mere messengers without any authority beyond their
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Ambassadors to Thebes: Diod. Sic. 15.28.2. Demosthenes: Dem. 9.72, 18.79, 178-179.
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Hansen 1983a, 151-180 lists 368 Athenian rhetores and strategoi from 403 to 322.
Rhetoric and foreign affairs: Piccirilli 2002; Gillett 2003, 15-16; Amantini 2005; Usher 2010,
220-235.
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Wealth and the choice of ambassadors: Mosley 1973, 44; Hodkinson 2000, 337-352.
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advocacy for an alliance.19 In defense of this representation, most point to the ambassadors with
full powers (πρέσβεις αὐτοκράτορες), who, despite their title, did little more than receive and
carry back treaties to their home authorities for authorization. But this type of ambassador served
on peace embassies or on a delegation from a conquered party that had no liberty to negotiate
terms anyway. By contrast, ambassadors on an alliance embassy had a fair amount of latitude.
Their assembly’s directives were rather broad. In the early 370s, for example, the Athenian
assembly charged its three ambassadors to Thebes to obtain “whatever benefits they could [ὅτι
ἂν δύνωνται ἀγαθὸν].” The same instructions were given in 346 to the Athenian ambassadors
seeking peace and alliance with Philip. In 369, the Thebans directed Pelopidas to arrange affairs
with the Thessalians “in the interests of the polis [εἰς τὸ συµφέρον].” In 360, when the Spartan
king Agesilaus asked his assembly for direction concerning an alliance proposal from the
Egyptian Nectanebo (S8), he was given the vague reply to “act in the interests of Sparta [πράξει
τὸ τῇ Σπάρτῃ συµφέρον].”20 In these cases the assembly’s orders were not specific. They only
authorized, in general terms, the representatives to arrange alliances for the good of the whole
polis. Furthermore, there are examples of ambassadors exercising this authority in the assembly
of the host polis (see below), no doubt cautiously, since ancient Greek politicians had a penchant
for prosecuting rivals for any perceived indiscretion or abuse of power.21 All the same, the
evidence indicates that ambassadors were more than mere messenger boys.
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Mosley 1973, 36; Missiou-Ladi 1987, 336-345; Pownall 1995, 140-149; Bederman
2001, 101-103; Wolpert 2001, 76.
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Ambassadors to Thebes: IG II2 43, lines 72-77. Ambassadors to Philip: Aeschin. 2.104,
120. Pelopidas: Diod. Sic. 15.67.3. Agesilaus: Plut. Ages. 37.5. In 379, although angered that the
enemy Phliasians treated him as one without authority (ἄκυρον) in truce negotiations, Agesilaus
sent for consultation from the home authorities (Xen. Hell. 5.3.23-24).
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After the assembly approved the embassy’s composition and made clear its instructions,
the Treasurer of the Demos (ταµίας τοῦ δήµου) supplied the ambassadors with money (about
twenty drachmas) for travelling expenses.22 The council reconvened in the Bouleuterion to attend
to any administrative and logistic matters extending from the assembly’s decisions. The rest of
the citizenry returned to their daily duties but remained in anticipation of positive news from the
alliance embassy.
In 339, when the Athenian delegation reached Thebes, it found that Philip’s ambassadors
had already arrived. In his account Demosthenes fails to mention any preliminary meeting with
the boeotarchs and jumps straight to the Theban assembly meeting.23 Since the Thebans and
Philip were technically still allies from their alliance in 347, the Macedonian delegation spoke
first. Pytho of Byzantium, a frequent Macedonian representative in interstate negotiations,
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The condemnation of an Athenian ambassador for agreeing to peace at the Susa
conference in 367 (Xen. Hell. 7.1.33-38; Plut. Pel. 30.1-6) shows that ambassadors exercised
initiative but could also face prosecution at home if they went against the overall policies of the
polis. Ambassadors were also subject to an audit (εὔθυναι) of their conduct (see note 56).
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Mosley 1973, 74-77.
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Dem. 18.213. Other examples of speeches from foreign ambassadors to an assembly
appear in A1, A13, and S10. Dem. 16.1 refers to the speeches in the Athenian assembly from the
Megalopolitan ambassadors seeking an alliance against the Spartans. Nep. Ep. 6 mentions a
debate in the Arcadian assembly between the Athenian Callistratus and the Theban Epaminondas
in an attempt to sustain (Callistratus) or to reinstate (Epaminondas) an alliance. Ste. Croix 1972,
128-129 and Kennell 2010, 113-114 note that nearly every account of the Spartan assembly
contains only the speeches of foreigner ambassadors. Foreigners not directly involved in the
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stressed Philip’s good services to Thebes, and asked that the Thebans either join in the attack on
Attica or at least allow Philip free passage through Boeotia.24
Demosthenes spoke on behalf of the Athenians, though surprisingly he does not record
his speech in On the Crown. Aeschines alleges that Demosthenes sold out Athenian interests in
order to gain the alliance with the Thebans: he recognized their domination over Boeotia; agreed
that the Athenians would bear all the costs of naval operations and two-thirds of land campaigns;
and promised them overall command on land and a joint command on sea.25 D.J. Mosley once
tried to rationalize these concessions as “not as one-sided as Aeschines alleged” by arguing that
the terms were not unprecedented and even reasonable for that critical situation.26 Dina Guth,
however, thinks the proposals were very much one-sided but adds that they may have originated
with the Thebans, who, forced to decide between Philip and the Athenians, offered them in the
hope of prolonging the negotiations to the point of a stalemate.27 If Guth is right, then by
accepting the terms, Demosthenes and the Athenian delegation shocked the Thebans, who could
do nothing but agree to their own proposals. This harmonizes with the earlier point of this
chapter that ambassadors were not passive mouthpieces but active agents in the negotiations. In
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Dem. 18.213; cf. Diod. Sic. 16.85.3; Plut. Dem. 18.2. Buckler 2003, 496 is surprised by
the Thebans’ refusal to cooperate with Philip who had, in his opinion, “always handsomely
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Aeschin. 3.142-143. Theopomp. FGrH 115 F328 appears to criticize Demosthenes’
performance in the Theban assembly (Flower 1994, 143-145; contra Shrimpton 1991, 175-176).
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Mosley 1971, 508-510.
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the case of the 339 alliance, the final provisions were a product of the dialogue between all
parties.
There could be considerable debate in the assemblies as the members engaged with the
details of prospective alliances. For example, in the negotiations for an alliance with the Spartans
in 369 (A13), the Athenian assembly rejected its own council’s advice (in a προβούλευµα) for
equal leadership roles (i.e., Sparta on land and Athens at sea) in favor of one assemblyman’s
motion for a five-day rotation of leadership.28 In 366, the same assembly nearly rejected an
alliance with the Arcadian League (A16), but someone raised the option of making it a defensive
alliance which would not violate any existing treaties. In 353, the assembly turned down a
proposal to ally with the Megalopolitans, even though Demosthenes advocated fiercely for it.29
An anecdote from the third century, which Polybius claims followed Spartan custom (τῶν
εἰθισµένων), shows a sharply divided assembly with its members delivering long speeches for or
against an alliance with the Aetolians.30 The orations of Demosthenes and Aeschines exhibit
pugnacious debate and protracted deliberation in the assembly over interstate affairs in the 340s
and 330s. The famous debate in 346 over the question of whether to accept peace and alliance
with Philip of Macedon continued over the course of two days.31 The Spartan assembly took
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The Spartan πρέσβεις αὐτοκράτορες agreed to the revised terms without submitting
them to the home authorities.
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Dem. 16.
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Polyb. 4.34. Kelly 1981, 47-61 and Kennell 2010, 111-114 dispute the notion that the
average Spartan did not engage in debate in the assembly and merely cast his vote according to
the dictates of his superiors.
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Aeschin 2.53, 61, 65, 3.68-72. Deliberation over the alliance with Corcyra in 433 also
took the Athenian assembly two days (Thuc. 1.44.1).
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three days to calculate its resources before returning a negative response to an appeal from
Polydamas of Pharsalus.32 These multiday convocations were not the norm, but they illustrate
that accepting an alliance and determining what shape it would take were issues that had to be
hammered out at length between the factious political authorities in each polis.33
Negotiations, therefore, could be protracted but not to the point of impracticability.
Although ambassadors in other types of missions might find a great deal of their time taken up in
shuttling back and forth between their respective poleis, the evidence for alliance embassies
suggests that negotiations were comparatively rapid.34 The circumstances for an alliance were of
a different sort from what they would have been for a peace treaty or a postwar settlement; and
they did not involve unfamiliar parties or even belligerents. Instead, because an alliance was
constructed on a socio-cultural foundation which produced a level of trust and affection between
the parties, these types of negotiations could go much more smoothly. Xenophon, for example,
suggests that the talks for the Athenian-Boeotian alliance in 395 (A1) took only one day and the
Athenians mustered their army for action immediately on the next day. When the Athenians
finally made an alliance with Dionysius I of Syracuse in 368 (A15), the assembly fixed the
operative details in just one day, except for the business of Athenian ambassadors swearing oaths
in Syracuse. In 366, Lycomedes, the leader of the Arcadian League, negotiated an alliance with
32

Xen. Hell. 6.1.2-17.
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Dem. 1.4 and 19.185-186 famously express his jealousy of Philip, who as a monarch
could direct Macedonian foreign policy more directly and quickly than an assembly, but these
complaints suit his own political purposes. Pericles, on the other hand, praised the open and
inclusive process of the democratic assembly (Thuc. 2.39.1).
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Mosley 1973, 70 hypothesizes that “a minimum of three embassies” were necessary to
complete an interstate treaty, but his examples exclude alliance embassies.
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the Athenians in one trip (A16). The Athenian alliance with four Peloponnesian poleis in 362
(A17) was concluded after one embassy, leaving any overlooked matters for future amendments.
Debate was ardent and at times drawn out, but the process was still functional and constructive.
Out of these negotiations came specific terms and conditions on which both sides agreed.

Articulating an Alliance

To facilitate the composition of an alliance treaty, the Greeks could refer to earlier ones
for inspiration. The King’s Peace in 386, for example, was a pattern for the Athenian-Chian
alliance in 384 (A8), which in turn was the model for the bilateral alliances that constituted the
core of the Second Athenian Confederacy. As a result, throughout the fourth century, there were
many specific articles that appeared again and again in written decrees (ψηφίσµατα). For
convenience in articulating the preamble and the main body, the Greeks came to devise linguistic
formulae. P.J. Rhodes and D.M. Lewis enumerate the common elements of the preamble, which
are summarized as follows.35
1. An invocation of the gods
2. A heading announcing the subject matter
3. A prescript containing the names of the presiding officials involved, the date, and the name of
the proposer
4. A motivation clause and an enactment formula

An example of a typical preamble comes from the first nine lines of IG II² 116, the inscription
recording the alliance between the Athenians and the Thessalian League in 361 (A18).
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Rhodes and Lewis 1997, 4-5 (reiterated in RO xix-xx). Invocation of the gods: Pounder
1984, 243-250; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 160-167. Henry 1977, 19-34 traces the
development of headings and prescripts throughout the fourth century, noting “continuing
refinement of detail.”
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Gods.
In the archonship of Nicophemus, the alliance of the Athenians and Thessalians forever.
It is resolved by the council and by the people. Leontis was the prytanis; Chaerion son of
Charinautes of Phalerum was secretary; Archippus from Amphitrope was presiding as
president. On the twelfth day of the prytany, Execestides proposed:
concerning what the ambassadors of the Thessalians said, let it be decreed by the people:
θε[ο]ί
ἐπὶ Νικοφήµο ἄρχοντος
συµµαχία Ἀθηναίων καὶ
Θετταλῶν εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον.
ἔδοξεν τ[ῆ]ι [β]ουλῆι κα[ὶ] τῶι δήµωι· Λ[ε]ωντὶς ἐπρυτάνευεν, Χαιρ[ί]ων Χαριναύ[τ]ο Φαληρεὺ[ς] ἐγραµµάτευεν, Ἄρχιππος, Ἀµφ[ι]τροπῆθε[ν] ἐπεστάτει· δωδεκάτει τῆς πρυτανείας· Ἐ[ξ]ηκεστίδης εἶπεν· [π]ε[ρὶ] ὧν λέγουσιν οἱ π[ρ]έσβεις τῶν Θετταλῶ[ν], ἐψηφίσθα[ι] τῶι δ[ή]µωι.

These elements regularly appear in the preambles of fourth-century alliance treaties.
More significant for this study, however, is what follows in the main body of those treaties.
Compared to modern international agreements, the articulation of provisions in fourth-century
alliances is rudimentary. But considering them on their own terms, it is not true, as some have
asserted, that the Greeks avoided “complicated arrangements” and persisted in making “simple
documents.”36 Rather, throughout this period there is an observable increase in the sophistication
and precision of the content and the vocabulary of the treaties. This can be illustrated in Tables
1.1 and 1.2 which compare the provisions of select Athenian alliances from earlier and later in
the century. The first table lists those in the Boeotian alliance in 395 (A1), the Locrian alliance in
the same year (A2), and the Eretrian alliance in 394 (A3). The second compares the provisions in
A1, A2, and A3 as a unit with those in the joint alliance with four Peloponnesian poleis in 362
(A17). The defining features of these provisions are discussed afterwards.
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Mosley 1973, 70-71; Wolpert 2001, 77-78.
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Table 1.1: Athenian Alliance Provisions in 395 and 394
A1
A2
Mutual defense
Mutual defense
Provision for future amendment

A3
Mutual defense
Provision for future amendment
Instructions for swearing oaths

Table 1.2: Athenian Alliance Provisions from 395 to 362
A1-A3
A17
Mutual defense
Mutual defense
Provision for future amendment
Provision for future amendment
Instructions for swearing oaths
Specification of leadership roles
Preservation of domestic constitutions
Exiles clause

As Table 1.1 shows, the first three treaties are brief and simple in their articulation. But as the
century advances and more alliances materialize, the expression of the specific articles becomes
more extensive and more refined. Obviously, not all treaties contained the same provisions; the
arrangements were context specific. Nevertheless, there were some that appeared regularly, in
particular those listed in Tables 1.1 and 1.2.37
The most recurrent was the mutual defense clause. It first appeared in its fourth-century
expression in the Athenian-Boeotian alliance of 395 (A1):
“If any one goes against the Athenians for war either by land or by sea, the Boeotians shall go in
support with all their strength as the Athenians call on them, as far as possible; and if any one
goes against the Boeotians for war either by land or by sea, the Athenians shall go in support with
all their strength as the Boeotians call on them, as far as possible.”
[ἐάν τ]ις ἴηι ἐπ[ὶ πολέµωι ἐπ Ἀθηναίος ἢ]
[κατὰ] γῆν ἢ κατ[ὰ θάλαττ]αν βοηθε̑ν Βοι[ω][τὸς π]αντὶ σθέ[νει καθ]ότι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλ[ωσιν] Ἀθηναῖ[οι κατὰ τὸ] δυνατόν· καὶ ἐ[ά][ν τις ἴ]ηι ἐπὶ [Βοιωτὸς ἐ]πὶ πολέµωι ἢ [κα][τὰ γῆν ἢ] κατὰ [θάλατταν], βοηθε̑ν Ἀθηνα[ί][ος παντὶ σθένει καθότι] ἂν ἐπαγγέλλ[ω]
[σι Βοιωτοὶ κατὰ τὸ δυνα]τόν.
37

A complete list is in Appendix A.
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Mutual defense clauses were present in the Athenian alliances with the Locrians (A2) and the
Eretrians (A3), as noted in Table 1.1, as well as in those with the Chians in 384 (A8), the
Byzantines in the late 380s (A10), Dionysius I in 368 (A15), the Thessalian League in 361
(A18), and the Eretrians (again) in 341 (A22).38 Some Theban alliances (T1, T2) contained it.
There is some epigraphical evidence that the Spartans, too, included such a clause in their
alliances.39 The frequent inclusion of “as far as possible [κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν]” in these clauses,
Raphael Sealey presumes, “rendered the obligation nugatory. If the casus foederis arose, a
reluctant ally could plead impossibility.”40 This reading might be expected, but Sealey offers no
evidence that the Greeks ever made this sort of sophistic justification for inaction. On the
contrary, the historical record, as the following chapters reveal, confirms that allies did in fact
uphold their obligations of mutual defense.41
Some Athenian alliance treaties contained a provision for future amendment. The alliance
with the Boeotians in 395 (A1) permitted additions or deletions according to common
deliberation (κοινῆι βουλευοµένοις). The same was required in the alliances with the Locrians
(A2) and Eretrians (A3). The one with the Peloponnesian poleis in 362 (A17) allowed
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It is also in the founding document of the Second Athenian Confederacy (IG II2 43,
lines 46-50) and in the Illyrian-Chalcidian alliance of 357 (SdA 307, lines 4-13).
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It is in a Spartan alliance with the Aetolians and the Erxadieis (SEG 26.461), which
Bolmarcich 2008, 70-76 uniquely dates to the fourth century. Antonetti 2012, 193-208 reviews
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Sealey 1993, 17.
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Cargill 1981, 144 lists a number of Athenian “relief missions” dispatched in
compliance with their mutual defense obligations.
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amendments as long as they were according to the oath (εὔορκον) which both sides swore after
the alliance negotiations. The alliance with three northern kings in 356 (A20) gave the authority
(κυρίαν) for making amendments to the council. Philip of Macedon’s alliance with the
Chalcidians in 357 permitted amendments but only within the first three months.42
Many treaties assigned specific leadership roles. The final version of the AthenianSpartan alliance in 369 (A13) authorized a rotation of supreme leadership every five days. The
Athenians and their new Peloponnesian allies (A17) agreed in 362 that leadership would pass to
the one in whose territory was the military campaign ([ἡγεµονίαν δὲ ἔχειν ἐ]ν τῆι αὑτῶν
ἑκά[στους]). In 339, the Athenians offered the Thebans supreme command of the land forces and
joint command of naval operations (A23). The Spartans imposed their leadership on the
Acarnanians (S4) and the Olynthians (S6) with a hegemonic oath: “to consider the same friends
and enemies as the Spartans, to follow them wherever they lead, and to be allies [τὸν αὐτὸν µὲν
ἐχθρὸν καὶ φίλον Λακεδαιµονίοις νοµίζειν, ἀκολουθεῖν δὲ ὅποι ἂν ἡγῶνται καὶ σύµµαχοι
εἶναι].”43 The Thebans did the same in their alliances with Ptolemy Alorus of Macedon (T5), the
Achaeans (T6), and Alexander of Pherae (T7).
In a few instances allies agreed to respect each other’s domestic constitution (πολιτεία).
This was often inserted into the mutual defense clauses, as in the Athenian alliances with the
Peloponnesians in 362 (A17) and the Thessalians in 361 (A18). The Thebans permitted their
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Tod 158 = Harding 67 = RO 50. Rhodes 1972, 278-279 lists amendments (riders) that
were attached to other types of Athenian decrees. Rhodes and Lewis 1997, 517 addresses
provisions for amendment in Greek decrees in general.
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Acarnanians: Xen. Hell. 4.6.1-7.1. Olynthians: ibid. 5.3.26.
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Peloponnesian allies (T2, T3, T6) to retain their oligarchic constitutions. Closely related to this is
the exiles clause, a prohibition against the deportation or the return of exiles without common
agreement, which showed up in a number of Athenian and Theban alliances (A7, A17, T3, T4,
T6). Other provisions called for revenue collection arrangements (A6, A19, A22), the exchange
of money and manpower (A14, S1, S7, S8, S9, S10, T2), the surrender of hostages (T4, T5), and
the prohibition against unilateral peace attempts with a mutual enemy (A18, A20, T1, T2).
Notably, nearly every Athenian alliance in the fourth century was designated to last
forever (ἀεί χρόνον or ἅπαντα χρόνον), a curious remark if contemporaries considered their
alliances to be merely temporary expedients.44 Evidently, the opinion of the signatories inclined
more towards the expectation of a long and productive working relationship.
After the assembly voted on the specific terms, someone would make an official
pronouncement of the new alliance and then the herald would proclaim the proceedings closed.45
Even so, there was still important work remaining. The alliance now had an “identity,” which
would only appear sharper in the subsequent joint performance of religious rituals. First, the
assembly directed chosen representatives to participate in the swearing of an oath (ὅρκος). The
Athenians generally chose generals, council members, knights, hipparchs, taxiarchs, or phylarchs
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Karavites 1982, 91-93. The only fourth-century alliance with a time limit (fifty years)
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Andoc. 1.36; Xen. Hell. 3.5.16. Hansen 1983b, 131-138 maintains that a typical
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to do this.46 Few treaties mention more than the simple command for the swearing of an oath, but
the inscription for the Athenian alliance with the Thessalian League in 361 (A18) is unique in
that it publishes the content of the oaths for both parties. The one for the Athenians is as follows:
“I will help with all my strength as far as possible if any one goes against the Thessalian League
for war, or overthrows the archon, whom the Thessalians chose, or sets up a tyrant in Thessaly.”
βοηθήσω π[α]ντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, ἐάν τι[ς] ἴηι ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν τὸ Θετταλῶν ἐπὶ πολ[έµ]ωι ἢ τὸν ἄρχοντα καταλύει, ὃν εἵλοντο Θετταλοί, ἢ
[τ]ύραννον καθ[ι]στῆι ἐν Θετταλίαι·

Then there is the oath for which the Thessalian League’s archon, polemarchs, hipparchs, knights,
religious authorities (ἱεροµνήµονες), and other political officials swore:
“I will help with all my strength as far as possible if any one goes against the city of the
Athenians for war or overthrows the Athenian people.”
βο[η]θ[ήσ]ω παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, ἐάν τις ἴ[η]ι ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν τὴν Ἀθ[ην]αίων ἐπὶ πολέµωι ἢ τὸν δῆµον καταλύει τὸν Ἀθηνα[ίων]·

These oaths addressed political and military matters by rehearsing the mutual defense clause and
the provision for the preservation of the domestic constitutions. “Co-ordinating warfare would
not have required an oath,” writes Andrew Bayliss on oaths in alliances, “but it must have given
confidence to those involved in the fighting that they would not be let down by their cofighters.”47 As Chapter I showed that συµµαχία, a military term, included socio-cultural
elements, so ὅρκος, a religious practice, integrated the pragmatic considerations of the alliance. It
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is impossible to compartmentalize these features. The oath in the Athenian alliance with three
northern kings in 356 (A20) reinforces this.
“I swear by Zeus and Gaia and Helios and Poseidon and Athena and Ares that I will be a friend
and an ally to Cetriporis and to the brothers of Cetriporis, and that I will wage the war with
Cetriporis against Philip without deceit and with all my strength as far as possible, and I will not
end the war against Philip without Cetriporis and his brothers; and the other places which Philip
controls I will join with Cetriporis and his brothers in subduing, and I shall join in taking
Crenides with Cetriporis and his brothers; and I will give back . . .”
[ὀµνύω Δία καὶ Γῆν] καὶ Ἥλιον καὶ Ποσει[δ]ῶ καὶ Ἀθηνᾶν καὶ
[Ἄρην, φίλος ἔσοµαι] Κετριπόρι καὶ τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς τοῖς Κ[ετριπόριος καὶ σ]ύµµαχος καὶ πολεµή[σ]ω µετὰ Κετριπόρ[ιος τὸν πόλεµον τ]ὸν πρὸς Φίλιππον ἀδόλως παντὶ σθένε[ι]
[κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, κ]αὶ οὐ προκαταλύσοµαι τὸν πόλεµον ἄν[ευ Κετριπόριος κ]αὶ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τὸν πρὸς Φίλιππον κ[αὶ]
[τἆλλα χωρία ἃ κατ]έχε[ι] Φίλιππος συνκα[τ]α[σ]τρέψοµαι µ[ε][τὰ Κετριπόριος κ]αὶ τῶν ἀδελφῶν καὶ Κρηνίδ[α]ς συνε[ξ]αι[ρήσω µετὰ Κετριπ]ό[ρ]ιος κα[ὶ τ]ῶν [ἀδ]ελφῶν καὶ ἀποδώσω τὰ

This oath also consists of a summary of the political elements of the treaty within a religious
framework. It makes mention of the mutual defense clause, a prohibition against unilateral peace
with a mutual enemy, and the new allies’ specific military objective, to win back areas recently
conquered by Philip. The naming of the six divinities, moreover, calls for divine witnesses of
these promises, impressing upon the participants their consecrated responsibility to observe the
terms of the alliance. Some alliance oaths even contained blessings (ἀγαθὰ) for faithful
observance and curses (κακά) for noncompliance.48
Sacrificial offerings followed the oaths. After Philip and the Chalcidians received
approval from the Delphic Apollo for their alliance in 357, the god directed them to swear oaths
and offer sacrifices:
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Tod 158 = Harding 67 = RO 50. The oaths in the Athenian Confederacy’s alliance
treaties with the Corcyraeans in 375 (IG II2 97, lines 25-26) and with the Ceans in 363 (111, lines
80-82) mention blessings and curses.
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“Sacrifice and obtain good omens from Zeus Teleos and Hypatos, Apollo Prostaterios, Artemis
Orthosia, Hermes; and pray that the alliance will be with good fortune; and return thank-offerings
49
to Pythian Apollo, and remember your gifts.”
θῦσαι δὲ καὶ καλλιερῆσαι Διὶ Τελέοι καὶ Υπάτωι Ἀπόλλωνι Προστατηρίωι Ἄρτέµιδι
Ὀρθωσίαι Ἑρµῆι καὶ κατὰ τύχαν ἀγαθὰν ἐπεύχεσθαι τὰν συµµαχίαν ἐσσεῖσθαι καὶ Πυθῶδε
τῶι Ἀπόλλωνι χαριστήρια ἀποδιδόναι, καὶ µνασιδωρεῖν.

The rituals invoked divine sanction and protection. They also accentuated the social signification
of the alliance. “The language of oaths,” Susan Guettel Cole comments, “provided metaphors of
unity.”50 The performative aspects of these rituals did the same. Pronouncing oaths, which
encapsulated the shared political and military goals, over the head of a sacrificial animal, with
the gods witnessing and acting as guardians of the agreement, brought the participants even
closer together. Of course, each polis retained its political sovereignty, but the joint performance
of the religious rituals reinforced the common interests, reminded them of their commitment to
their mutual welfare, and activated a sense of solidarity, a shared identity. An IR Constructivist
might interpret the discourse and the drama of the ceremonies as instrumental in transforming
what had begun as a domestic communal activity into an interstate communal activity.
In Athens, there was yet another traditional practice that continued this transformative
aspect. Since in the fourth century there were no permanent diplomatic quarters, ambassadors
spent the night at the homes of their friends or the proxenos of their polis.51 Then, in the evening
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The same four gods appear in a contemporary oath of reconciliation between the
citizens of Dicea in the Chalcidice (cf. Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 141) and in the
inscription for the Corinthian League in 338 (RO 76, lines 2-3). Faraone 1993, 60-80 and Steiner
1994, 61-99 emphasize the magical aspects of oaths and sacrifices.
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Cole 1996, 240.
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Adcock and Mosley 1975, 164.
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of the next day, they would be entertained to a meal of hospitality (ξένια) served around the
common hearth in the Prytaneion. This meal, ostensibly a political custom extending back to the
Mycenaean period, and its location reinforced the social and religious signification of the
alliance on many levels.52 Entering into the ceremonial hall of the Prytaneion, the symbolic “life
of the city,” the participants would see the eternal flame of the hearth, a strong reminder of the
perpetual and sacred nature of the new treaty.53 As they sat down to the meal, the intimacy of
which was accentuated by the environment and the circumstances, the diners would sense the
presence of the goddess Hestia, who, being a domestic figure, symbolized the virtual extended
family status that the two allies now shared. Furthermore, as older Greek literary references point
out, the hearth was the traditional place of refuge for suppliants and asylum seekers.54 That
vulnerable condition was, in effect, the same for the petitioning polis, whose representatives now
sat within that protective enclosure. All involved at the meal would have recalled the normative
responsibility to come to the assistance of the weak and the wronged. Bringing the alliance to a
full procedural close at this specific location exemplified the moral obligations incumbent upon
the Greeks. On a symbolic and even a phenomenological level, therefore, the shared meal was
celebratory (of the achieved alliance), commemorative (of the moral responsibilities behind
interstate action), and constitutive (of a shared, familial identity).
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Miller 1978; Engen 2010, 168-173; Cinalli 2015, 35-40. Harrell and Fox 2008, 28-37
suggests how Mycenaean alliances proceeded from meals around the palatial hearth.
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Miller 1978, 13-14; Hedrick 2013, 393. Schmalz 2006, 33-81 thinks the Athenian
Pyrtaneion was located in the literal center of the city.
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At some point after the meal the foreign ambassadors returned home to announce the new
alliance.55 Accompanying them were representatives of the host polis who would participate in a
correlating ceremony of oaths and sacrifices. It is not known whether they repeated any other
rituals (another shared meal perhaps) or how long all of this would have taken. In Athens,
returning ambassadors were expected to report first to the council, after which they received a
meal (δεῖπνον) in their honor. They were also subjected at some point to an audit (εὔθυναι) of
their conduct.56
With the alliance firmly established, the new allies turned their immediate attention to the
military tasks for which all of this was intended. They did not, however, neglect to celebrate the
alliance with festivals. The treaty between the Athenians and the four Peloponnesian poleis in
362 (A17) called for sacrifices and a procession (θυσίαν καὶ πρόσοδον). Demosthenes notes that
in 338, after concluding their alliance with the Thebans (A23) and proceeding immediately to
win two small victories over Philip’s army, the Athenians held festivities in which they made
sacrifices and a procession for the gods (θυσίαι καὶ ποµπαὶ τοῖς θεοῖς).57 Isocrates mentions the
custom (ἔθος) of holding festivals after the conclusion of interstate agreements, in which people
from different poleis offer common prayers and sacrifices (εὐχὰς καὶ θυσίας κοινὰς). By
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Some ambassadors may have stayed longer in the host city to see that the expedition
got under way and to serve as advisors. For example, that no Tarentine ambassador sailed with
the Phocian general Phalaecus to Italy in 346 convinced his soldiers that no alliance existed with
the Tarentines (Diod. Sic. 16.61.4-62.1).
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Report to the council: Pl. Leg. 12.941a; Dem. 19.17-18; Aeschin. 2.16, 45. Miller
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celebrating in this manner, Isocrates continues, “we are reminded of the kinship which originated
among us, are disposed to be more kindly towards each other in the future and to renew our old
friendships and to make new ones [ἀναµνησθῆναι µὲν τῆς συγγενείας τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους
ὑπαρχούσης, εὐµενεστέρως δ᾽ εἰς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον διατεθῆναι πρὸς ἡµᾶς αὐτούς, καὶ τάς τε
παλαιὰς ξενίας ἀνανεώσασθαι καὶ καινὰς ἑτέρας ποιήσασθαι].”58 The celebrations connected the
past and the present, commemorating the long-standing relationships and also encouraging the
creation of new ones to perpetuate the ties between the two poleis. The Greeks did not expect
their alliances and the interstate relationships which they represented to dissolve quickly, but
actively sought to preserve them. They commemorated their alliances because they hoped they
would last. This is also why they publicly displayed the alliances in marmoreal form.

Displaying an Alliance

To return to the assembly meetings that authorized alliances, at some point near their end
someone wrote up the content of the alliances in the form of a decree (ψήφισµα). In Athens, the
Secretary (ὁ γραµµατεὺς τἤς βουλῆς or γραµµατεὺς ὁ κατὰ πρυτανείαν) was responsible for
depositing those decrees in the archive, which in the fourth century was in the Metroon, the
building dedicated to the Mother of the Gods.59 The precise correlation of the documents to that
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Isoc. 4.43. In 422, the Athenians and Spartans agreed to commemorate their new
alliance by participating in each other’s annual festivals (Thuc. 5.23.4).
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Arist. Ath. Pol. 54.3; Dem. 19.129; Din. 1.86; Lyc. 1.66. The Secretary and the archive
staff: Sickinger 1999, 139-147; Henry 2002, 91-94. Metroon: Thomas 1989, 34-94; Sickinger
1999, 108-113; Munn 2006, 63-64, 328-330; Pébarthe 2006, 147-171.
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goddess is unknown today, yet because of that it is not necessary to assume that “originally the
Athenians made no direct association.”60 Each component in the alliance process was deliberate,
intended for a practical or symbolic purpose. The absence of an acceptable functionalist
interpretation notwithstanding, it must have been significant that the Athenians and other Greeks
stored alliance treaties in areas associated with a divinity.61
It was also the assembly’s prerogative to publish the treaties on stone and display them in
public. This was also the responsibility of the Secretary, whom the assembly instructed to “write
up the decree on a stone stele [ἀναγράψαι τόδε τὸ ψήφισµα ἐν στήληι λιθίνηι].”62 Since not every
extant inscription, even the ones in good condition, contains all the elements of a standard
decree, most scholars today deem the stone copies to be only abbreviated versions of the
assembly’s original decrees.63 If this were the case, however, that would mean that after taking
so much care to involve the whole community in the process of determining the form which an
alliance would take, the authorities suddenly decided that it was acceptable to surrender the
display copy, as it were, to the “editorial hand” of one individual, the Secretary.64 The
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Millender 2001, 127-141 suggests that the Spartans stored their documents in the
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The Poletai (πωληταὶ) farmed out the contracts for stonemasons and inscribers (Arist.
Ath. Pol. 47.2; cf. Langdon 1991, 62-63; Pébarthe 2006, 280-281), and the Treasurer of the
Demos (ταµίας τοῦ δήµου) dispersed the payment (usually twenty or thirty drachmas) from a
designated fund (cf. Henry 1982, 97-112). Loomis 1998, 158-163, responding to Nolan 1981,
provides an itemized list of expenses in the inscription process.
63

Osborne 1999, 341-358 (reprinted in 2010, 64-82); Rhodes 2001, 37-40; Davies 2003,
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epigraphist Michael J. Osborne is one who detects the problems in this line of reasoning and
offers two counterpoints in response: the public inscription reproduced precisely what was
finalized in the assembly and every decree was inscribed on stone. Osborne goes too far in his
absolutism, but his general point that there is a close correspondence between the assembly
decree and the inscription is compelling. “In the case of alliances and treaties,” Osborne stresses,
“it was obviously important that they be available for public scrutiny and equally obvious that
the text was authoritative.”65 Since the public inscriptions reflected the work of the whole polis
and the stone material represented the alliance’s permanence, it was necessary that they be
authentic. The stelai embodied all of the aspects which this chapter has highlighted – political,
communal (domestic and interstate), and religious.
In the fourth century, the Athenians erected nearly all of their alliance stelai on the
Acropolis, where they came under the supervision of the Treasurers of Athena (ταµίαι τῆς θεο͂).
The Spartans displayed theirs at the Apollonion at Amyclae; the Thebans in the sanctuary of
Heracles Promachus.66 The choice of the display sites suggests that the intended audience was
those who lived in the temples, the gods. On the one hand, the topographical context underscores
the role of the gods in treaty enforcement: their presence made violations of the alliance terms
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Acropolis: Liddel 2003, 79-81. Apollonion: Thuc. 5.18.10, 23.5; cf. Isoc. 12.107,
14.180. Sanctuary of Heracles Promachus: Aravantinos and Papazarkadas 2012, 250-251.
Treasurers of Athena: Aristot. Ath. Pol. 30.2; cf. Ferguson 1932; Pébarthe 2006, 277-280;
Marcaccini 2015, 515-532. Thuc. 5.47.11 says the Argives used the temple of Apollo, and the
Mantineans the temple of Zeus. The Chalcidians had the sanctuary of Artemis at Olynthus, and
Philip II of Macedon the sanctuary of Olympian Zeus at Dion (Tod 158 = Harding 67 = RO 50).
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less likely.67 Yet, on the other hand, a few scholars have added to this juridical aspect the
magical powers inherent in these sacred spots. “Divine proximity,” writes Deborah Steiner, “not
only reinforces the ‘charge’ carried by the inscribed column but also guarantees the preservation
of the material record by elevating it to the rank of sacred property.”68 Others have stressed the
stone’s transfiguration in the terms of it assuming a “votive character.”69
The intended audience was the gods but this does not mean that the public was barred
from seeing and even reading these display texts. Robin Osborne comments that by placing the
treaties in sacred locations, “political decisions are taken from the sphere of debate, from the
political world of the Pnyx and the agora, and replaced set before the eyes of the gods.”70 But his
depiction of this as a “depoliticizing” act is exaggerated and something the Greeks could not
have fathomed. A number of scholars have responded that the stelai were not hidden in the
temple inventory but were available for public viewing and scrutiny.71 Moreover, the political
authorities did not surrender all supervisory responsibilities and they continued to manage the
practical affairs of the alliance. The erection of stelai at sacred spots is rather a reiteration of the
67
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69

Lawton 1995, 28; Osborne 1999, 346-347 (reprinted in 2010, 69-70); Hagemajer Allen
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Stroud 1998, 46-48; Osborne 2012, 43-48. Culasso Gastaldi 2010, 139-155 argues that
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combined religious and secular nature of the agreements. They now possessed the full authority
of both the secular and the divine powers of the city.
Some alliances were also represented pictorially. Reliefs graced a few of the alliance
stelai in the first half of the fourth century: the Athenian alliances with the Eretrians in 394 (A3),
the Chians in 384 (A8), the Olynthians in 383 (A9), the four Peloponnesian poleis in 362 (A17),
the Thessalian League in 361 (A18), the northern kings in 356 (A20), and the Thracian
Neapolitans in 355.72 The reliefs generally depict the patron deities or other representative
figures in close proximity and with amicable gestures. In the relief for the joint alliance between
the Athenians and the Arcadians, Achaeans, Eleans, and Phliasians, for example, Athena,
representing Athens, stands with Zeus and Hera, popular divinities at Olympia then under Elean
control. The only example from this period of the dexiosis motif, the intimate act of clasping
right hands, is in the relief for the Athenian alliance with the Thracian Neapolitans, in which
Athena extends her right hand to the Neapolitan Parthenos.73 By midcentury, however, as Carol
Lawton notes, alliance reliefs decrease in importance, “having been replaced by diplomatic
documents emphasizing honours for foreign dignitaries.”74
At the same time, the Greeks began to commemorate the principal agents in the alliances
with honorific statues. The Thessalians, allies of the Thebans through much of the 360s (T1),
hired the sculptor Lysippus to make a statue of Pelopidas, which they erected at Dephi. Cornelius
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Nepos adds that bronze statues of the Theban general existed throughout Thessaly. Pausanias
says that the Messenians erected in their new capitol a statue of their patron Epaminondas and
placed it amongst statues of their divinities. Plutarch claims that in 368 the Athenians erected a
bronze statue of their benefactor (εὐεργέτης) and ally, Alexander of Pherae (A14). And the
Tarentines set up statues of the Spartan king Archidamus III at Delphi and at Olympia (S10).75
Allies could also express their cooperative agreements through coinage, in shared
iconography, mints, and weight standards. Examples of “cooperative coinage” are fairly regular
throughout the fourth century – the famous ΣΥN coinage, Byzantium and Chalcedon, Apollonia
and Epidamnus, Aspendus and Selge, and the Timoleontic coinage in Sicily are only a few
examples – but, unfortunately, they are not as prevalent a feature of the alliances for the
Athenians, Spartans, and Thebans at this time.76 There are only a few examples, discussed in
Chapter IV, of Phocian generals minting coins that commemorated their alliances with the
Spartans (S9) and Athenians (A21), and of the Tarentines minting coins with imagery that
represented their alliance with the Spartans (S10).
This chapter outlined the general procedures and protocols through which an alliance
passed from conception to conclusion. By passing the proposal through the political institutions,
the entire community came to have a vested interest in the form which it would take. It was a
communal activity with social connotations. Those principally involved in the process were
those with preexisting interstate relationships and connections which helped bring the two poleis
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together. And through the alliance process, with its many religious practices, the two created
even further ties of camaraderie. The oaths, sacrifices, shared meals, festivals, and display of the
alliance stelai in sacred locations accentuated the socio-cultural features. The practical and
symbolic meanings behind these procedures gave a greater purpose to the political and military
objectives. The following chapters turn to an examination of the Athenian, Spartan, and Theban
alliances in the fourth century.
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PART II:

CASE STUDIES (403-338)
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Chapter III
Athenian Alliances
A. From the Corinthian War to the Confederacy
As a result of their final defeat in the Peloponnesian War in 404, the Athenians were
forced to dismantle their vast network of interstate alliances, which had supported their
hegemony in Greece through much of the fifth century. In the peace treaty, the defeated swore to
“have the same enemies and friends [as the Spartans have], and to follow the Spartans on land
and on sea, wherever they should lead [τὸν αὐτὸν ἐχθρὸν καὶ φίλον νοµίζοντας Λακεδαιµονίοις
ἕπεσθαι καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ὅποι ἂν ἡγῶνται].”1 Henceforth, it would be the
dictates of the Spartan victors that directed their foreign policies. The Athenians and their allies
were then incorporated into the Spartan Empire, and nearly a decade would pass before they
circumvented Sparta’s oversight and entered into a bilateral alliance with the Boeotians, the first
of at least fifteen Athenian alliances in the ensuing Corinthian War (395 to 387).
By what means and for what purposes these alliances materialized is still not fully
understood. Scholarship today, under the influence of modern political science theories (i.e.,
Realism), is almost unanimous in its acceptance that they were tools of Realpolitik, products of
the Athenians’ imperial ambitions.2 This conventional representation of alliances, however, is
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Xen. Hell. 2.2.20. Bolmarcich 2008, 65-79 argues that this was the first time that the
Spartans imposed this form of the oath on an ally. Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 212-222
discusses the so-called oath of the Peloponnesian League.
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Seager 1967, 95-115; Cawkwell 1976b, 270-277; Badian 1995, 80-86; Buck 1998, 9698, 115-118; Harding 2015, 27-30. Exceptions to this perspective include Accame 1951; Griffith
1978, 127-144; Cargill 1981.
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reductionistic: it places a disproportionate amount of emphasis on the Athenians’ alleged allconsuming obsession with reviving their empire and ignores non-political influences. While not
denying that political factors existed, this chapter focuses on the socio-cultural aspects of the
new alliances. After a brief look at the interwar years (403 to 396), when the Athenians had to
come to terms with the loss of their alliance organization, the first half of Part A examines the
two phases in the revival of Athenian alliances during the Corinthian War: the mainland phase
from 395 to 394 and the Aegean phase from 390 to 389. In each phase the Athenians, especially
Thrasybulus of Steiria, built on existing social, religious, and economic connections for the
politico-military accords. The second half investigates the alliances after the war, from the
King’s Peace in 386 to the foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy in 377. Again, in this
period it was the long history of socio-economic contacts, as well as shared ideology, kinship,
and religion that prompted and substantiated these alliances. The conclusion drawn from this
evidence is that these alliances were more than isolated and temporary expedients; they were also
manifestations of the various interstate interactions between the Athenians and their allies. In
short, this chapter rejects the notion of the Athenian empire striking back in the early years of the
fourth century and supports the existence of a new hope of interstate collaboration through
alliances.

Alliances on the Mainland (395-394)

In order to understand the revival of Athenian alliances in the beginning of the fourth
century, it is not enough to only appreciate the geopolitical position (or rather non-position) of
Athens at the time but also to take notice of the social bonds between individual Athenians and
71

future allies that originated in the dramatic weeks and months after the Peloponnesian War. With
Athens under the control of the Thirty Tyrants, many of the democrats, now considered persona
non grata in the city, fled for refuge to Thebes, among other areas.3 The exiles developed
relationships with their hosts that they would appeal to later in forming alliances. Take, for
example, the case of Thrasybulus of Steiria, who formed a close friendship with Ismenias, the
anti-Spartan leader in Thebes. The latter supported Thrasybulus during his stay and provided him
with arms, money, and a base to oust the Thirty and restore democracy to Athens.4 It is true that
this assistance was given as a power play – the Thebans, wounded by the Spartans’ disregard for
their postwar wishes, helped the Athenian democrats only in retaliation against the Spartans –
but, as an explanation for interstate behavior, human agency need not be discarded entirely in
favor of the structural factors of geopolitics.5 As will be seen in this chapter, sub-unit level
interactions from 404 and 403 played just as significant a role in the first alliances of the fourth
century.
Against all odds, the Athenian democrats defeated the oligarchs and their Spartan
defenders, and instituted a peaceful restoration of democracy under Thrasybulus’ supervision.
Afterwards, the Athenians dedicated in the temple of Heracles at Thebes statues of Athena and

3
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Xen. Hell. 2.4.2; Diod. Sic. 14.32.1; Plut. Lys. 27.4; Just. Epit. 5.9.8. Buck 1998, 66 and
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Heracles, representative deities of each polis and symbols of the new ties between them. They
also passed a number of honorific decrees on behalf of their benefactors.6 Already in 403, the
Athenians intended to eventually break from their Spartan overseers and turn to their Theban
friends, but such a reorientation took a few years to accomplish. On a number of occasions
between 403 and 396, the Athenians dismissed Sparta’s authority, but they were limited to acts
of passive resistance or cautious assertions of their autonomy.7 In 396, for example, Thrasybulus
publicly opposed a plot by the Athenian radicals to dispatch a state ship in support of Conon and
the Persians who were fighting the Spartans in the Aegean, and convinced the Athenians to
disavow the action to the Spartans.8 He reasoned that the city, with its present state of defense
(no walls), would be at risk of Spartan retaliation if they did not renounce the radicals’ scheme.
Had there been a strong ally, such as Thebes would be in the next year, he would not have been
averse to hazard a confrontation with Sparta.9 It is worth supposing that he was privy as early as
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Statues of Heracles and Athena: Paus. 9.11.6; cf. Pemberton 1981, 317-320; Steinbock
2013, 232-235. Honorific decrees: ibid., 235-245. Buck 2005, 37-38 supposes that when the
Thebans seized Oropus, an Athenian satellite in northeast Attica (Diod. Sic. 14.17.3),
Thrasybulus restrained any response as a gesture of gratitude to the Thebans. Athenian-Theban
relations in general in the first decades of the fourth century: Buckler and Beck 2008, 33-43.
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Culasso Gastaldi 2003, 244-248; Shear 2011, 235-238; Lambert 2012b, 257-259). At the turn of
the century, they contributed troops to at least two Spartan campaigns, but Xen. Hell. 3.1.4, 2.25
supposes that this was so that the democrats could rid the city of unwanted oligarchic (proSpartan) elements. In 397 they sent arms and sailors to Conon and made an unsuccessful attempt
to open diplomatic overtures to the Persian King (Hell. Oxy. 7.1). In 396 they refused to join
Agesilaus’ Asian expedition (Paus. 3.9.2). Harding 2015, 26 sums up the Athenian condition:
“The Athenians were not lacking in spirit or overwhelmed by their defeat in the Peloponnesian
War. . . . They were not cowering in their boots, as has been suggested.”
8
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this to Theban machinations against Sparta. Since the contemporary author of the Hellenica
Oxyrhynchia depicts close, almost symbiotic, connections between like-minded factions in
various poleis, it would be remarkable if Ismenias did not share sensitive information with him.
His familiarity with and support for current war plans in Thebes, then, explains, ironically, his
apparent cooperation with Sparta; it can be seen as a tactic to buy time for those preparations.10
Those plans materialized in early 395. The leading Thebans conspired to start a conflict
between Locris (a Theban ally) and Phocis (a Spartan ally), in the hopes of it erupting into a
general war against Sparta. As expected, Phocis appealed to its Spartan protectors, who
responded, also as expected, by leading an army towards Boeotia. Locris, meanwhile, looked to
Thebes.11 Rather than face the invaders immediately and with more substantial support, the
Thebans dispatched ambassadors to Athens regarding an alliance. But this was not a sudden
reaction to the Spartan invasion – the Thebans had been long hoping and plotting for this war. It
was a natural appeal to their friends in Athens.
A1

The Athenians and the Boeotians (395)
IG II² 14; Xen. Hell. 3.5.7-16
There is no historical or epigraphical evidence for the reception of the ambassadors by

the Athenian council; perhaps the circumstances were already known so the council fast-tracked
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His support for the anti-Spartan alliance with the Boeotians in 395 (see below) shows a
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the matter to the assembly, where the envoys presented their case for alliance. Many scholars
have already examined in detail this speech, recorded in Xen. Hell. 3.5.8-15, so it is not
necessary here to mention more than the main points.12 The speakers begin with the moral
imperative, derived from the social norms of gratitude and reciprocity, which the Athenians have
to help because the Thebans acted on their behalf in 404 and 403 (8-9). They next argue that in
order for the Athenians to recover their prominence in Greece they must help the wronged
(βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουµένοις), in this case all the Greeks under Spartan domination (10-13).13 And
if they accept this charge, to become the “guardians of the wronged [προστῆτε . . .
ἀδικουµένων],” it is promised that the liberated Greeks will be grateful and loyal to the
Athenians, who will in turn become “by far the greatest of those that have ever been [πολὺ ἤδη
µεγίστους τῶν πώποτε γενέσθαι]” (14). The speech ends with a promise of future benefits for
both sides deriving from the proposed alliance (15).
It is important to note that this case includes both political (restoration of Athenian rule in
the Greek world) and moral grounds (reciprocity and helping the wronged). The latter are what
modern scholars pass over, assuming them to be a mask which needs to be stripped away and
discarded, to get at the supposed real factors of power and self-interest.14 While it is true that
much of the speech is concerned with the possibility of a restored Athenian hegemony, that
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Seager 1967, 96-99; Gray 1989, 107-112; Tuplin 1993, 60-64; Krentz 1995, 198-200;
Low 2007, 71-72; Christ 2012, 156-158; Steinbock 2013, 245-253.
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Reciprocity in this speech: Gray 1989, 107-112; Low 2007, 69-72.

14

Hamilton 1979, 202 labels the ambassadors’ points “rhetorical and tendentious.”
Cartledge 1987, 292 calls the speech “a heterogeneous cocktail of truths, half-truths and
demonstrable falsehoods.” Christ 2012, 156 describes the speech as “fundamentally pragmatic in
its appeal to Athenian interests.”
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promise is based upon the fulfillment of the moral duties to help the wronged and return services.
Moral and political considerations are inextricable, therefore, in the formation of this alliance.
The identity of the speakers is not recorded, but it is reasonable that they would be
associated somehow with Isemenias and Thrasybulus. Within the (self-)deceptive claims in the
introduction to the speech – i.e., Thebes did not support the proposal to destroy Athens in 404
and every Theban contributed to the Athenian democrats’ victory at the Piraeus in 403 – are
insinuations that the speakers were on intimate terms with Thrasybulus and his faction.15 The
envoys hold in contempt the city faction (τῶν ἐν ἄστει) of Athens, those who had collaborated
with the Spartans, saying, “you would certainly have perished, but the commons [ὁ δῆµος] here
saved you.”16 These words reminded all of that crucial period when the two parties forged close
ties of friendship, manifested in their support for the return of the Athenian democrats in 403 and
which now obligated the latter to make return services.
Thrasybulus may have even met with the envoys before they presented their case to the
assembly.17 Xenophon, shielding his fellow Athenian from the culpability of the Thebans in
starting the war against his Spartan friends, presents Thrasybulus only after the envoys finished
speaking and the assembly voted. The friend of Ismenias should not, however, be seen merely
reacting to the Theban speech; on the contrary, he was actively involved behind the scenes laying
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Xen. Hell. 3.5.8-9. The demand for Athens’ destruction in 404: ibid. 2.2.19 (cf. Plut.
Lys. 15.2). The Thebans’ refusal to march against Athens in 403: Xen. Hell. 2.4.30.
16

Ibid. 3.5.9.
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Alcibiades met in advance with the Spartan envoys to Athens in 420 (Thuc. 5.44-45).
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the groundwork for the alliance.18 During the debate in the assembly, moreover, he and his
associates must have stressed the strength and resources of the Boeotian forces, as the orator
Andocides said a few years later, recalling this day: “when we made an alliance with the
Boeotians, we did this having some opinion. Was it not that it would be sufficient, having the
power of Boeotia with us, to defend ourselves from all men [ὅτε Βοιωτοῖς τὴν συµµαχίαν
ἐποιούµεθα, τίνα γνώµην ἔχοντες ταῦτα ἐπράττοµεν. οὐχ ὡς ἱκανὴν οὖσαν τὴν Βοιωτῶν δύναµιν
µεθ᾽ ἡµῶν γενοµένην κοινῇ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἀµύνασθαι;]?”19 With optimism such as this,
says Xenophon, very many (πάµπολλοι) spoke in support of the alliance and everyone (πάντες)
cast a vote in its favor. Thrasybulus announced the decision (ψήφισµα) to the Theban envoys
along with an explanation for its acceptance. He did not respond to the ambassadors’ promises of
a restored empire; his attention was chiefly on fulfilling the obligations of reciprocity.
“Thrasybulus, while announcing the decree, was pointing out that, although the Piraeus was
unwalled, they would nevertheless run the risk to return a favor to them greater than the one they
received [in 404]. ‘For you,’ he said, ‘did not join in the campaign against us [in 403], but we will
20
fight with you against them if they come against you.’”
Θρασύβουλος δὲ ἀποκρινάµενος τὸ ψήφισµα καὶ τοῦτο ἐνεδείκνυτο, ὅτι ἀτειχίστου τοῦ Πειραιῶς
ὄντος ὅµως παρακινδυνεύσοιεν χάριτα αὐτοῖς ἀποδοῦναι µείζονα ἢ ἔλαβον. ὑµεῖς µὲν γάρ, ἔφη,
οὐ συνεστρατεύσατε ἐφ᾽ ἡµᾶς, ἡµεῖς δέ γε µεθ᾽ ὑµῶν µαχούµεθα ἐκείνοις, ἂν ἴωσιν ἐφ᾽ ὑµᾶς.

Thrasybulus recognized the earlier Theban services and the Athenians’ moral duty to reciprocate.
His final remark, which Xenophon records in direct speech, a comparison of what Athens is
about to do (send an army to Boeotia) with what Thebes did not do in 403 (send an army to
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That Thrasybulus proposed the alliance in the assembly is not implausible (pace
Cawkwell 1976b, 275; Hansen 1983, 169).
19

Andoc. 3.25.
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Xen. Hell. 3.5.16.
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Attica), however acerbic it may appear, harmonized with the practicalities of traditional
reciprocity. For a return of exact equivalence risked the cancellation of future benefits, but by
repaying a favor with a greater one, the Athenians guaranteed continued Theban services.
The two sides came to an agreement on the operative terms of the alliance, which were
then inscribed on stone and erected on the Acropolis. The extant treaty reads as follows:
“Alliance of the Boeotians and Athenians for all time.
If any one goes against the Athenians for war either by land or by sea, the Boeotians shall go in
support with all their strength as the Athenians call on them, as far as possible; and if any one
goes against the Boeotians for war either by land or by sea, the Athenians shall go in support with
all their strength as the Boeotians call on them, as far as possible.
And if it is decided to add or subtract anything by the Athenians and Boeotians in common
21
deliberation.”
[ ]οι
vacat
[συµ]µαχία Βοιω[τῶν καὶ Ἀ]θηναί[ων ἐς τὸ][ν ἀεὶ] χρόνον vacat
[ἐάν τ]ις ἴηι ἐπ [Ἀθηναίος] ἐπ[ὶ] πολέµω [ι ἢ]
[κατὰ] γῆν ἢ κατ[ὰ θάλαττ]αν βοηθε̑ν Βοι[ω][τὸς π]αντὶ σθέ[νει καθ]ότι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλ[ωσιν] Ἀθηναῖ[οι κατὰ τὸ] δυνατόν· καὶ ἐ[ά][ν τις ἴ]ηι ἐπὶ [Βοιωτὸς ἐ]πὶ πολέµωι ἢ [κα][τὰ γῆν ἢ] κατὰ [θάλατταν], βοηθε̑ν Ἀθηνα[ί][ος παντὶ σθένει καθότι] ἂν ἐπαγγέλλ[ω]
[σι Βοιωτοὶ κατὰ τὸ δυνα]τόν. ἐάν δέ τ[ι δ]οκῆι ἢ προσθεῖναι ἢ ἀφελεῖ]ν Ἀθην[αίο][ις καὶ Βοιωτοῖς κοινῆι βουλευοµένο][ις (?) - - - - -]

The treaty follows the diplomatic conventions of fourth-century Greece, combining
political and non-political features. The first line contains only “[ ]οι,” the typical invocation of
the gods (θεοί), reinforcing the primary importance which the Greeks gave to the religious

21

IG II² 14. The English translation comes from RO 6. Philoch. FGrH 328 F 148 (cf.
Harding 2008, 142-143) also mentions a “συµµαχία Ἀθηναίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν.”
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elements of political and military accords (see Chapter II).22 The next two lines contain the
subject-heading and the eternal duration of the alliance (ἐς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον), an indication that, at
least in its conception, the signatories considered their collaboration to last beyond the immediate
military objective. Next is the debut of the mutual defense clause that would become a standard
feature in alliances of the fourth century – the Boeotians will support Athens “with all their
strength” (κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν) if attacked and vice versa. Finally, provision is made for
amendment, another common article of interstate documents. In sum, the alliance was an active
affirmation of the commitment that the new allies had to each other in the context of an
impending war with Sparta, and a manifestation of their specific socio-cultural connections.
But the terms of the ratified alliance were rudimentary. It probably contained some form
of prohibition against intervening in each other’s domestic affairs, but any other article is
unrecoverable.23 The authorities, perhaps under pressure from the immediate crisis, overlooked
some practical matters of alliance management. For example, they did not clarify details of
leadership roles, which were still unsettled in the next year at the Battle of Nemea.24 They did
not include a prohibition against making a unilateral peace with the enemy, as the Thebans
attempted to do in 390.25 There was also no time for the customary meal of hospitality (ξένια) for
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Pounder 1984, 243-250 shows the Near Eastern origin of θεοί in inscription headings.
The gods in Greek treaties: Bederman 2001, 48-87; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 160-167.
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In 382, after the war, an Athenian attempted to raise a revolution in Thebes, which,
according to Lys. 26.23, “deprived us of that alliance [τῆς συµµαχίας ἡµᾶς ταύτης
ἀπεστέρησεν]” (see note 78).
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Xen. Hell. 4.2.13.
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Ibid. 4.5.6; Plut. Ages. 22.1; cf. Buck 1994, 55-56.
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the envoys. The Thebans returned hastily to Boeotia, where their army defeated the invading
Spartans. The Athenian army with Thrasybulus at the head arrived soon afterwards; although it
played no operational part in the battle, its very presence shows commitment to the new
alliance.26
A2-A3 The Athenians and the Locrians and the Eretrians (395-394)
IG II² 15-16
In the first two years of the Corinthian War, the Athenians concluded other bilateral
alliances with the Locrians and the Eretrians. The wording of the first treaty is nearly identical to
the one with the Boeotians that it must have been concluded around the same time. Their
similarity in vocabulary and their coevality makes sense since it was the Locrians, Theban allies,
who set off the events leading to the Corinthian War.27 The Eretrian alliance came about very
early in 394.28 Its inscription survives in two fragments. The first contains the subject-heading
and the prescript. The second has the familiar clauses for mutual defense, indicated by κατὰ τὸ
δυνατόν, and for future amendment. There are also features that did not appear in the two earlier
treaties. This is the first to preserve instructions for the swearing of a general oath for the alliance
as well as of the customary oath (τὸν νόµιµον ὅρκον), but neither oath’s contents is disclosed.29

26

Xen. Hell. 3.5.17-22; Plut. Lys. 28.3; Paus. 3.5.3-4.

27

Xen. Hell. 3.5.3-4 says Opuntian Locris. Hell. Oxy. 18.2 (cf. Paus. 3.9.9) says Ozolian

Locris.
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Because the council rather than the assembly plays a prominent role in enacting this
alliance, Krentz 1979, 398-400 revises its date to 403. Rhodes 1972, 83-84 supposes that the
decree is misattributed to the council and actually a “probouleumata ratified by the ecclesia.”
Knoepfler 1980, 462-469 supports the traditional date of 394.
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A νόµιµος ὅρκος appears also in A15, A18, and A22. Low 2007, 94-95 considers
νόµιµος ὅρκος in official records to be evidence of the impact of social norms on interstate
relations.
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As with the invocation of the gods, this indicates the religious significance which the ancient
Greeks saw in their secular contracts. The treaty also includes the charge for the Athenian
council to choose five council members and five common citizens (ἐξ ἰδιωτῶν) to travel to
Eretria and receive the return oaths from their new allies. The alliance was not the product of one
man or faction but incorporated participation from a cross-section of society. The ambassadors
exchanged oaths and put the agreement into operation; accordingly, in the battles of 394 the
Eretrians contributed forces to the allied side.30 Meanwhile, in addition to their bilateral
alliances, the Athenians and their new allies (Boeotians, Corinthians, and Argives) established a
common council (συνέδριον κοινὸν) at Corinth, to ensure efficient management of the alliances
and of the war. This council dispatched ambassadors (πρέσβεις) to win over more allies at
Euboea, Leucas, Acarnania, Ambracia, and the Chalcidice.31 As these were multilateral not
bilateral alliances, this study will not discuss their distinctive features.

Alliances in the Aegean (390-389)

The momentum, however, was short-lived. The allies could not rebound from significant
defeats at Nemea and Coronea.32 By 392, a faction in Athens, weary of the war, dispatched a
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Xen. Hell. 4.2.17, 3.15; Diod. Sic. 14.82.3.
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Ibid. 14.82.1-3. The military victories of Conon at Cos, Nisyros, Teos, Mytilene,
Ephesus, Erythrae and Samos did not create official Athenian alliances. Ibid. 14.84.3-4 says only
that they were previously allies (σύµµαχοι) of Sparta but changed sides (µετέβαλον).
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Nemea: Xen. Hell. 4.2.9-23; Dem. 20.52-53; Diod. Sic. 14.82.10-83.2. Coronea: Xen.
Hell. 4.3.15-21; Ages. 2.6-16; Diod. Sic. 14.84.1-2; Nep. Ages. 4.5; Plut. Ages. 18-19.
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peace embassy to Sparta, but that effort failed.33 The war continued, as did the practice of
making alliances, this time in the Aegean. In 391, the Spartans dispatched their navy to help the
oligarchs on Rhodes seize political control away from the democrats and then set up their own
base on the island from where they could badger Athenian ships.34 In response, the Athenians
ordered the construction of forty ships (the largest Athenian fleet thus far in the fourth century)
for an expedition to Rhodes. The objectives were clear, consisting of military and moral
objectives: defeat the Spartan enemy and help the Rhodian democrats, friends of the Athenians.
While the new fleet was under construction, it became apparent that the expedition and
the continuation of the war would be costly. In a speech delivered c. 388, the orator Lysias
implies that when Thrasybulus, who, among all Athenians at the time, had the most experience in
naval command and in raising revenue, campaigned for command of this expedition, he
promised that he would secure funds to support the fleet and also enrich the home treasury.35
These financial concerns explain why as soon as the fleet set sail he redirected it to the north
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General discussions of the Peace: Ryder 1965, 27-33; Hamilton 1979, 233-259;
Roberts 1982, 88-93; Strauss 1987, 138-143. Keen 1995, 1-10 discusses the proposed dates (392
or 387) for the Peace mentioned in Philoch. FGrH 328 F149a. Seager 1967, 107-108 (cf. Buck
1998, 111) infers Thrasybulus’ opposition to the Peace from an Aristophanic (Eccl. 356-364)
comparison of a speech from a certain Thrasybulus to a wild pear that causes constipation; i.e.,
he blocked the Peace.
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Lys. 19.21. Xen. Hell. 4.8.24 comments on the irony of a Spartan capture of ten
Athenian ships on their way to the Cypriote King Evagoras, who had recently revolted from the
Persian King: “Both were doing these things contrary to themselves: for the Athenians,
professing to be a friend [φίλῳ] to the King, were sending a force [συµµαχίαν] to Evagoras who
was making war against the King. But Teleutias, although the Spartans were at war with the
King, was destroying those sailing to make war against him.”
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Lys. 28.4. There were feeble attempts to raise money in 392 with property or sales
taxes at low rates, the πεντακοσιοστή (1/500) and τεσσαρακοστή (1/40) (Aristoph. Eccl. 823825, 1006-1007).
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Aegean.36 Some have interpreted this and Thrasybulus’ subsequent actions as a product of the
Athenian impulse towards imperialism.37 Xenophon, however, says that in the meantime the
Rhodian democrats had returned to power and there was nothing more to achieve on the island.38
But, considering the monthly expense of keeping the ships at sea reaching forty talents and the
unlikelihood of receiving financial support from home, Thrasybulus needed to find a way to
quickly raise revenue. His solution was to combine money collection with making (or restoring)
alliances, a strategy he had employed in the north Aegean in the previous century.
Diodorus, perhaps confusing activities at the end of the campaign for the beginning, says
the fleet sailed first to Ionia, “taking money from the allies [χρήµατα λαβὼν παρὰ τῶν
συµµάχων],” but he does not identify precisely who these allies were. Xenophon, making no
mention of Ionian allies, says that the Athenians went straight to the Hellespont, where “there
was no opposition present [οὐδενὸς ἀντιπάλου παρόντος].”39 In fact, there were Spartans in the
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Proposed dates for the start of the expedition are 391 (Cawkwell 1976b, 271-275;
Strauss 1984, 45-47; Howan 2005, 19-20, 29-32), 390 (Seager 1967, 108-110; Funke 1980, 96;
Buck 1998, 112), or 389 (Hamilton 1979, 294-296; Stylianou 1988, 470-471).
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Seager 1967, 115: Thrasybulus was “the instrument of the assembly’s imperial design.”
Cawkwell 1976b, 270: he was “a full-blooded restorer of the fifth-century empire.” Hamilton
1979, 294: “his real motive was to reconstruct a new maritime empire for Athens.” Cartledge
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Xen. Hell. 4.8.25.
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Ibid. 4.8.26; Diod. Sic. 14.94.2. The Loeb edition translates οὐδενὸς ἀντιπάλου
παρόντος as “there was no adversary there,” but this does not correspond with the presence of
Dercylidas at the straits.
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area – at Lesbos, Thasos and at the straits, at least – but they did not challenge the Athenian
ships.40 Modern historians make the sensible, prima facie, case that Thrasybulus’ motive in
sailing here was the security of the Black Sea grain route. With the memory of the fatal
consequences from the Spartans’ occupation of the Hellespont in 404, it seems impossible that
such an objective was not in his mind; however, there is no indication in the sources that he
recognized any threat to the Athenians’ access to the grain route.41 Nor did he attempt to drive
out the Spartan Dercylidas from Abydus on the Asiatic side of the straights. Instead, the sources
indicate that the principal advocate of Athenian alliances on mainland Greece had his eyes on
expanding the alliance network into the north Aegean.
A4-A5 The Athenians and Seuthes and Amadocus (390)
IG II2 21-22; Xen. Hell. 4.8.26; Diod. Sic. 14.94.2
Xenophon says Thrasybulus went to Thrace because “he thought he might accomplish
something good for the city [ἐνόµισε καταπρᾶξαι ἄν τι τῇ πόλει ἀγαθόν].”42 A rivalry had
erupted between two Odrysian (Thracian) leaders, Amadocus I and Seuthes II, which had the
potential of disrupting the security of the Greeks in the region as well as Athenian prospects
there.43 Thrasybulus was well qualified to effect a rapprochement and “to accomplish something
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Lesbos: Xen. Hell. 4.8.28-29; Diod. Sic. 14.94.4. Thasos: Dem. 20.59. The straits: Xen.
Hell. 4.8.3-6.
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Hamilton 1979, 294-295; Burke 1990, 5-7; Sears 2013, 99-100; Sorg 2015, 52.
Athenian enemies often blockaded the Hellespont: in 404 (Xen. Hell. 2.2.1-10), 388 (ibid.
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Archibald 1998, 122-124.
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good” for Athens. There is a strong possibility that his family had personal connections with elite
Thracians from the early fifth century, which, if true, he could have exploited when he
campaigned and engaged in money collection (ἀργυρολόγος) around Thrace between 410 and
407.44 Thracians, too, may have been one of the foreign groups who fought alongside him at the
Piraeus in 403.45 In other words, his social contacts with Thracians were as extensive as those
with the Thebans.
Therefore, notwithstanding the presence of enemy Spartans, Thrasybulus sailed to the
Thracian coast to arbitrate first with Seuthes and then with Amadocus. Xenophon says that he
successfully negotiated a reconciliation between the two rivals and made them both “friends and
allies [φίλοι καὶ σύµµαχοι]” of Athens.46 The inscription recording the alliance with Seuthes
(A4) is badly preserved, but it is possible to make out the instructions for the erection of the
stele; for the swearing of the oath in Athens by the general, hipparch, taxiarch, and phylarch; and
the customary invitation to Seuthes’ ambassadors for a meal in the Prytaneion. Some form of
σύµµαχος appears three times in the inscription but without context. Whatever the arrangements
were, Seuthes was satisfied – Lysias voices the rumor that he offered Thrasybulus his daughter in
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marriage – as was Amadocus.47 The two-sided inscription for the alliance with the latter (A5) is
also fragmentary, only mentioning the Odrysian’s name (twice) on one side; on the other side
another Thracian is honored as πρόξενος καὶ εὐεργέτης of the Athenians and there are
instructions for the display of the stele on the Acropolis. Unfortunately, these fragments do not
disclose the exact terms of the alliances and it is impossible to reconstruct them from any other
sources. There may have been little more than what is mentioned above along with a
reaffirmation of earlier Athenian-Thracian alliances.48 Thrasybulus negotiated the terms of these
alliances quickly: there was no time for the usual procedural interchange between states. Indeed,
in all of the alliances in this campaign he worked on his own authority. Later, his subordinate
Chabrias, who also participated in the negotiations in Thrace, brought the provisional agreements
back to the Athenian assembly, which then ratified them.49
A6

The Athenians and the Thasians (390)
IG II² 24; Dem. 20.59
Thrasybulus chose deliberately to deal first with the situation in Thrace because the

rapprochement of the rivals and gaining alliances with them could influence others in the region
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to collaborate with Athens. So from Thrace he sailed to Thasos, another place where he engaged
in money collection (ἀργυρολογία) during the Peloponnesian War. In 407, after its brief
defection to the Spartans, he recovered the island for Athens and restored democracy.50 Although
control of the island changed hands again later, the Athenians maintained friendly relations with
the islanders in the first decades of the fourth century; there are at least a half-dozen honorific
decrees for individual Thasians.51 Considering the commercial significance of its natural
resources and strategic location, the interest in Thasos is not hard to recognize.52 When the
Athenian fleet reached the island in 390, according to Demosthenes, a certain Ecphantus and his
followers rose up, expelled the Spartan garrison, and welcomed Thrasybulus.53 The Athenian
decree most likely associated with the alliance at this time is IG II² 24, a composite inscription of
four fragments. Fragments B and C describe various awards for individual Thasians, including
dinner in the Prytaneion, and contain the usual instructions for the erection of the stele.
Fragment A, although badly preserved, is more important for an understanding of the
alliance conditions.
[Ἀρχίππωι καὶ Ἱππάρχωι τοῖς Ἀρχίπ]που Θασίοις.
[
]γ καὶ χ[— — — — — — — — — — — — —]
[ ]ας κον ἱκανὰ ε[— — — — — — — — — — —]
[Θ]ασίοις εἰκοστὴγ κ[— — — — — — — — — —]
είων εἰκοστὴν ὑποτ[ελ
ἐµ]
πορίων εἰκοστὴν τω[— — — — — — — — — — —]
50

Thasian campaigns in 410 and 409: Thuc. 8.64; Xen. Hell. 1.1.12; Diod. Sic. 13.49.1-3,
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ν ὅτε [Θρασ]ύβολος ἦρ[χεν — — — — — — — —]
[
]ιετ[— — — — — — — — — — —]
[
]υλι[— — — — — — — — — — — —]
[π]ερ[ὶ δὲ] τῶν ἄλλων [ὧν λέγουσιν Θάσιοι τὴν βο]λὴ[ν ἑλ]έ[σ]θαι πέν[τε ἄνδρας οἵτινες µετὰ τῆς]
πρ[εσ]βέ[ας τῶν Θασίων
]
ς ἀ[π]δείξοσιν [
τὰς δὲ δί][κ]ας δο͂ναι κ[α]ὶ δ[έξασθαι — — — — — — —]
[ ]α̣[
]ι̣επι ε[— — — — — — — — — — —]

This fragment refers back to Thrasybulus’ expedition on line 7 (ὅτε [Θρασ]ύβολος ἦρ[χεν]). It also
mentions the selection by the council of five ambassadors to Thasos, presumably to swear to
oaths and confirm the alliance terms. But what is noteworthy are the three references on lines
four to six to an εἰκοστή (a five percent tax) on goods passing through the island. In 413, as a
response to a financial crisis, the Athenians had replaced the traditional tribute (φόρος) with an
εἰκοστή as a means for the allies to meet the financial obligations of their alliances. Thucydides,
judging it an irrational and hasty measure of the democracy, bleakly assesses the effectiveness of
the new tax.54 Lisa Kallet, however, underscoring the motivations and expectations of the time,
views it as a subtle yet significant change in the fundamental nature of the Athenian Empire. The
old φόρος arrangement drew the Athenians into the internal affairs of the allies, but the εἰκοστή
reduced their supervision to the collection of funds when necessary. This, Kallet says, was
“nothing short of a radical reorientation of the arche. . . . The Athenians’ self-interest in their
empire in the course of the Peloponnesian War has come to have to do with money above all –
not power over allies per se.” Likewise, Thomas Figueira labels the change as “an evolution of
hegemonic policy toward a more ideological orientation.”55 The change in Athens’ relationship
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Thuc. 7.28.4. Kallet 2001, 197-226 and Figueira 2005, 83-133 critique previous
scholarship on the tax.
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Kallet 2001, 200; Figueira 2005, 120-121; cf. Kellogg 2004/2005, 65-66.
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to the allies, therefore, was momentous and must have impressed Thrasybulus, who learned the
fine points of collecting the εἰκοστή when he conducted operations around Thrace and Thasos
between 410 and 407.56
When he returned in 390, it was natural for him to revive a familiar method of revenue
collection. Rather than the φόρος, the symbol of the fifth-century empire, he imposed the
εἰκοστή, suggesting that this was an economic more than a political measure. Indeed, there is no
evidence in the literary or epigraphic record of any irritation from the Thasians because of the
economic burdens of their alliance with Athens. Had it been recognized that Thrasybulus was reestablishing the Athenian Empire at their expense, there would likely be some indication of
frustration.57 In any case, as in the Thracian alliances, Thrasybulus arranged the terms on his own
authority and then sent the provisional treaty to Athens for ratification and public display.58
Securing Thasos as an ally encouraged others in the region to follow suit. Demosthenes
says that the islanders, “offering to be a friend to your country [i.e., Athens], were the reason you
made allies around Thrace [καὶ παρασχόντες φίλην ὑµῖν τὴν αὑτῶν πατρίδα αἴτιοι τοῦ γενέσθαι
σύµµαχον τὸν περὶ Θρᾴκην τόπον ὑµῖν ἐγένοντο].”59 His next stops were at Samothrace and
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The tax’s continuation beyond 413: Kallet 2001, 224-226; Figueira 2005, 95-110.
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A number of scholars (Griffith 1978, 130-132; Strauss 1984, 47; Figueira 2005, 130)
see the allies agreeing to bear the taxes as part of the common war effort.
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Harding 25 discusses the date of the inscription.
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Dem. 20.59. It is unclear whether this passage is referring to the renewal of relations in
407 or 391. It could apply to both. A later Athenian honorific decree (IG II² 33), dated to
sometime in the 380s or 370s (Osborne 1982, 48-57), grants tax exemptions (ἀτέλεια) to
Ecphantus and his party, presumably the same ones mentioned by Demosthenes (as suggested by
Harris 2008, 39 n. 85).
89

Tenedos, and then, even though the Spartan Dercylidas was stationed at Sestus and Abydus, he
sailed unopposed through the straits and on to Byzantium, where he restored democracy and
reinstated a ten percent tax (δεκάτη) on ships sailing into and out of the Black Sea.60 The δεκάτη
was another tax from the fifth century: in 410 Alcibiades, Thrasybulus’ associate at the time, set
up a custom house (δεκατευτήριον) at nearby Chrysopolis to collect this tax.61 Thrasybulus
followed this example in 390, but he farmed out its collection (ἀπέδοτο τὴν δεκάτην). As at
Thasos, there is no evidence of dissatisfaction with the arrangements; in fact, Xenophon says the
common people (ὁ δῆµος), at least, were happy to see so many Athenians in their city.62 Later in
the century, Demosthenes claims that these achievements made the Athenians “masters of the
Hellespont [κυρίους . . . τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου].”63 Although there is no mention of an official
alliance at this time, the revenue collection arrangements at Byzantium are significant to this
study because they were consistent with the overall objectives of this second phase of alliancemaking. And there were later alliances – an official one in the late 380s (A10) and a renewal as
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Samothrace and Tenedos: Xen. Hell. 5.1.7. In 394, Dercylidas had held back the
attacks of Conon’s forty ships (ibid. 4.8.4-6). Byzantium: Dem. 20.60; cf. Robinson 2011, 146149.
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IG I2 91; IG I3 108; Xen. Hell. 1.1.22; Polyb. 4.44.3; cf. Rubel 2001, 39-51. Figueira
2005, 111-117 sees the legitimacy of Thrasybulus’ tax extending from Alcibiades’ precedent.
Alcibiades carried on additional money collection (ἀργυρολόγος) ventures in 411 at
Halicarnassus and Cos (Thuc. 8.108.2; Diod. Sic. 13.42.2-3); in 410 at Cyzicus and Selymbria
(Xen. Hell. 1.1.20-21); and in 408 at Selymbria, Chalcedon, and elsewhere in the Hellespont
(ibid. 1.3.3, 8; Diod. Sic. 13.66.3-4; Plut. Alc. 30.1).
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Xen. Hell. 4.8.27.
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Dem. 20.60. Demosthenes also says that the δεκάτη supplied Athens with enough
money to force a peace on the Spartans. Although he has completely reversed the conditions
under which peace was made, he is expressing the expectations of the time that Thrasybulus
would successfully establish a means of revenue for the polis.
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part of the Second Athenian Confederacy in 377 – which can be seen as distant results of
Thrasybulus’ work.64 In 390, he also made the Chalcedonians friends (φιλοῖ) of Athens before
sailing back out to the Aegean.65
A7

The Athenians and the Mytileneans (389)
Xen. Hell. 4.8.28-30; Diod. Sic. 14.94.3-4
After encountering a severe storm, less than half of the fleet arrived on the island of

Lesbos. It landed at Mytilene, the only Lesbian city not under Spartan control. Diodorus claims
that the Mytileneans became allies (σύµµαχοι) of Thrasybulus. Xenophon seems to support this.
He says that the Mytileneans offered their strongest fighters (ἐρρωµενεστάτους) for the
impending battle against the Spartans, and Thrasybulus reciprocated this service with promises
commonly associated with interstate coalitions: to set up the Mytileneans as the leaders
(προστάται) of the island, to return the democratic exiles to their various home states on the
island, and to “add Lesbos as a friend to the city (of Athens) [ὡς φίλην Λέσβον προσποιήσαντες
τῇ πόλει].”66 With the support of the new Mytilenean allies, the Athenians defeated the Spartans
at Methymna, after which Thrasybulus brought over more of the cities (τὰς µὲν προσηγάγετο
τῶν πόλεων) and levied contributions (ἀργυρολόγος) in order to pay for the campaign. Those
who refused he plundered (λεηλατῶν χρήµατα), an indication of continuing financial need.67
Diodorus says that after losing twenty-three ships in the earlier storm and enduring other losses
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IG II2 43, line 83; Diod. Sic. 15.28.3.
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Xen. Hell. 4.8.28.
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Ibid.; Diod. Sic. 14.94.3-4.
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Xen. Hell. 4.8.30.
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at Methymna, the Athenians received reinforcements from Chian allies (παρά Χίων συµµάχων),
which, if true, indicates that Thrasybulus also made an alliance with Chios at this time.68
Although there are no official alliances recorded with any other Lesbian cities besides Mytilene,
Diodorus mentions Methymna, along with Chios, Byzantium, and Mytilene (and Rhodes), as
founding members of the Second Athenian Confederacy.69 This is an outcome of the alliance
infrastructure set up by Thrasybulus.
No more alliances materialized after he left Lesbos. Xenophon says that from now on he
was eager to sail to the original target, Rhodes. But this was misinformation to throw off his
enemies at home, those who originally voted for the Rhodian expedition and had recently called
for an audit (εὔθυναι) of the expedition.70 Ignoring calls for his returrn, Thrasybulus led the fleet
southwards perhaps to Chios; to Clazomenae, where he imposed another five-percent tax
(εἰκοστή); to Halicarnassus, where the Athenians treated the inhabitants unjustly (ἠδικηµένοι);
and then to Aspendus, a curious detour of about 150 nautical miles past Rhodes.71 At this last
stop the army engaged in the same money collecting and plundering activities as before, but to
an even greater degree of license. One can trace an escalation in coercion from the commercial
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Diod. Sic. 14.94.4. Lys. 28.4 notes the poor condition of the Aegean fleet. If Diod. Sic.
14.94.2 is correct that Thrasybulus sailed to Ionia before Thrace (see note 39), he could have
renewed the Chian alliance then. Cimon could have done so after the Battle of Cnidus (ibid.
14.84.3).
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Ibid. 15.28.2-3.
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Xen. Hell. 4.8.30. Audit: Hansen n. 73; Roberts 1982, 96-102. Lys. 28.5 claims that
Ergocles, Thrasybulus’ subordinate, advised him to occupy Byzantium, keep the ships, and
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Clazomenae: IG II2 28, lines 7-8 (= RO 18). Hallicarnassus: Lys. 28.17. Aspendus:
Xen. Hell. 4.8.30; Diod. Sic. 14.99.4-5; Nep. Thras. 4.4.
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taxes at Thasos and Byzantium early in the expedition, to money collection and plundering on
Lesbos in the middle, and finally to unjust and excessive pillaging at Halicarnassus and
Aspendus. But this was due to the increase in financial pressures, not imperial ambitions. Still, in
response, the angry Aspendians attacked the Athenians and murdered Thrasybulus in his tent.72
Thrasybulus left behind alliances from Boeotia to Thrace to Asia Minor. In spite of the
notoriety of his final days, his successes overall brought him great popularity. Xenophon notes
on more than one occasion the approval in Athens (and among the new allies) for what he had
achieved in the Aegean. His enemies, who had tried to stop the expedition and afterwards
executed his subordinate Ergocles, were not troubled by his alliances and wished to see them
maintained. The Athenians, Xenophon says, “feared that the things Thrasybulus arranged for
them in the Hellesponst would be wasted [δεδιότες µὴ φθαρείη σφίσιν ἃ κατεσκεύασεν ἐν τῷ
Ἑλλησπόντῳ Θρασύβουλος],” so they dispatched to the region first Agyrrhius, a financial
authority with experience in tax collection, and then Iphicrates, another general familiar with
revenue collection.73 The Athenians even expanded their alliances to include the king of Egypt.74
The continuation of Thrasybulus’ policies caught the attention of the Spartans, who finally
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Paus. 1.29.3 says his grave was the first (πρῶτος τάφος) in the Kerameikos, next to
those of Pericles and Phormio. Wolpert 2002, 89 sees his burial spot as a stamp of approval for
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Xen. Hell. 4.8.31, 34. Agyrrhius introduced pay for assembly attendance (Arist. Ath.
Pol. 41.3), supervised the collection of the two percent import tax (πεντηκοστή) at the Piraeus
(Andoc. 1.133-134), and was an associate of the banker Pasion (Isoc. 17.31). Xen. Hell. 4.8.35
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Arist. Pl. 178; cf. Carrez-Maratray 2005, 50-53; Perdu 2010, 153-154.
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capitalized on their position in the Hellespont to block Athenian access to the Black Sea grain
route. In 387, Athens, faced with starvation, was forced to sue for peace.

Post-war Athens and Alliances (386-385)

Many scholars, those who consider interstate alliances to be instruments of Athenian
domination and thus violations of autonomy, think that the King’s Peace called for the
dissolution of alliances.75 Xenophon quotes from the Peace the principles upon which interstate
relations would henceforth be conducted, but there is no mention of alliances:
“King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should be his, and among the islands,
Clazomenae and Cyprus, but that the other Greek cities, both small and great, be left autonomous,
except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and these are, as of old, Athenian.”76
Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νοµίζει δίκαιον τὰς µὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι καὶ τῶν νήσων
Κλαζοµενὰς καὶ Κύπρον, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ µικρὰς καὶ µεγάλας αὐτονόµους
ἀφεῖναι πλὴν Λήµνου καὶ Ἴµβρου καὶ Σκύρου: ταύτας δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἶναι Ἀθηναίων.

The phantom prohibition against alliances does not harmonize with the evidence presented thus
far; i.e., alliances were reflections of social, religious, and economic interactions, not of political
oppression.77 There is positive evidence, moreover, that the alliances continued beyond the
signing of the Peace. As for the one with the Boeotians, even though the Peace called for the
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Ryder 1965, 36; Hamilton 1979, 324; Strauss 1987, 160; Badian 1995, 86; Dmitriev
2011, 28-31; Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 204.
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Xen. Hell. 5.1.31. Diod. Sic. 14.110.3 gives a truncated version. Isoc. 4.180 and 12.207
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The Peace expressly permitted Athens to retain control of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros
(Xen. Hell. 5.1.35; cf. Ampolo 2010, 39-66).
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dissolution of the Boeotian League and thus should have spelled the end of the alliance with the
Athenians, Lysias suggests that it lingered on for a few more years, at least in the minds of the
two parties.78 There are also hints that the taxes instituted in the Aegean continued after the war,
indicating that they neither contravened autonomy nor were seen as symbols of Athenian
imperial ambitions.79 That there was no incompatibility between alliances and autonomy is
furthered demonstrated in the next Athenian alliances which are unambiguously dedicated to the
principles of the Peace.
Nevertheless, there is a noticeable absence of new alliances for the next two years. In
fact, the Athenians rejected opportunities to ally with the Thracian king Hebryzelmis in 386 and
with the Mantineans in 385. If this apparent hesitance was not because alliance-making was by
definition a violation of the Peace, then why did the Athenians put a full stop to their alliance
practices? The following account argues that the absence of new alliances at this time was the
same for the creation of alliances at other times. It was determined by the depth of historical ties
between the parties. Going forward the Athenians were not adverse to new alliances, as long as
they were based on shared socio-cultural elements and harmonized with the principles of the
Peace.
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Xen. Hell. 5.1.36 records the dissolution of the Boeotian League. Lys. 26.23 claims
that a conspiracy to raise a revolution in Thebes in 382 by Thrasybulus of Collytus (not
Thrasybulus of Steiria) “deprived us of that alliance.” Buckler 1980a, 179-185 dismisses the
alleged Theban-Spartan alliance of 386 (Isoc. 14.27; Plut. Pel. 4.4-5.1; Paus. 9.13.1).
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Kellogg 2004/2005, 66-68 suggests the Athenian ships sailing around the Thracian
coast sometime after the Peace (IG II2 31, lines 19-21) were tax-collecting ships. Figueira 2005,
121-123 discusses the relationship of εἰκοστή to autonomy. Isoc. 14.28 says that after the end of
the war, at least Chios, Mytilene, and Byzantium remained with (συµπαρέµειναν) Athens.
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In 386, the Athenians received an embassy from King Hebryzelmis, the Odrysian
successor to Amadocus, concerning the presence of Athenian ships around Thrace.80 Seuthes,
Amadocus’ rival in the 390s, had renewed his ambitions on central Thrace, and had on his side
the Athenian Iphicrates, an experienced commander of light-armed soldiers, who had not
returned home after the Corinthian War.81 When Hebryzelmis saw the Athenian ships, he
worried they were also on the enemy’s side and immediately dispatched an embassy to the
Athenians to question their intentions. Since the ships were benign, the two sides came to a quick
agreement.82 The Athenian assembly passed an honorific inscription (IG II2 31) for the king, but
there is no mention in it of an alliance. Some suppose that, unlike the earlier alliances with
Amadocus and Seuthes, an alliance at this time might give the impression that the Athenians
were transgressing the autonomy clause of the Peace, and thus prompt reprisals from the
Spartans.83 This is guesswork based on the notion that alliances are only instruments of
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Nep. Iph. 2.1. Archibald 1998, 218-219 reviews the evidence for the conflict between
Hebryzelmis and Seuthes. Sears 2013, 124-126 focuses on Iphicrates’ part in the Thracian
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Sinclair 1978, 47-49; Hagemajer Allen 2002, 232.
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domination. There is another explanation, one that is rooted in the documentary evidence. Lines
5 to 9 of the inscription record the praise for Hebryzelmis, “a good man [ἁνὴρ ἀγαθὸς]” towards
the Athenians, and the pledge that “he himself is to have all the things which his ancestors had
[ἐ͂ναι αὐτῶι ἅπερ τοῖς π[ρογό]νοι[ς] ἅπα[ν]τ[α]].” This should include an alliance since at least
two of Hebryzelmis’ immediate ancestors had one with the Athenians.84 If it is true that the new
Thracian king inherited an alliance, then there is no reason to suppose that the absence of one
indicates that the Athenians were reluctant to violate the Peace. Instead, it indicates an inherent
continuity in Athenian relations with the Odrysian rulers.
In the next year, the Athenians rejected an alliance proposal from the Mantineans, but
under different circumstances. Diodorus records that after the Spartans attacked and dioecized
(dispersed into five villages) Mantinea, the victims asked the Athenians to aid them (ἑαυτοῖς
βοηθῆσαι), but the Athenians refused “preferring not to transgress the common agreement [i.e.,
the King’s Peace] [οὐ προαιρουµένων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων παραβαίνειν τὰς κοινὰς συνθήκας].”85
Does this not prove that alliances were prohibited, and that the Athenians, humbled in defeat and
cowering in fear of the Spartans, respected that restriction?86 This does nothing of the sort. It
often goes unnoticed that the Mantineans never even made an appeal for a formal alliance, to
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which the Athenians could refuse; they only made an isolated request for military support. Nor
did they have a substantial history of socio-cultural interactions with the Athenians that would
create a sense of moral obligation to intercede.87 No doubt the attack on Mantinea was not
popular in Athens, but the diplomatic restraint need not be interpreted as evidence of a negation
of interstate alliances under the Peace.88 In fact, the Athenians were not entirely passive in this
matter. Although they refused to send an army, since they prided themselves on their reputation
for helping the weak and the wronged, they granted asylum to sixty democratic leaders from
Mantinea.89 Apparently unconcerned about Spartan reprisals, the Athenians went beyond what
was strictly necessary in this treatment of the exiles. This, however, initiated contacts and
relationships from which would emanate alliances between the Athenians and the Mantineans in
366 (A16) and in 362 (A17).
The two different responses to Hebryzelmis and the Mantineans, therefore, were made
according to the extent of their existing connections with the Athenians. Far from refusing an
alliance with the Odrysian king, the Athenians reaffirmed the one which his ancestors had. And
the supposed failure to ally with the Mantineans proves nothing because there was not even a
request for an alliance. Yet, rather than remain aloof, the Athenians actually exceeded what was
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Alcibiades’ arrangement of an alliance with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea in 420 (IG I2
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Athens did not seize the occasion of Mantinea’s appeal for aid against Sparta in 385 is hardly
evidence of her acceptance of Spartan hegemony.”
89
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legally required of them by offering refuge to the anti-Spartan democrats. In these cases the
guidelines for accepting or rejecting an alliance consisted of social and ideological concerns over
geopolitics. And this is consistent with the alliance with Chios, the first one since the end of the
Corinthian War.

From Chios to the Confederacy (384-378)

A8

The Athenians and the Chians (384)
IG II2 34
Even if there was some noticeable reticence among the Athenians for making new

alliances, it was overcome in late summer of 384, when they agreed to ally with the Chians. The
reconstructed inscription is, although a composite of five fragments (a – e), the fullest one yet
seen for the fourth century. A viewer’s eyes would likely be drawn first to the relief in the center
of the top fragment (e), which depicts the body of an indiscernible female figure clothed in a
chiton and himation.90 This fragment also contains the heading and prescript (lines 1-4) which
provide a secure date of 384 (the archonship of Dieitrephes) for the alliance. After a lacuna (5-6)
which will be discussed later, the remaining fragments (a-e) open with the dominant theme of the
alliance – the King’s Peace (εἰρήνη):
. . . the common discussion which took place among the Greeks, have remembered to preserve,
like the Athenians, the peace and the friendship and the oaths and the existing agreement, which
were sworn by the King and the Athenians and the Spartans and the other Greeks, and have come
offering good things to the people of Athens and to all of Greece and to the King; be it decreed by
the people:
Praise the people of Chios and the envoys who have come; and there shall remain in force the
peace and the oaths and the agreement now existing; and make the Chians allies on terms of

90
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freedom and autonomy, not contravening any of the things written on the stelai about the peace,
91
nor being persuaded if anyone else transgresses, as far as possible.
τῶν κο]ινῶν λόγων [τῶν γεγενηµένων τοῖς Ἕλλ]ησιν µέµνην[ται διαφυλάξεν καθάπερ]
Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν ε[ἰρήνην καὶ τὴν φιλίαν]
[κ]αὶ τὸς ὅρκ[ο]ς κα[ὶ τὰς οὔσας συνθῆκας],
[ἃ]ς ὤµοσεν βασιλ[εὺς καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ]
Λακεδαιµόνιοι κ[αὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες],
καὶ ἥκοσιν ἀγαθὰ [ἐπαγγελλόµενοι τῶ]ι δήµωι τῶι Ἀθηνα[ίων καὶ ἁπάσηι τῆι Ἑ]λλάδι καὶ βασιλεῖ, [ἐψηφίσθαι τῶι δή]µωι· ἐπαινέσαι µὲν τ[ὸν δῆµον τὸν] τῶν Χί[ω]ν καὶ τὸς πρέσβες [τὸς ἥκον]τας, ὑπάρχε[ν δὲ] τὴν εἰρήνην κα[ὶ τὸ]ς ὅρκος καὶ τὰς
σ[υνθήκα]ς [τὰς νῦν ὄσας], συµµάχος δὲ ποιεῖσ[θα]ι [Χί]ος ἐπ’ ἐλευ[θε]ρίαι καὶ αὐτονοµί[α]ι µὴ παραβαίνο[ντ]ας τῶν ἐν ταῖς στήλαις γεγραµµένων [π]ερὶ τῆς ἐρήνης
µηδὲν, µηδ’ ἐάν τις ἄλ[λο]ς παραβαίνηι πειθοµένος κατὰ τὸ δυ[να]τόν·

The Peace (εἰρήνη) appears here three times with the appositives “friendship” (φιλία), “oaths”
(ὅρκος), and “agreement” (συνθήκη). The Chian envoys raised the prospect of an alliance in
harmony with those principles – which may be included in the reference to the “good things”
(ἀγαθὰ) they brought for the Athenians, the Greeks, and the Persian King.92 The Athenian
assembly listened favorably to the proposition, praised the envoys and the people (δῆµος) of
Chios, and agreed to make an alliance in line with “freedom and autonomy” (ἐλευθερία καὶ
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Dušanić 1999, 5 thinks that the absence of the Spartans and the inclusion of the
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the alliance were “Persophile – and indeed anti-Spartan.”
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αὐτονοµία).93 Thereafter, the inscription records the alliance terms in conventional phraseology
but in a nonsequential order.94
Place a stele on the Acropolis in front of the image; and on it write up that, if any one goes
against the Athenians, the Chians shall go in support with all their strength as far as possible, and
if any one goes against the Chians, the Athenians shall go in support as far as possible.
The oath shall be sworn to the Chians who have come by the council and the generals and the
taxiarchs; and in Chios by the council and the other officials.
Choose five men who will sail to Chios and administer the oath to the city of Chios.
The alliance shall remain in force for all time.
Invite the Chian embassy to hospitality in the Prytaneion tomorrow.
The following were chosen as envoys: Cephalus of Collytus, - - of Alopece, Aesimus of - -, - of Phrearrhii, Democlides of - -. The following were the Chian envoys: Bryon, Apelles,
Theocritus, Archelaus.
στῆσαι δὲ στήλην ἐν ἀκροπόλει [πρό]σθεν το͂ ἀγάλµατος, ἐς δὲ ταύτην ἀνα[γρ]άφεν, ἐάν τις ἴηι ἐπ’ Ἀθηναίος, βοηθε͂[ν] Χίος παντὶ σθέ[νε]ι κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν, [καὶ ἐ]άν τις ἴηι [ἐπ][ὶ Χί]ος, βοηθε͂[ν] Ἀθηναίο[ς π]αντὶ σθέ[νει]
[κατὰ τ]ὸ δυνατόν· ὁµόσα[ι δ]ὲ τοῖς [ἥκοσι][ν Χίοις] µὲν τὴµ βολὴν κ[αὶ] τὸς [στρατηγ][ὸς καὶ τα]ξιάρχος, ἐγ Χί[ω]ι δὲ [τὴµ βολὴν]
[καὶ τὰς ἄλλ]ας ἀρχάς· ἑλ[έ]σ[θαι δὲ πέντε]
[ἄνδρας, οἵτι]νες πλεύ[σαντες ἐς Χίον ὁρ][κώσουσι τὴµ] πόλιν [τὴν Χίων· ὑπάρχεν δὲ τ][ὴν συµµαχίαν ἐς τὸν ἅπαντα χ]ρόνο[ν. καλ][έσαι δὲ τὴν πρεσβείαν τὴ]ν τῶν Χί[ων ἐπὶ]
[ξένια ἐς τὸ πρυτανε]ῖον ἐς αὔρι[ον. vv]
[οἵδε ἡιρέθησαν πρ]έσβεις· Κέφαλο[ς Κολ][λυτεύς, --c.5-- Ἀ]λωπεκῆθεν, Αἴσιµο[ς ]
[----c.10----]ς Φρεάρριος, Δηµοκλε[ίδη][ς --c.4--. οἵδ]ε ἐπρέσβευον Χίων· Βρύων, Ἀπε[λλῆς Θεόκ]ριτος, Ἀρχέλας.
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Bosworth 1993, 136 points out that freedom (ἐλευθερία) is not mentioned in the Peace,
but it must be remembered that Xen. Hell. 5.1.31 does not record all of that treaty. The Decree of
Aristoteles also contains the phrase “ἐλευθερία καὶ αὐτονοµία” (IG II2 43, lines 10 and 20 = Tod
123 = Harding 35 = RO 22).
94

RO 20 suggests the lack of editing on the part of the proposer.
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The mutual defense clauses are nearly identical to those contained in the Athenian alliances with
the Boeotians (A1) and the Locrians (A2) in 395, including the designation that the alliance was
intended to remain in force “for all time” (ἐς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον).95 The assembly appointed the
council, generals, and taxiarchs to swear an unrecorded oath to the Chian envoys; in turn, five
other Athenian representatives were chosen to sail to Chios to receive the same oath from the
Chian authorities.96 And there is the customary invitation to the Chian envoys to a meal of
hospitality (ξένια) in the Prytaneion. The directions for the erection of the stele call for it to be
placed “in front of the image on the Acropolis [ἐν ἀκροπόλει [πρό]σθεν το͂ ἀγάλµατος],”
referring to the statue of Athena Promachos, a martial deity – despite the fact that no military
threat is expressed in the inscription.97 Similar to the earlier alliances that Thrasybulus
concluded, there is no sense here of an attempt to renew Athenian imperialism.
Even with all the detail which the inscription supplies, unfortunately, it leaves
unmentioned the purpose for the alliance. Nevertheless, many scholars propose that it was a
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This mutual defense clause lacks “κατὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλατταν.” Perhaps this implies the
irrelevance of land defense between the two naval powers. As an analogy, Bolmarcich 2008, 75
proposes that the lack of “κατὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλατταν” in an undated alliance between the
Spartans and the Erxadieis (SEG 26.461) is because “it would seem illogical for the Spartans, the
land power of ancient Greece, to be concerned with her allies following her by sea.”
96

The identity of the Chian envoys: Dušanić 1999, 6-8. It is noteworthy that Aesimus, a
former associate of Thrasybulus and rival of Cephalus (Lys. 13.80-82; Hell. Oxy. 6.9), is
included in the Athenian delegation. Roberts 1982, 101 proposes that over the course of the
Corinthian War “the distinction between moderates and radicals gradually disappeared and the
moderates came increasingly to support the idea of fighting Sparta.”
97

Dušanić 2000a, 24-25 and Monaco 2010, 287-289 discuss the stele’s “topographical
symbolism.”
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response to renewed threats from the Persians against the Greeks in Asia Minor.98 The Persian
King had been occupied with revolts in Egypt since c. 404 and on Cyprus since 391, and more
recently Tiribazus, the satrap of Lydia and a friend of the Spartans, had begun collecting naval
and infantry forces from Ionia. The Asiatic Greeks must have grown suspicious about when (not
if) the Persians would intrude in their affairs as well.99 Yet, in spite of all this activity in the
eastern Mediterranean, there is no evidence of any direct attack on Chios. To use Stephen Walt’s
terminology, the islanders perceived a threat to their autonomy – which inspired the idea of an
alliance in harmony with the King’s Peace.
The Athenians, on the other hand, located away from the action in the east, did not share
the same sense of danger from the Persians. They rather anticipated a threat coming from the
recent conduct of the Spartans. I.A.F. Bruce once postulated that in the mid-380s “the Athenians
may with good reason have sensed a dangerous revival of Spartan ambitions, and it is likely that
there were already elements in Athens advocating a return to some kind of naval confederacy
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Hornblower 1983, 232-23; Seager 1994, 163; Badian 1995, 86-87. Dušanić 2000a, 2130 proposes that the specific menace to Chios was Glos, a high-ranking naval commander, who
revolted from the King at the end of the Cypriot War and concluded alliances with Sparta,
Evagoras, and Egypt, creating an Aegean-wide disturbance. Diod. Sic. 15.9.3-5 places this revolt
in 385, but most scholars (Ryder 1963, 105-109; Tuplin 1983, 178-182; Stylianou 1998, 143154; Ruzicka 2012, 94-98) suggest instead 381.
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Tiribazus: Isoc. 4.134-135; Theopomp. FGrH 115 F103; Diod. Sic. 15.2-4, 8.1-3, 10.2;
Polyaenus Strat. 7.20; cf. Ruzicka 2012, 87-98. A decree from c. 387 records a plea to the
Athenians not to allow the Erythraeans to be “handed over to the barbarians [περὶ δὲ τοῦ
ἐκδίδοσθαι Ἐρυθραίους τοῖς βαρβάροις]” (Harding 28a, lines 12-13; cf. Hornblower 1982, 108109). Isoc. 4.163 says that the Persians stationed garrisons at coastal cities near Rhodes, Samos
and Chios. Constantakopoulou 2007, 178-179 raises the importance for Chios of controlling its
neighboring islands.
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[i.e. the Second Athenian Confederacy].”100 While Bruce’s conclusion is accurate, it rests feebly
on the asserted illegality of the Spartans’ interventions at Mantinea in 385 and at Phlius in 384. It
is unlikely that these attacks on Peloponnesians were a reasonable justification for the Athenians
to agree to an alliance with Chios, a power outside of mainland Greece in the opposite direction.
There are, however, obscure indications that Sparta was involved in the north Aegean and in the
Cyclades, the Athenians’ traditional sphere of influence.101 Although his details are suspect, it is
worth mentioning that Diodorus speaks of a number of islands under Spartan control (πολλοὶ τῶν
ὑπ᾽ αὐτοὺς τεταγµένων) in 378, but he does not say whether that control extended back as far as
the mid-380s.102 A more compelling point is that both Evagoras and Glos, a naval commander in
rebellion from the Persian King, sought out alliances with the Spartans c. 381, suggesting that
there were already indications that the Spartans had an interest and the capabilities to intercede in
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Bruce 1965, 263-264.
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Stylianou 1998, 174 suggests that it would not be remarkable (or unprecedented) if
they instigated or offered promises of support for the anti-democratic uprisings in Byzantium and
in Thasos in 385. The Athenians granted refuge and immunity from taxation to the exiled
Byzantine (Dem. 20.59-60) and Thasian (IG II2 33, lines 5-7) democrats. Isoc. 4.136 refers to a
“wrangle over the Cyclades [τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων ἀµφισβητοῦµεν]” at some time in the 380s
(cf. Sinclair 1978, 44; Harding 1995, 119 n. 82; Rutishauser 2012, 153-158). Sinclair 1978, 4344 and Sealey 1993, 16 suppose that Sparta supported (morally not materially) Delos’ liberation
from Athens c. 385, but Chanowski 2008, 169-174 has disputed that Athens lost any control of
the island between 393 and 314.
102

Diod. Sic. 15.28.2-3. Diodorus specifically mentions that Chios, Byzantium, Mytilene,
and Rhodes were under Spartan control, but Isoc. 14.28 says that the first three remained loyal to
Athens after 387. Although Byzantium came under oligarchic control in 385 (see previous note),
it did not come under Spartan control. The Spartans occupied Rhodes in 387, but the island is not
heard of again until its alliance with Athens in 378. No comment can be made on Diodorus’
other unspecified islands (τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς νησιωτῶν), unless they include Histiaea on Euboea,
Peparethus, Sciathus and some Cycladic islands which, as he mentions in 15.30.5, were under
Spartan control (τεταγµένας ὑπὸ Λακεδαιµονίοις).
104

eastern Greek affairs.103 Finally, there is the testimony of Theopompus of Chios, who says that
“the city of the Athenians tried to abide by the terms of the agreement with the King, but the
Spartans, being arrogantly minded, transgressed the agreement [καὶ ὡς Ἀθηναίων ἡ πόλις ταῖς
πρὸς βασιλέα συνθήκαις ἐπειρᾶτο ἐµµένειν, λακεδαιµόνιοι δὲ ὑπέρογκα φρονοῦντες παρέβαινον
τὰς συνθήκας].”104 He does not give specific examples, but, being from the region, he could be
referring to Spartan activities in the Aegean. Overall, then, since the evidence is murky, all that
can be offered here is the suggestion that prior to the alliance with Chios, the Athenians
perceived an increase of Spartan influence outside of the Peloponnesus, just as the Chians
perceived a threat from the Persians.
This does not, however, explain why the Chian assembly made the decision to send
ambassadors specifically to Athens? This relied to a great extent on the varied interactions
between Athens and Chios throughout the classical period. Since the early fifth century their
relationship had been for the most part friendly and mutually beneficial. The islanders provided
significant military contributions, for which, Aristotle says, the Athenians held them, of all the
Delian League allies, in the highest esteem.105 This participation lasted until the Chians
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Sparta’s alliance with Evagoras: Isoc. 4.135; Theopomp. FGrH 115 F103; Diod. Sic.
15.2.3, 3.3-4. The alliance with Glos: ibid. 15.9.3-5. Ibid. 15.19.1 claims that during the alliance
with Glos the Spartans extended their activities into Asia (κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν πράξεις). Cawkwell
1976a, 70 (reprinted in 2011, 253-254) and Buckler 2003, 184 reject the veracity of Glos’
alliance with the Spartans.
104

Theopomp. FGrH 115 F103; cf. Milns and Ellis 1966, 56-60. Theopompus’ father,
exiled from Chios for laconism after 384 (Plut. Mor. 837c; cf. Lane Fox 1986, 107-108; Flower
1994, 3-7), could have made contact with the Spartans at this time.
105

Arist. Ath. Pol. 24.2. Quinn 1981, 39-49 and Piérart 1995, 253-282 see a maintenance
of good relations between Athens and Chios until the island’s revolt in 412. Blanshard 2007,
105

abandoned Athens for Sparta in 412, but they returned to friendship with Conon and the
Athenians in 394, and resumed their military cooperation by 389, when they contributed naval
reinforcements to Thrasybulus at Lesbos.106 There also existed stable economic interactions,
especially in the export of Chian wine to Athens. Chios, in turn, attracted prominent Athenians,
who cultivated further economic contacts and were granted honors of proxenia.107 Supporting
these practical activities were the intimate friendships between leading individuals in each city.
In the fifth century, the family of the celebrated poet Ion of Chios had close contacts with
prominent Athenians, especially with Cimon.108 In the early fourth century, Isocrates visited
Chios and helped set up an Athenian-style government, headed up a school, and made many
friends with the islanders, with whom he remained in contact later in life.109
The mutual military assistance and economic and social exchanges were reinforced
further by shared religious practices, such as common prayers (εὐχαί κοιναί). Aristophanes, for
155-175 prefers to see their relations in need of frequent renegotiation. Occhipinti 2010, 27-33
suggests a more significant role for Chios in geopolitics than there really was.
106

Conon and Chios: Diod. Sic. 14.84.3; cf. Monaco 2010, 287-288. Thrasybulus and
Chian ships: Diod. Sic. 14.94.4. The Athenians expressed their gratitude in 388 with an honorary
decree for an unnamed Chian (IG II2 23), who, according to Dušanić 2000a, 24 n. 18, might be
Theocritus, one of the Chian ambassadors to Athens in 384.
107

Sarikakis 1986, 121-129 presents the archaeological and epigraphic evidence for
socio-economic interactions. Mac Sweeney 2013, 85-86 looks at the numismatic evidence.
108

Ion and Cimon: Ion FGrH 392 F12-15; Plut. Cim. 9; Jacoby 1947, 4; Geddess 2007,
110-138. Ion also had relationships with Aeschylus (Plut. Mor. 79d-e; West 1985, 72), Sophocles
(Ath.13.603e-604d; Dover 1986, 35), and Lamachus (Mattingly 1977, 238-239), but not with
Pericles (Plut. Per. 5.3; Geddes 2007, 127-132). Ion’s biography: Valerio 2013, 5-9.
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Plut. Mor. 837b-c; cf. Carlucci 2013, 11. Metrodorus, a Chian student of Isocrates,
was admired in Athens (Ath. 3.100d; Dušanić 1999, 7). Not all Chian students of Isocrates,
however, became friends of Athens: the historian Theopompus and his father were laconophiles
and eventually exiled from Chios for it (see note 104).
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example, speaks of a prayer for the “health and salvation for the Athenians and the Chians”
(ὑγιείαν καὶ σωτηρίαν αὐτοῖσι καὶ Χίοισι).110 To return to IG II2 34, the inscription recording the
alliance, line 6 has a lacuna, which, as Slobodan Dušanić proposes in his reconstruction of ταῦτα
µε[ν ηὖχθαι ἐπειδὴ δὲ Χῖοι, ἐκ κο]ινῶν λόγων, may have contained a reference to prayers.
Indeed, there are contemporary analogies in treaties of alliance and other official documents, and
it would have been entirely expected for the Chians and the Athenians in 384 to participate in a
ritual consisting of common prayers and sacrifices.111
Finally, a manifestation of these shared practices can be seen in their belief in a common
ancestry. Among the many possible legendary founders of Chios, the poet Ion of Chios,
mentioned earlier for his numerous contacts in Athens, highlights Oinopion. According to
Plutarch, the poet attributes this prominent wine-drinker’s parentage to Theseus (τήν ποτε
Θησείδης ἔκτισεν Οἰνοπίων), an Athenian hero, rather than to Dionysus.112 The reason Ion,
perhaps for the first time in Greek history, did this was to represent the close association of his
two favorite cities. “The claim [of Ion’s],” writes Naoíse Mac Sweeney, “places Athens and
Chios in a close relationship of metropolis (mother-city) and colony, bringing the two cities
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Ar. Birds 878-880; Theopomp. FGrH 115 F104. Barron 1986, 102-103 and Blanshard
2007, 159-161 consider the prayers to be an Aristophanic joke about how Athens had no
remaining allies except Chios for which to pray, but this does not have to detract from the
Athenians’ high regard for Chios (cf. Arist. Ath. Pol. 24.2).
111

Dušanić 1999, 12; 2000, 26; cf. Bliquez 1979, 237-40.
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Plut. Thes. 20.2. Chios’ origins were confused even in antiquity (Paus. 7.4.8-10; Mac
Sweeney 2013, 80-91; Federico 2004, 179-214). Theopompus of Chios preserves Oinopion’s
Dionysiac descent (FGrH 115 F276).
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together through the medium of myth.”113 Ion records mythological history as he thought it
should have been, with the Athenians holding a significant position in Chios’ beginnings. This
refashioning of the island’s foundation legend appears at a time when the Chians and the
Athenians had developed an almost symbiotic relationship. After decades of practical military
cooperation and economic interactions, brought together by interstate friendships, and rarefied
by mutual prayers and sacrifices, this new version of shared ancestry became popular in Chian
and Athenian circles. It should be expected, therefore, even without direct evidence, that when
the Chian ambassadors approached the Athenian assembly in 384, they rehearsed arguments of
kinship diplomacy, a common diplomatic practice in the classical period.114 For these reasons, in
addition to the influence of perceived military threats coming from the Persians and the Spartans,
the Chian assembly dispatched ambassadors specifically to their Athenian friends for an alliance,
and the Athenians agreed to it.
It was natural for the Chians to seek help from Athens based upon such factors, just as the
Boeotians did in 395.115 And so the Athenians revived (again) their alliance activities. Although
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Mac Sweeney 2013, 90. A vase by the Lewis Painter (ARV2 972.2) depicts Athena and
Theseus (...SEUS) on one side, and a woman (Ariadne?) handing her two sons (Oinopion and a
brother?) to a nymph (NUPHE) on the other (disputed by Olding 2007, 147-148 as evidence of
Oinopion’s parentage). It is also suggestive that Cimon, with whom Ion’s family was on an
intimate basis, promoted the cult of Theseus in Athens (Barron 1986, 92; Walker 1995, 55-61).
114

Kinship diplomacy: Jones 1999, 27-35; Bolmarcich 2010, 125-131; Patterson 2010;
Fragoulaki 2013. Only Dušanić 1999, 11-12; 2000, 26 mentions syngenia in the context of this
alliance.
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The Boeotians did not have a common ancestral link with the Athenians, but the
association of Athena with Heracles served a similar function (Paus. 9.11.6).
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the inscription recording the Athenian-Chian alliance contains numerous references to the King’s
Peace, it should not obscure the purpose for the Athenians to agree to it: to counteract potential
violations of Greek autonomy by the Spartans outside of the Peloponnesus. Indeed, the inclusion
of Cephalus, a consistent opponent of the Spartans, in the embassy to Chios suggests that there
was an anti-Spartan component to the alliance.116 And this same feature would continue to play a
part in the bilateral alliances that grew into the larger Second Athenian Confederacy.117
A9

The Athenians and the Olynthians (383)
IG II2 36; Xen. Hell. 5.2.15
The alliance with the Chians was followed in the next year by an overture for an alliance

with the Olynthians. Scholars who explain the absence of alliances in 386 and 385 as the result
of Athenian fear of the Spartans are likewise uncomfortable with the thought of the Athenians
extending their involvement in northern affairs at this time, belittling the significance of this
proposed alliance or even revising its date to the mid-370s. The Thebans also approached the
Olynthians but it is the Athenian embassy that truly bothers scholars.118 R.K. Sinclair, for
example, considers the Athenians’ only intention in reaching out to the Olynthians to be the
relatively benign one of securing access to the northern grain route.119 It is worth considering that
116

IG II2 34, lines 39-40. Cephalus supported the dispatch of reinforcements to Conon
fighting the Spartans in 397 and advocated Demaenetus’ theft of the state trireme in 396 (Hell.
Oxy. 6.1-7.1). Displeased with the outcome of the Corinthian War, he maligned the Athenian
generals responsible for the defeat (IG II2 29 = Tod 116 = RO 19). Cephalus’ biography: Nails
2002, 83.
117

Monaco 2010, 288; Lambert 2012b, 259-260.
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There is an anonymous source (FGrH 153 F1) that claims Thebes aided Olynthus in
expelling Amyntas of Macedon, but it is largely considered spurious (Hornblower 1983, 230231; Worthington 2004, 69-70).
109

there was more to it. Diodorus says that the Olynthians had recently acquired much (πολλὴν)
Macedonian territory, which netted them revenue (τὰς προσόδους), perhaps from the mineral or
timber resources in the region. The Athenians, fresh from their new alliance with the Chians,
may have considered collaboration with the Olynthians, now with access to Macedonian
resources, as a practical yet indirect step towards increasing the size of their diminished navy.120
There is no mention of the individuals behind the exploratory mission to Olynthus, but it would
come as no surprise if Cephalus, the radical, anti-Spartan previously mentioned, and Ismenias,
once again in leadership in Thebes, were not intimately involved. The evidence for the Athenian
alliance comes from a reference in Xenophon to Athenian and Theban ambassadors in Olynthus.
There is also a fragmentary stele with the heading “συµµαχία Χαλκιδέων” (i.e., Olynthus as head
of the Chalicidians) and a relief depicting Athena and Apollo, the two respective patron deities of
Athens and Olynthus. The rest of the inscription contains the names of the ten Athenian envoys
to Olynthus, an incomplete motivation clause ([ὅπως ἂν ἀπ]ολάβωσ[ι] τ[οὺ]), and a reference to
oaths (ὅρκους).121 Subsequent events, however, prevented the alliance from becoming operative.
In response to an appeal from Chalcidian poleis under Olynthian domination, the Spartans sent
an army northwards, obstructing the arrival of the Athenian envoys and the full implementation
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Sinclair 1978, 40-42 (followed by Borza 1990, 186 n. 20).
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Diod. Sic. 15.19.2 (cf. Isoc. 6.46). The backside of the undated (393?) alliance
between Amyntas and the Chalcidians (Olynthus) regulates the import and re-export of
Macedonian timber (Tod 111 = Harding 21 = RO 12).
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Xen. Hell. 5.2.15; IG II2 36. Relief: Lawton 1995, 110. The existence of a similar
fragmentary inscription leads Stroud 1971, 149-150 to suggest that there were two stelai on the
Acropolis commemorating this alliance.
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of the alliance.122 Spartan intervention in the north also provided justification for other Athenian
alliances that would eventually become the core of a new confederacy – not a revival of the fifthcentury empire, but an organization of poleis committed to defending Greek autonomy from
Spartan aggression.
Until recently scholars understood the Confederacy’s commencement in the spring of 378
to be a sudden, unplanned response to an attempted raid on the Piraeus by the Spartan Sphodrias,
but many now invert this scenario and consider the formal institution of the Confederacy to have
predated that raid.123 This latter ordering follows Diodorus who says that before the raid the
Athenians dispatched embassies into the Aegean to encourage the Greeks there to continue to
uphold the principles of the King’s Peace and to join in the development of a new confederacy
for mutual defense against the Spartans. Nearly all of the Greeks who responded positively to
those embassies – Chios, Byzantium, Mytilene, Rhodes, and “certain other islanders” (τῶν
ἄλλων τινὲς νησιωτῶν) – already had previous alliance arrangements with the Athenians.124 In
other words, although the formal organization of the Confederacy came about in 378, there were
already preparatory stirrings towards its creation. “In my opinion,” Victor Parker judges, “we
should perhaps view the League's foundation rather as a process than as an event which took
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Xen. Hell. 5.2.36.
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Sphodrias’ raid: Diod. Sic. 15.29.5-6. The creation of the Confederacy before
Sphodrias’ raid but still in 378: Burnett 1962, 1-17; Cawkwell 1973, 47-60 (reprinted in 2011,
192-211); Cargill 1981, 58-59; Stylianou 1998, 249-251. The creation of the Confederacy in 379:
Pritchett 1972, 164-169; Kallet-Marx 1985, 127-151.
124

Diod. Sic. 15.28.2-3; cf. Plut. Pel. 15.1. Although the Spartans’ recent activities were
in central and northern Greece, there must have been some activity in the Aegean to lead so
many to respond positively to the Athenian embassies.
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place at one point in time: from a certain perspective the League began in 384/3 with the
swearing of the model treaty with Chios.”125 Even if one is uncomfortable assigning the
Confederacy’s origins as early as the alliances with Chios and Olynthus, there is obvious interest
at least as far back as the late 380s. The remainder of this section traces this development by
examining the previous associations and bilateral alliances of these first Confederacy members.
After the failed alliance with Olynthus in 383, the next Athenian alliance for which there
is firm epigraphical evidence is the mention of a συµµαχία with an unknown state in 379 (the
archonship of Nicon) in an honorific inscription for an otherwise unknown Euryphon.126 The
date is significant, coming a year before the big push towards confederacy. W.K. Pritchett, who
first published the inscription in 1972, thinks the reconstruction of προέδρος on line 10 of the
inscription signifies that the Confederacy’s institutions were already operative in 379, but none
today accept this supposition. There were no formal allied institutions yet. This was only a
bilateral συµµαχία.
The rest of the alliances predating the Confederacy do not have epigraphic testimony.
One has to piece together the evidence from various sources. Mytilene, for example, became a
leading Athenian ally in 389, and throughout the 380s, according to Isocrates, it was one of the
states to remain with (συµπαρέµειναν) Athens. It is no surprise, then, that in 378 Athens would
send an embassy to Mytilene to solicit its participation in a new confederacy. Individual
Mytileneans, moreover, played key roles in encouraging other states to join with them.127
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Parker 2007, 13 n.1.
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EM 13230; Pritchett 1972, 164-169. Knoepfler 1988, 234 raises the possibility that
Euryphon is a Theban.
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Little more needs to be said about Chios. After the alliance in 384, the two renewed their
relationship in a Confederacy alliance in 378, indicated by the erection on the Acropolis of
another stele (IG II2 35) nearly identical to the original. At least one Chian, Antimachus, received
Athenian citizenship and helped bring about the Athenian alliance with the Thebans in 378.128
A10

The Athenians and the Byzantines (380s)
IG II2 41
The Byzantines collaborated with Thrasybulus in the Corinthian War and retained a

democratic government until an oligarchic revolt in 385. The exiled democrats received refuge
and immunity from taxation from the Athenians.129 At some point the Byzantine democrats made
an alliance with the Athenians, the extant inscription (IG II2 41) for which can be dated to
sometime between the one with Chios (line 7: καθάπερ Χίοις) and the institution of the
Confederacy’s council (συνέδριον) in 377.130 There is no direct evidence, but one might
conjecture that after observing firsthand the Athenian alliance with Chios come about, the
Byzantine democrats found a way to return to power at home, and then proposed to the
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Isoc. 14.28; Xen. Hell. 4.8.28-29; Diod. Sic. 14.84.3, 94.3-4. An unknown Mytilenean
is praised and invited to δεῖπνον in the Prytaneion in IG II2 40, lines 12 and 20, presumably for
his part in bringing the Thebans into the general alliance.
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Accame 1941, 9-13. Clark 1990, 53-54 thinks Chios is the unknown state in the 379
alliance (see note 126). Antimachus: IG II2 40, lines 11-12; cf. Clark 1990, 53-54, 65-66.
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Isoc. 14.28; Dem. 20.59-60.
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Harding 34 proposes that the lacuna at the beginning of IG II2 41 contained the same
phrase (“since the Byzantines continue to be well disposed to the city of the Athenians now, as
they have been in the past”) as the alliance with Methymna, which also falls between 384 and
378 (IG II2 42, line 5 = Harding 37).
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Athenians an alliance similar to the Chian one.131 If this is the case, the Athenian alliance can be
seen as support for and a confirmation of the restored Byzantine democracy. To return to the
inscription, it mentions the oath (lines 8-10), an invitation for the Byzantine ambassadors to
enjoy a meal of hospitality (ξένια) in the Prytaneion (11-14), instructions for the preparation of
the alliance stele (14-15), and the selection of Athenian ambassadors to go to Byzantium and
confirm the alliance terms (16-21).
A11

The Athenians and the Methymnaeans (380s)
IG II2 41
The Methymnaeans were also ones who joined Thrasybulus in 389 and seem to have

maintained contact with his associates, such as Aesimus who was involved in their later alliance
with the Athenians in 377.132 Although they are included in the first six names inscribed on the
Decree of Aristoteles (IG II2 43), the Confederacy’s charter, Diodorus does not mention them
among those who first responded to the Athenian embassies in early 378, unless they are implied
in his “certain other islanders.”133 Nevertheless, there is evidence that they made an alliance with
Athens at some time between 384 and 378. The inscription (IG II2 42) recording the 377 alliance
says that the two already had a preexisting alliance (ἐπειδὴ σύµ<µ>αχοί εἰσιν καὶ εὖνοι τῆι πόληι
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Kallet-Marx 1985, 131 also considers the possibility that the “alliances with
Byzantion, Mytilene, and Methymna may date to the 380s.”
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Aesimus and Thrasybulus: Lys. 13.80-82; Hell. Oxy. 6.9. Aesimus was also in the
embassy to receive the alliance oath from the Chians in 384 (IG II2 34, line 40). Aesimus and the
377 alliance: IG II2 42, lines 19-20.
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Diod. Sic. 15.28.3. Stylianou 1998, 155 does not think Methymna is included in
“certain other islanders.” Cawkwell 1973, 51 [reprinted in 2011, 196-197] and Kallet-Marx
1985, 131 do.
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τῆι Ἀθηναίων Μηθυµναῖοι).134 Without the documentation for that earlier alliance, there is no
way to pinpoint precisely when it was concluded, but since the Athenians had already exhibited a
willingness to make new alliances in 384 and 383 (with Chios, Olynthus, and perhaps
Byzantium), it is not impossible to situate the first Methymnaean alliance somewhere in the late
380s.135 As for Rhodes, nothing more is known of it after the Spartans occupied the island in 387
until its alliance with the Athenians in 378.
A12

The Athenians and the Thebans (378)
IG II2 40; Plut. Pel. 15.1
And, finally, there was another bilateral alliance with the Thebans before the birth of the

Confederacy. From 382 to 379 there were at least 300 Theban democrats (i.e., Ismenias’ faction)
living in exile in Athens because the pro-Spartan faction in Thebes had permitted a Spartan army
to occupy their Cadmeia.136 The presence of the exiles in Athens was a daily reminder of the
collaboration between the two states in 404 and 403 and in the Corinthian War. Thus, partly out
of gratitude for those earlier services, in the winter of 379 the Athenians helped the exiles return
to Thebes. But there are irreconcilable differences in the sources concerning the extent of that
support: Xenophon denies it was official; Dinarchus and Diodorus insist that it was.137 Only
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IG II2 42, line 5.
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As does Kallet-Marx 1985, 131. Dreher 2001, 153: “Außer mit Chios hat Athen in der
Folgezeit auch mit Methymna und vielleicht weiteren Städten zweiseitige Bündnisse
geschlossen, die uns nicht erhalten sind.” Hornblower 1982, 126 supposes that Methymna is the
unknown state in the 379 alliance (see note 126).
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Xen. Hell. 5.2.25-31; Diod. Sic. 15.20.1-2; Plut. Pel. 5.2-3. Plut. Mor. 576a says that
many of the exiles were private friends (ἰδιόξενοι) of the Athenians, friendships likely extending
back to 404. Plut. Pel. 6.2-4 says that the Athenians received the exiles out of a desire to repay
(ἀµειβόµενοι) earlier services.
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Plutarch acknowledges that there was a formal alliance with the new Theban government in early
378. He says when Spartan king Cleombrotus invaded Boeotia, the Athenians panicked and
“renounced the alliance with the Thebans [τήν τε συµµαχίαν ἀπείπαντο τοῖς Θηβαίοις].”138 To
renounce an alliance indicates that one was already in existence. Plutarch, however, confuses the
official assistance mentioned by Diodorus and Dinarchus for an alliance. The Athenians would
not have made such a binding agreement, more than an authorized (or unauthorized) dispatch of
troops, that could be discarded so quickly upon the appearance of a Spartan army. In the next
chapter Plutarch adds that after (ἐκ τούτου) Sphodrias’ failed raid on the Piraeus, in the spring of
378, “the Athenians very eagerly made an alliance again with the Thebans [πάλιν προθυµότατα
Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς Θηβαίοις συνεµάχουν].”139 It looks as though the biographer has created a
doublet. It is this so-called second alliance that is the genuine one, the one that is confirmed in IG
II² 40. This inscription is badly preserved but the likely restoration contains all the expected
elements of a fourth-century treaty: an oath (line 1), invitation for the Theban ambassadors to
enjoy a meal of hospitality (ξένια) in the Prytaneion (2-4), praise and another invitation for
specific Thebans to a meal (δεῖπνον) in the Prytaneion (5-14), a proboulemata and a decree
137

Xen. Hell. 5.4.1-19. Din. 1.39 mentions an official decree (ψήφισµα), proposed by
Cephalus, to help the Thebans. Diod. Sic. 15.25.4-26.2 says the Athenians sent an official force,
consisting of 5,000 hoplites and 500 horseman, intending to “repay their obligation for the
former service [τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἀποδιδοὺς τὰς χάριτας].” Roberts 1982, 81-83 looks at the
conflicting accounts and the trial of the Athenian generals who helped the Thebans. A number of
scholars (Stylianou 1998, 230-236; Parker 2007, 14-24; Steinbock 2013, 260-267) argue that
Xenophon suppresses the assembly’s authorization in order to shield the Athenians from blame
in Thebes’ subsequent ascendancy in Greece.
138

Plut. Pel. 14.1.
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Ibid. 15.1. The solution of Dmitriev 2011, 382, that Plutarch’s first alliance was the
one of 395 (A1), does not work because it was an alliance with the Boeotians not the Thebans.
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passed by the assembly (15-21), and provisions for inscribing the stele (21-23).140 Specific terms
for the alliance probably appeared on the top half of the stele but it is missing. This was the last
of the bilateral alliances that rapidly expanded into what is known as the Second Athenian
Confederacy.141 Table 2 reviews the proposed chronology for these important alliances.
Table 2: Proposed Chronology of Athenian Alliances Leading to the Confederacy
Athenian Alliance with:
Date:
Reaffirmed in the Confederacy:
Mytilene
389
(Diod. Sic. 14.94.4)
378
(IG II2 40, lines 11-12, 20)
377
(IG II2 43, line 80)
2
Chios
384
(IG II 34)
378
(IG II2 35)
377
(IG II2 43, line 79)
2
Olynthus
383* (IG II 36)
377
(IG II2 43, line 80)
†
2
Byzantium
383-0 (IG II 41)
377
(IG II2 43, line 83)
†
2
Methymna
383-0 (IG II 42, line 5)
377
(IG II2 43, line 81)
377
(IG II2 42)
Unknown State
379
(Pritchett 1972, 164-169)
-Rhodes
378
(Diod. Sic. 15.28.3)
377
(IG II2 43, line 82)
2
Thebes
378
(IG II 40)
377
(IG II2 43, line 79)
* not implemented
† based on circumstantial evidence

There is no indication that the allies subordinated their policies to Athens. Indeed, the
alliances followed the model of the Chian alliance by upholding the principles of freedom and
autonomy and should not be considered tools of Athenian imperialistic recrudescence. Therefore,
they were also not violations of some phantom prohibition in the Peace against alliance-making.
Although the alliances were responses to Spartan encroachments on Greek autonomy, these

140

The substitution by Burnett 1962, 5 n. 5 and Cargill 1981, 53 of Stephanus for
Cephalus as the mover of the decree eliminates the confusion of this alliance with Cephalus’
ψήφισµα in Din. 1.39 (see note 137). Cinalli 2015, 35-40 problematizes the traditional
distinction of ξένια for non-citizens and δεῖπνον for citizens.
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Diod. Sic. 15.28.5 says that the Athenians and the first members of the nascent
confederacy allied (συµµαχούντων) with the Thebans.
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particular allies were drawn together by their historical ties in the social, religious, and economic
spheres, and thus follow the same pattern as those in the Corinthian War. When the Spartan army
invaded Boeotia in 395, the Thebans chose to send envoys to Athens because of their friendships
and shared objectives. In 390 and 389, when Thrasybulus re-established Athenian alliances in the
north Aegean, he reached back to his earlier experiences with revenue collection, but he
deliberately avoided measures associated with the oppressive rule of the fifth-century empire.
After the war, the Athenians refused to enter alliances with King Hebryzelmis and the
Mantineans based on the existence or lack of previous interactions. The Athenian alliance with
the Chians in 384 grew out of very close connections in social, religious, and economic matters
throughout the classical period. This alliance became the impetus and model in the next five
years for a number of other bilateral alliances, which, in turn, formed the nucleus of the Second
Athenian Confederacy, an association of Greeks joined together by observance of the principles
of the King’s Peace and in opposition to Spartan imperialism. As a leader in Greece, Athens had
to practice a certain amount of power politics; yet the Athenians placed their political and
military objectives within a socio-cultural framework. It was not the case of the empire striking
back but rather a new hope for the conduct of interstate relations in the fourth century.
The new confederacy was in full operation by 377 and continued to expand until there
were close to seventy members. As a multilateral association, which has been treated at length by
other scholars, the Confederacy falls outside this study.142 But it should be noted that, as it
consisted almost entirely of Aegean members, the inclusion of Thebes, a land power, was
unique. And the Thebans’ particular interests were not at all easy to reconcile with those of the
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Cargill 1981; Dreher 1995; Baron 2006, 379-395.
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larger group. As a result, over the course of the 370s, Athenian relations with Thebes soured. The
latter seized the opportunity to extend its influence throughout Boeotia and neglected its duties as
a member of the Confederacy. In 369, the Athenians shocked everyone by making a clean break
with the Thebans and entering into an alliance with the Spartans, the subject of the next part of
this chapter.
B. From Leuctra to Chaeronea
For much of the first quarter of the fourth century, the Athenians conducted their foreign
policies in close alignment with the Thebans, bringing about two bilateral alliances with them in
395 and 378, as well as their incorporation into the Second Athenian Confederacy. During these
years personal contacts and shared political goals generated and sustained their collaborative
efforts. In the 370s, however, that dynamic changed. The Thebans withheld their full support for
the Confederacy’s campaigns against the Spartans and concentrated instead on expanding their
control over Boeotia and preparing a path for their own place of leadership in the wider Greek
world (see Chapter V). As for the Athenians, after the Thebans destroyed the Spartan army at the
Battle of Leuctra in 371, one might have expected them either to join jubilantly with the victors
and complete the reduction of Spartan power in Greece, or, at the very least, remain neutral and
distance themselves from the conflict. Neither happened; instead, in 369, they made an alliance
with the Spartans (A13).
As surprising as it is to see these two adversaries come together in one of the most
momentous alliances of the fourth century, it is even more startling that there is no surviving
epigraphical evidence for it. Moreover, Xenophon, an Athenian laconophile, gives strikingly
little information about the alliance conditions, recording only the debate in the Athenian
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assembly over the question of leadership assignments. But within his record, he mentions a
comment from one of the delegates that “the other things for the most part have been agreed
upon [τὰ µὲν οὖν ἄλλα σχεδόν τι συνωµολόγηται].”143 What were τὰ ἄλλα? In order to uncover
what they might have been, the first half of this section investigates the articles of four political
agreements between the Athenians and the Spartans from 375 to 370, on the premise that the
alliance was the end product of a longer diplomatic process. The conclusion drawn from this
approach challenges the prevailing notion today that the 369 alliance was a knee-jerk reaction to
the Theban victory at Leuctra, an attempt to restore the unsettled BOP.144 Instead, the influence
of the ideological connections between individuals in Athens and Sparta over the course of the
370s created an environment which made palatable an alliance with the enemy. This new
alignment towards the Spartans and away from the Thebans inspired new alliances in the north
and in Sicily. But it was not to last; gradually, the Athenians drifted away from their association
with the Spartans.
The second half of this section examines the proliferation of alliances in the
Peloponnesus and in the north from 366 onwards. For much of this period the Athenians
struggled with the growing presence of Philip II of Macedon in Greek affairs. Although the
Athenians, especially Demosthenes, continued to arrange alliances according to their historical
relationships, the politico-military objective (i.e., opposition to Philip) became much more
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Xen. Hell. 7.1.2.
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As in Fisher 1994, 350-351; Harding 1995, 109 (reiterated in 2015, 152); Buckler and
Beck 2008, 159; Christ 2012, 158-162. Jaeger 1938, 218 n. 2 also emphasized the influence of
BOP on Callistratus but cited a nineteenth-century English politician, Lord Brougham, who in
turn referred to the philosopher David Hume, not any ancient sources.
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prominent in these last alliances of the classical period. It turned out to be a losing strategy. After
the Battle of Chaeronea, where Philip soundly defeated the allied Greek forces, and then the
subsequent establishment of the League of Corinth under Philip’s direction, the Athenians were
deprived of their alliances. It was an abject end to a dynamic period of interstate activity.

Alliances with Sparta and Its Allies (369-366)

A13

The Athenians and the Spartans (369)
Xen. Hell. 7.1.1-14
Although the Athenian-Spartan alliance was not formally concluded until the late spring

of 369, one can see, in retrospect, that for some time there were those in each polis who favored
closer collaboration. In the early fourth century, despite the military conflict between the two, the
Athenians were not en bloc anti-Spartan. Even in the midst of the Corinthian War, the orator
Andocides praised the enemy for past acts of beneficence to Athens and promoted the belief that
Athenian prosperity was through peace with them.145 Even Callistratus of Aphidna, although he
motioned for Andocides’ exile, was not ideologically opposed to peace with the Spartans. As
Jennifer Roberts argues persuasively, he did not prosecute Andocides for proposing peace but for
failing to achieve a peace that the Athenian people would accept.146 Early in his career, then,
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Andoc. 3.21. Missiou 1992, 87-108 places Andocides’ characterization of ethical
Spartans in the context of other contemporary writers. Fisher 1994, 347-400 stresses that
Athenian laconizers celebrated Sparta’s stable constitution but not its empire. Tigerstedt 1965
looks at Athenian representations of Sparta in general.
146

Roberts 1982, 92-93. Callistratus and Andocides: Philoch. FGrH 328 F149a. Bearzot
1978-1979, 8-9 reviews the hypotheses of earlier scholars for Callistratus’ early political
orientation and concludes that he was “una figura notevole della politica moderata.” Missiou
1992, 82-84 returns to the position that the lower classes demanded the continuation of war.
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Callistratus showed a willingness to work with rather than against the traditional enemy, and it
appears that he maintained a consistent policy later in life. Even though he was one of the first
generals of the nascent Second Athenian Confederacy in 378, he never led an army against the
Spartans.147 His participation in the Confederacy may have been due to his association with the
Spartans, his ability to serve as an intermediary. For example, the congruity of his ideas with
those of Agesilaus in the 375 and 371 peace conferences makes it hard not to believe that he had
some sort of acquaintance with the Spartan king.148 At any rate, if he is representative of other
Athenians, there was a segment of the population with a willingness to cooperate with Sparta
long before the Battle of Leuctra.
Many reject the potency or even existence of these ideological ties in the 370s, preferring
to see the Athenian turn to Sparta in nothing more than practical terms. They consider the
aggrandizement of Theban power and the financial burdens of continuing war with Sparta to be
the only catalysts for the Athenians to adopt, faut de mieux, a pro-Spartan policy.149 These
concerns undoubtedly played a part in the easing of tensions between the two adversaries, but it
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Diod. Sic. 15.29.7; cf. Develin 1989, 223. Many (Strauss 1987, 14; Caven 1990, 23;
Shrimpton 1991, 141; Dillery 1995, 136) label him “the architect of the Confederacy,” but his
election to the generalship does not mean that he fully endorsed the anti-Spartan enterprise any
more than Nicias’ election in 415 is proof that he was the author of the Sicilian Expedition.
Sealey 1956, 187 suggested that he was elected as general because of the influence of his
associate Chabrias.
148

Callistratus also had a reputation for corresponding with the pro-Spartan Leontiades in
Thebes (Plut. Mor. 597d).
149

Sealey 1956, 191-192; Mosley 1973, 59-60; Adcock and Mosley 1975, 159-60; Munn
1993, 174-179. To be fair, Xen. Hell. 6.2.1 also highlights these practical problems, but the
historian rarely gives credit to Callistratus for his diplomatic achievements anyway. Bianco
2011, 44-45 comments on Xenophon’s “ambiguous feelings” towards Callistratus.
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seems impossible that their growing alignment of policies could have come about without the
idealogical influences of men such as Callistratus. Both of these components, realism and
idealism, became conspicuous in the 375 peace conference in Sparta, which, in retrospect, was
the first discernible step towards the Athenian-Spartan alliance.
By 375, regular military campaigning had drained the treasuries of the Athenians and the
Spartans, so the two sides agreed to discuss terms for peace. As someone with influence in
Sparta, Callistratus was included in the Athenian delegation; likewise, Agesilaus was probably
the spokesman for the Spartans.150 Unfortunately, Xenophon does not give any details about the
proceedings. Diodorus, however, discloses the peace terms: “all agreed to peace on the condition
that all the cities be independent and ungarrisoned [συνέθεντο πάντες τὴν εἰρήνην, ὥστε πάσας
τὰς πόλεις αὐτονόµους καὶ ἀφρουρήτους εἶναι].”151 The first condition, Greek autonomy, was
not new – it was the key principle of the King’s Peace. The second, the garrisons clause, was a
practical implementation of the first. As Martin Jehne stresses, the two clauses were correlative
and context-specific: in order to deter the Thebans from expanding their influence in Boeotia,
there was a need to reinforce the principle of autonomy with a prohibition against garrisons.152
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Agesilaus and the Athenians: Cawkwell 1976a, 79 (reprinted in 2011, 266-267).
Philoch. FGrH 328 F151 and Diod. Sic. 15.38.1 place the initiative for the conference with the
Persian King. Cawkwell 2005, 175-197 explains the suppression of the King in Xenophon’s
account.
151

Diod. Sic. 15.38.2. The Peace in general: Ryder 1965, 58-59, 124-126; Jehne 1994,
57-64; Dmitriev 2011, 41-45.
152

Jehne 1994, 60-61. Cawkwell 1981b, 73-74 (reprinted in 2011, 176-177) is alone in
imagining a garrisons clause in the King’s Peace. There was one in the Decree of Aristoteles in
377 (IG II2 43, lines 20-22).
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Furthermore, the new peace isolated the Thebans from any participation in the new leadership
arrangements in Greece because the other two powers included a nominal provision for dual
hegemony (Sparta on land and Athens on sea).153 A clear rift between Athens and Thebes was
now unmistakable; as for Athens and Sparta, although no alliance developed at this time, it was a
significant first step towards that closer relationship.
The new peace was celebrated in Athens with pomp and ceremony.154 But, the state of
harmony was ephemeral. On his way home from Corcyra, the Athenian Timotheus, perhaps in
observance (or in violation) of an unrecorded exiles clause in the peace, intervened in the internal
affairs of Zacynthus by forcibly returning exiles to the island. When the Spartans responded
positively to an appeal from the Zacynthian oligarchs, their involvement reignited hostilities with
the Athenians.155 In the next year, after bringing up Timotheus on charges and pressuring him to
leave the city, Callistratus, along with Iphicrates and Chabrias, was elected general for the
campaign in the west.156 When they ran out of funds – the same condition as in 375 – Callistratus
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Diod. Sic. 15.38.4; cf. Nep. Timoth. 2.2. The non-legality of dual hegemony: Munn
1993, 229-230. Diod. Sic. 15.38.3 says the Theban Epaminondas objected when Callistratus read
out the peace terms in the Confederacy’s council (συνέδριον), but the Athenian silenced that
opposition (Lauffer 1959, 315-348 and Schepens 2001, 84 n.12 dispute the historicity of this
altercation, but Sealey 1956, 189-190 and Stylianou 1998, 327-328 accept it).
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Philochor. FGrH 328 F151; Schol. Ar. Peace 1019 (Holwerda 1982, 150); Isoc.
15.109-110. The Athenians seem to have overlooked Callistratus’ diplomatic achievements with
the Spartans, and instead awarded Timotheus a statue in the Agora for his military successes
against the Spartans (Aeschin. 3.243; Nep. Timoth. 2.3; Paus. 1.3.2).
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Xen. Hell. 6.2.2-3; Diod. Sic. 15.45.2-4. The Zacynthus incident: Tuplin 1984, 537538; Parker 2001, 353-368. Possible exiles clause: Cawkwell 1981b, 80-83 (reprinted in 2011,
188-191).
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quickly proposed another peace conference with the Spartans.157 Xenophon records the
proceedings including three speeches from the Athenians, which contained varied arguments in
favor of the proposed peace. Callias, Sparta’s proxenos, insisted that the legendary kinship ties
between the two poleis obligated their cooperation. Autocles admonished the Spartans, saying
that if they intended to unite with the Athenians in friendship, they must honor Greek autonomy.
And Callistratus made a call for the Athenians to recognize their own history of imperial abuses
against the Greeks, to forgive the Spartans, and to reconfirm the dual hegemony arrangements.158
After listening to these speeches, the Spartans voted to accept the peace with its three
provisions: the removal of governors (ἁρµοσταί) from the Greek poleis, the dissolution of
military forces, and the autonomy (αὐτόνοµος) of the Greeks.159 The first provision appeared in
the 375 peace, assuming the removal of garrisons (ἀφρουρήτους) is roughly synonymous with
the removal of governors, and so did the third. The demilitarization clause, however, was new.160
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The trial of Timotheus: Hansen n. 80; Roberts 1982, 40-45; Rice 1997, 227-240;
Hochschulz 2007, 99-111. Although there is no explicit link in the sources connecting Timotheus
to the pro-Theban faction (βοιωτιάζοντες), some (Plut. Mor. 575e; Roberts 1982, 43-45; Rice
1997, 232, 236) have noted in him such a political orientation.
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Xen. Hell. 6.3.3. He also offered to search for available funds but he must have known
that was futile: an eisphora had recently been exacted from the Athenians ([Dem.] 49.23).
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Xen. Hell. 6.3.1-17. Callias’ use of kinship diplomacy: Jones 1999, 32; Schepens
2001, 91-93. Xenophon’s literary handling of the speeches: Gray 1989, 123-131; Tuplin 1993,
101-110; Dillery 1995, 243-245; Schepens 2001, 81-96. Mosley 1962, 41-46 and Tuplin 1977,
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ambassadors in Xen. Hell. 6.3.2.
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Since the previous peace collapsed so quickly because of military intervention in Zacynthian
affairs, its inclusion here was as far as the delegates could go legally to increase the likelihood
that this peace might endure. But if a conflict did break out, there was the further addition of a
guarantee (or sanctions) clause: “if anyone acts against these things, one who wished could help
the wronged poleis, but to the one unwilling it is not required by oath to fight as an ally of the
wronged ones [εἰ δέ τις παρὰ ταῦτα ποιοίη, τὸν µὲν βουλόµενον βοηθεῖν ταῖς ἀδικουµέναις
πόλεσι, τῷ δὲ µὴ βουλοµένῳ µὴ εἶναι ἔνορκον συµµαχεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουµένοις].”161 Being
unprecedented, the voluntary guarantee was ambiguous and impractical. Unlike promises of
mutual defense, this was virtually unenforceable – a voluntary guarantee is, after all, almost
tantamount to no guarantee at all. In fact, in the next treaty there is a compulsory guarantee
clause (see below). There must have been more than what Xenophon records. Aeschines, for
example, adds that King Amyntas III of Macedon, an Athenian ally for only the past few years,
sent a representative who recognized Athenian claims to Amphipolis.162 All in all, the treaty
represents a closer association between the Athenians and Spartans, and, conversely, a rupture of
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Cawkwell 1981b, 74-76 (reprinted in 2011, 178-182) thinks the King’s Peace
contained this clause, but Clarke 1990, 57-65 (cf. Stylianou 1998, 166-167) effectively dismisses
that suggestion.
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Xen. Hell. 6.3.18. Most scholars (Ryder 1965, 68, 72, 125; Jehne 1994, 68-69; Low
2007, 109; Rhodes 2008, 23; Dmitriev 2011, 50) think this is the first guarantee clause in a
Greek interstate treaty, though Cawkwell 1981b, 78-79 (reprinted in 2011, 184-186), as usual,
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Aeschin. 2.32-33.
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all friendly relations with the Thebans.163 The end result of all this was the Battle of Leuctra,
where the Thebans thrashed the Spartan army.
After the battle, the Athenians remained committed to the defeated Spartans, and when
they saw that many Peloponnesians were too (οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἔτι οἴονται χρῆναι ἀκολουθεῖν),
they made an open call – excluding the Thebans – for a conference in Athens to renew the peace
yet again.164 Although Xenophon’s account of this conference is terse, lacking any record of
debate or dissension, what he does report is that the delegates reaffirmed the principle of Greek
autonomy and swore a new oath with a compulsory guarantee clause: “I will abide by the peace
which the King sent down and by the decrees of the Athenians and their allies. If anyone makes
war on any polis of those that have sworn this oath, I will help with all my strength [ἐµµενῶ ταῖς
σπονδαῖς ἃς βασιλεὺς κατέπεµψε καὶ τοῖς ψηφίσµασι τοῖς Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συµµάχων. ἐὰν δέ
τις στρατεύῃ ἐπί τινα πόλιν τῶν ὀµοσασῶν τόνδε τὸν ὅρκον, βοηθήσω παντὶ σθένει].”165 By
stating that the Spartans and their allies accepted the decrees of the Athenians and their allies,
Xenophon does not have in mind that they became members of the Confederacy but rather that
they pledged to uphold the principle of autonomy as it was encapsulated in the Confederacy’s
defining mission statement.166 A sense of cooperation towards a common goal existed among the
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parties and was reflected in the inclusion of βοηθήσω παντὶ σθένει in the guarantee clause. This
is identical to the wording of mutual defense clauses in official alliances, suggesting that those
involved in the Athens peace considered their agreement in operation to be akin to a defensive
alliance against Thebes. They did not, however, go so far as to call it a συµµαχία, perhaps
because that might be taken as a contradiction of the Confederacy’s original anti-Spartan
commission, and the allies may look askance upon that. Athenian caution notwithstanding, it is
clear that an alliance with the Spartans was only a matter of time.
That they were determined to make this happen is seen at the end of the next year, when
the Athenians refused to make an anti-Spartan alliance with the newly constituted Arcadian
League. Rejected by the Athenians, the Arcadians made an alliance with the Thebans and invited
them into the Peloponnesus (T2).167 The Athenians, meanwhile, concerned (ἐν φροντίδι) about
Sparta’s situation, called yet another conference to discuss a plan of action.168 The Spartan
ambassadors spoke first. After opening with spurious historical instances of Spartan support for
Athens – help in removing the Pisistratids and approval of the creation of the Delian League –
they raised their strongest argument (µέγιστον . . . τῶν λεχθέντων): their preservation of Athens
at the end of the Peloponnesian War. All of this was meant to impress on the Athenians their
moral obligation to repay past services. The Spartans also pointed to the legal obligation to help
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according to the compulsory guarantee clause from the previous peace conference.169 The next
speakers expanded on the moral line of reasoning: Cleiteles of Corinth called attention to the
Athenians’ reputation for helping the wronged and Procles of Phlius, a friend of Agesilaus,
underscored the principles of reciprocity, gratitude, and helping the wronged.170 Xenophon says
that the Athenians, although initially unaffected, became so moved by these moral arguments
that they “would not bear to hear those speaking in opposition, but voted to help in full force, and
chose Iphicrates as general [καὶ τῶν µὲν ἀντιλεγόντων οὐκ ἠνείχοντο ἀκούοντες, ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ
βοηθεῖν πανδηµεί, καὶ Ἰφικράτην στρατηγὸν εἵλοντο].”171 Diodorus says that, out of their
largesse (µεγαλόψυχος ὢν καὶ φιλάνθρωπος), the Athenians dispatched 12,000 young men (νέοι)
to protect the Spartans.172 This military contribution is noteworthy to the development of the
alliance in the next year. Unlike other alliances in which the dispatch of forces follows the
ratification of an official alliance treaty, in this case the Athenians and Spartans made promises
of mutual defense and cooperated in military engagements long before there was a formal
alliance.
The Athenian army contributed to Sparta’s defense and the Thebans left the
Peloponnesus in the spring of 369. Unaware of whether they would return, the Spartans and their
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allies sent ambassadors with full powers (πρέσβεις αὐτοκράτορες) to Athens to specify more
fully the terms of an alliance.173 Xenophon records only one topic on the agenda: the leadership
of the alliance. The Athenian council had advised a leadership on equal terms (ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ
ὁµοίοις), with Sparta in full command of the land campaigns and Athens of the naval, and many
in the conference spoke in favor of this arrangement.174 Others, however, feared that the alliance
would not be equal in practice because the naval contribution from the Spartans would be
composed of helots and non-citizens, while full Athenian citizens would fight under Spartan
command on land. One of those to object was the Athenian assemblyman Cephisodotus who
proposed a five-day rotation of overall leadership, a notable modification of Callistratus’ vision
of dual hegemony but one with contemporary parallels (A17, A23).175 The alliance with
Cephisodotus’ proposal was what the assembly ratified.
But there must have been other provisions. One of the representatives to the conference
noted, “the other things for the most part have been agreed upon [τὰ µὲν οὖν ἄλλα σχεδόν τι
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συνωµολόγηται].”176 No ancient writer specifies what τὰ ἄλλα were and no inscription for the
alliance survives. This chapter has proceeded on the proposition that the alliance was a
culmination of the earlier peace conferences and that, in all probability, τὰ ἄλλα refers to some of
the items from the earlier agreements. Here are those provisions in review:
Table 3: Provisions in Athenian-Spartan Treaties (375-369)
375 Sparta Conference
Greek autonomy
Garrisons clause
Exiles clause (?)
371 Sparta Conference
Removal of governors
Demilitarization
Greek autonomy
Voluntary guarantee clause
Athenian claims on Amphipolis
371 Athens Conference
Greek autonomy
Compulsory guarantee clause
370 Athens Conference
Dispatch of military forces
369 Spartan-Athenian Alliance
Leadership on five-day rotation

τὰ ἄλλα
Without further evidence it is impossible to specify whether none, some, or all of these
provisions were included in the 369 alliance. But taking into consideration the earlier
agreements, the analogous conditions of contemporary alliances (see Chapter II), and the strong
ideological ties between individuals within each polis, it is not unreasonable to suspect that, in
addition to the specification of the leadership arrangements, the alliance included provisions for
autonomy, removal of garrisons, mutual defense, or any of the other provisions that appeared in
the previous conferences. Whatever the specific content of the alliance, the two sides gave their
approval, most certainly exchanged oaths and participated in a ceremony of sacrifices and shared
meals before marching to the Peloponnesus for another showdown with the Thebans. The
alliance was now fully operational.
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John Buckler believes the alliance was “short-sighted, wasteful, and potentially
dangerous, and from it Athens gained nothing but some regrets.”177 This assessment is too harsh.
The earlier Theban policy had not worked out and became in fact detrimental to Athenian
interests and morale. Aligning with the Spartans was the best option open to them under the
circumstances. Indeed, fourth-century Athenian orators referred with pride to how they saved the
Spartans in their time of need.178 The Athenians had great concern for the rapid rise of Theban
power, but the alliance with the Spartans was, at its foundation, a product of a long process that
covered a number of personal contacts and collaborative commitments. And the next alliances
were extensions of that policy.
The rapprochement of these two adversaries changed the nature of geopolitics in the
Greek world. The Second Athenian Confederacy had been established to oppose Sparta, but now
the Athenians had agreed to ally with that very enemy. Unsurprisingly, some of the Confederacy
allies questioned the sagacity of this move. A fragmentary inscription from 368, for example,
preserves a request from Mytilene for an explanation. In the reply Callistratus reminds the
Mytileneans that the Athenians began the war (and the Confederacy) against Sparta to preserve
the principle of Greek freedom ([ὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερία]ς τῶν Ἑλλήνων). But he also announces that
although their devotion to that objective has not diminished, the war with Sparta has now passed
(τὸµ πόλεµον τὸν παρελθό[ντα]). Unfortunately, the inscription then becomes too incomplete to
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reconstruct any further his justification for the new alliance.179 The complete reply apparently
satisfied the allies since there is no other evidence of scepticism or dissension for several years.
With the new Peloponnesian policy firmly in place, the Athenians turned their attention
to making alliances elsewhere. As mentioned earlier, they had succeeded – in either 375
(Chabrias’ campaign) or 373 (Timotheus’ campaign) – in gaining a bilateral alliance with King
Amyntas III of Macedon, a former Spartan ally. Nothing can be said with certainty about its
conditions, although there may have been something in it about Amyntas supplying Athens with
timber and supporting Athenian claims to Amphipolis.180 The alliance held until the king’s death
c. 370, after which his son Alexander II turned from the Athenians and allied with the Thebans
(T4). In 365, the Athenians made another alliance with Amyntas’ second son, Perdiccas, but that
too did not last long.181
A14

The Athenians and Alexander of Pherae (368)
IG II² 116, lines 39-40; Dem. 23.120; Diod. Sic. 15.71.3; Plut. Pel. 31.4; Mor. 193d
In 368, the Athenians accepted an alliance proposal from Alexander, the tyrant of Pherae.

His uncle Jason, a friend of the Athenian Timotheus, had made a brief alliance with the
Athenians in the mid-370s, which seems to have lapsed after Timotheus’ voluntary exile in
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373.182 The increase in anti-Theban sentiment amongst the Athenians after Leuctra, however,
encouraged Alexander to think that he might revive his uncle’s alliance. In 368, when he was
confronted by an invading Theban army, he dispatched ambassadors to Athens for assistance
against their mutual enemy, and the Athenians agreed with alacrity. The stele recording the
alliance does not survive – a later Athenian alliance with the Thessalian League stipulated its
destruction – so the terms can only be guessed at from bits of information in the historians.
Plutarch says that the Athenians for some time were receiving (εἶχον is imperfect) money from
Alexander.183 If this was an obligatory condition of the alliance, then it was the first prescribed
financial arrangement in an interstate treaty since Thrasybulus’ alliances in Thrace and in the
Aegean. Revenue collection was a part of the Confederacy alliances but only in the form of
συντάξεις (contributions), a practically ineffective mechanism for managing alliances. By 368,
the Athenians apparently deemed financial obligations to be once again a necessary feature of an
alliance. According to Diodorus, in return for Alexander’s money, the Athenians dispatched
thirty ships carrying one thousand soldiers.184 The exchange of money and military support was
an arrangement based on mutual benefit but not mutual defense. For through supplying large
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sums of money, the tyrant did not contribute directly or personally to the defense of Athens (as
the Athenians did for him), but his contribution was to the benefit of Athens nonetheless. If there
was a military threat to the city, that money could serve as an indirect means of defense because
the Athenians could use it to hire outside help.
Whatever the other arrangements may have been, there was a great deal of excitement in
Athens. Demosthenes remarks that “Alexander was everywhere, by Zeus [πάντ᾽ ἦν Ἀλέξανδρος,
πρὸς Διὸς].”185 But neither the enthusiasm nor the alliance was long-lived. In 364, the Thebans,
having defeated Alexander in battle, forced him to accept a subordinate alliance with them (T7)
and to cease his association with Athens. And yet the Athenians did not remove the alliance stele
from their Acropolis, a strong indication of how seriously they took the alliance (see
Conclusion). Nor did they remove it in 362 when Alexander made attacks against Athenian allies
and the Piraeus.186 It was destroyed only in 361, as mentioned earlier, in accordance with a new
alliance with the Thessalian League, a traditional enemy of Alexander (A19).
A15

The Athenians and Dionysius I of Syracuse (368)
IG II2 105
Also in 368, the Athenians secured a long sought-after alliance with Dionysius I of

Syracuse, bringing them even closer to the Spartans, old allies of the tyrant (S1).187 Previously,
during the Corinthian War, the Athenians had courted Dionysius in order to draw away western
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support from Sparta, but they were unable to make any headway at that time.188 But now that
they had become Spartan allies there was a better chance of reaching amity with the Syracusan
leader. In 369, the Athenian council passed a probouleumatic decree that praised Dionysius and
granted him and his descendants (ἐκγόνους) crowns, citizenship, and priority access to the
council.189 It was a flattering and effective gesture, followed in the next year by an assembly
decree, which records the alliance with Dionysius:
“He and his descendants shall be allies of the people of Athens for all time on the following
terms. If any one goes against the territory of Athens for war either by land or by sea, Dionysius
and his descendants shall go in support as the Athenians call on them, both by land and by sea
with all their strength as far as possible; and if any one goes against Dionysius or his descendants
or what Dionysius rules for war either by land or by sea, the Athenians shall go in support as they
190
call on them, both by land and by sea with all their strength as far as possible.”
εἶ[ναι δὲ συµµάχος αὐ][τὸν κα]ὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους [τοῦ δήµου τοῦ Ἀθην][αίων ἐ]ς [τ]ὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον [ἐπὶ τοῖσδε· ἐάν τις]
[ἴηι ἐπ]ὶ [τ]ὴν χώραν τὴν Ἀ[θηναίων ἐπὶ πολέµ][ωι ἢ κατ]ὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλ[ατταν, βοηθεῖν Διο][νύσιον] καὶ τοὺς ἐκγόν[ους αὐτο͂ καθότι ἂν]
[ἐπαγγέ]λλωσιν Ἀθηναῖ[οι καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ]
[κατὰ θά]λατταν παντ[ὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυνα][τόν· καὶ] ἐάν τις ἴηι ἐ[πὶ Διονύσιον ἢ τοὺς ἐ][κγόνου]ς αὐτο͂ ἢ ὅσων ἄ[ρχει Διονύσιος ἐπὶ]
[πολέµω]ι ἢ κατὰ γῆν ἢ κα[τὰ θάλατταν, βοηθε][ῖν Ἀθη]ναίους καθότι ἂ[ν ἐπαγγέλλωσιν κα][ὶ κατὰ γ]ῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλα[τταν παντὶ σθένε][ι κατὰ τ]ὸ [δυ]νατόν.
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As is customary in fourth-century Athenian alliances, there is a specification that the
arrangements are to last forever (ἐς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον), extending beyond Dionysius to his
descendants. Mutual defense is expressed here in the terms of territorial defense clauses,
encompassing the political centers as well as the larger territories (χώρα) in their possession.191
There is also the converse of mutual defense, a promise of mutual non-aggression:
“It shall not be permitted to Dionysius or his descendants to bear arms against the territory of the
Athenians for hurt either by land or by sea; nor shall it be permitted to the Athenians to bear arms
against Dionysius or his descendants or what Dionysius rules for hurt either by land or by sea.”
ὅπλα δ[ὲ µὴ ἐξεῖναι ἐπι][φέρειν] Δ[ιο]νυσίωι µηδ[ὲ τοῖς ἐκγόνοις αὐ][τοῦ ἐπὶ] τ[ὴν] χώραν τὴν Ἀ[θηναίων ἐπὶ πηµον][ῆι µῆτε] κ[ατ]ὰ γῆν µήτε κ[ατὰ θάλατταν· µηδὲ]
[Ἀθηναί]ο[ι]ς ἐξεῖναι ὅπ[λα ἐπιφέρειν ἐπὶ]
[Διονύ]σι[ο]ν µηδὲ τοὺ<ς> ἐκ[γόνους αὐτοῦ µηδὲ]
[ὅσων ἄ]ρχ[ε]ι Διονύσιος [ἐπὶ πηµονῆι µήτε κ][ατὰ γῆν] µ[ή]τε κατὰ θάλα[τταν.

This mutual non-aggression clause, which also applies equally to the territories under each ally’s
rule, is close in form to the prohibition against interference in an ally’s domestic constitution that
is common in subsequent treaties. In other words, the allies are to act according to the guiding
principles of reciprocity; they are to support each other as friends and not to harm each other as
enemies. These terms are followed by the instructions for the swearing of the oaths in both poleis
and for the erection of the alliance stele on the Acropolis. Very soon after the conclusion of the
alliance, Dionysius, now an Athenian citizen, submitted one of his own tragedies to the Lenaean
festival in Athens. After hearing that it won first prize, he celebrated so fiercely that he died, so it
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is said.192 Despite the extension of the alliance to Dionysius’ descendants, his son and successor,
Dionysius II, did not continue it.

Alliances in the Peloponnesus and the North (366-357)

A16

The Athenians and the Arcadian League (366)
Xen. Hel. 7.4.2-3, 6
Gradually, however, sentiment in Athens turned away from the Spartans and their

traditional allies. In 366, after Chabrias and Callistratus lost control of the border town of Oropus
to the Thebans, the first real signs of displeasure with the pro-Spartan policy began to surface.193
Lycomedes of Mantinea, having difficulties with his own allies in the Peloponnesus, took notice
of this shifting mood and made a second attempt (the first was in 370) to win over the Athenians
to an alliance. Some Athenians stood fast in their devotion to preserving friendly relations with
the Spartans, enemies of the Arcadians, unless they could be assured that this new alliance would
be defensive in nature, without any requirement to assist in an Arcadian attack against their
friends in Sparta.194 The proposal passed, but it was the result of a risky balancing act that
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reflected the division of opinion in Athens. In 362, after the Battle of Mantinea, the Mantinean
faction of the Arcadians would be joined by the Achaeans, Eleans, and Phliasians in making a
joint alliance with the Athenians.
A17

The Athenians and Arcadia, Achaea, Elis, and Phlius (362)
IG II2 112
After the conclusion of the alliance with the Arcadians, there was a perceptible shift away

from Callistratus’ policies. In the same year, the Athenians agreed to a common peace proposal
from the Thebans, which included support for Messenian independence from Sparta.195 In 365,
Callistratus was finally brought up on charges extending from his failure to regain Oropus. He
escaped prosecution, because of his remarkable defense speech, but later, in 362, he was tried in
absentia in an impeachment trial (εἰσαγγελία) and sentenced to death.196 This took place about
the same time as the Battle of Mantinea, which pitted most of the Greeks on the side of the
Thebans or on the side of the Peloponnesians and Athenians but, in the end, failed to bring about
any decisive military or political outcome. In the subsequent peace conference, the Athenians
agreed once again to Messenian autonomy.197 The alliance with the Spartans remained on the
books for some time afterwards, but for all practical purposes the Athenians had renounced it.
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Also coming out of the aftermath of Mantinea was a joint alliance with four
Peloponnesian poleis (Arcadia, Achaea, Elis, and Phlius). This alliance is only known through
the epigraphical record. Compared to early alliances, this inscription is much lengthier and fuller
in its expression of the alliance’s conditions. The main text opens with a vow:
“The herald shall vow forthwith to Zeus Olympics and to Athena Polias and to Demeter and to
Kore and to the Twelve Gods and to the August Goddesses, that, if what is resolved about the
alliance is to the advantage of the people of Athens, a sacrifice and procession shall be made on
the accomplishment of these things as the people shall resolve. That is to be vowed.”198
εὔξασθαι µὲν τὸγ κήρυκα αὐτίκα µάλα τῶι Διὶ τῶι Ὀλυµπίωι καὶ τῆι Ἀθηνᾶι τῆι Πολιάδι καὶ τῆι Δήµητρι καὶ τῆι Κόρηι καὶ τοῖς δώδεκα [θ]εοῖς καὶ ταῖς σεµναῖς θεαῖς, ἐὰν συνενείγκηι Ἀ[θη]ναίων τῶι δήµωι τὰ δόξαντα περὶ τῆς συµµαχία[ς θυ][σί]αν καὶ πρόσοδον ποιήσασθα[ι] τελουµένων [τούτω][ν κα]θότι ἂν τῶι δήµωι δοκῆι· τα[ῦ]τα µὲν ηὖχθ[αι,

This vow is directed to six divinities or groups of divinities. Zeus and Athena are representative
patrons of the Peloponnesians (in particular, Elis) and the Athenians, respectively. The
accompanying relief, showing a standing Athena behind the figures of Hera and an enthroned
Zeus, illustrates visually their presence in the alliance.199 The inclusion of Demeter and Kore,
patron deities for Arcadia and Eleusis, the Attic religious center under Athenian control, may
symbolize the close relationship which the Arcadians and the Athenians enjoyed since their
alliance in 366 (A16). Slobodan Dušanić, scholar of the Arcadian League, argues that a kinship
narrative proceeded from the recent contacts between the two parties and was communicated
here by the appearance of the two goddesses.200 This is a long way from 385, when the
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Athenians refused to send military assistance to the Mantineans because of their lack of close
personal relationships and contacts. Now, the two express their relationship in terms of legendary
kinship. These particular divinities, along with the Twelve Gods and the August Goddesses (i.e.,
the Eirynes), therefore, define the alliance in religious and social terms.
The inscription then moves to the more practical items of the alliance. For the Athenians,
this alliance indicated that they would continue on the trajectory away from Callistratus’
laconizing policy.201 But for the Peloponnesians, three of whom (Arcadia, Achaea, and Elis)
were primary allies of the Thebans throughout the 360s (see Chapter V), this new alliance
indicates their clean break with the Thebans. And the five provisions included here exhibit this
shift in a subtle way. The first three are contained inside the familiar mutual defense clause:
“If any one goes against Attica or overthrows the people of Athens or sets up a tyrant or an
oligarchy, the Arcadians and Achaeans and Eleans and Phliasians shall go in support of the
Athenians with all their strength as called on by the Athenians as far as possible; and if any one
goes against those cities, or overthrows the people of Phlius or overthrows or changes the
constitution of Achaea or Arcadia or Elis, or exiles anybody, the Athenians shall go in support of
these with all their strength as called on by those who are being wronged as far as possible.”
ἐὰν δέ τις ἴηι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττι][κὴ]ν ἢ τὸν δῆµον [καταλύηι τὸν Ἀθηναίων ἢ τύραννον]
[κα]θιστῆι ἢ ὀλι[γαρχίαν, βοηθεῖν Ἀρκάδας καὶ Ἀχαι][ος] καὶ Ἠλείους κ[αὶ Φλειασίους Ἀθηναίοις παντὶ σ][θε]νει καθότι ἂν [ἐπαγγέλλωσιν Ἀθηναίοι κατὰ τὸ δ][υν]ατόν· καὶ ἐάν [τις ἴηι ἐπὶ ταύτας τὰς πόλεις ἢ τὸν]
δῆµον καταλύε[ι τὸν Φλειασίων ἢ ἐὰν τὴν πολιτεία]ν τὴν Ἀχαιῶν ἢ τ[ὴν Ἀρκάδων ἢ τὴν Ἠλείων καταλύηι ἢ]
µεθιστῆι ἢ φυγα[δεύηι τινάς, βοηθεῖν Ἀθηναίους τ]ούτοις παντὶ σθ[ένει καθότι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλωσιν οἱ ἀ]δικούµενοι κατ[ὰ τὸ δυνατὸν.
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The alliance proposal was first introduced in the form of a resolution (δόγµα) from the
allies in the Confederacy, who seem to have had more of a voice in the creation of Athenian
alliances since the unilateral decision to ally with the Spartans in 369 (Ryder 1965, 88). The
Athenian council also expressed its endorsement in a resolution (πρὀβούλευσεν) (Rhodes 1972,
68-69, 76-78).
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Mutual defense, the prohibition against any interference in another ally’s domestic constitution,
and an exiles clause were all previously included in the joint alliance between the Arcadians,
Eleans, Argives, and the Thebans in 370 (T2). Four years later, the Achaeans committed to an
offensive alliance with the Thebans which also contained the latter two conditions (T6). Yet, as
Chapter V explains further, these alliances collapsed rather quickly. All of those involved in this
alliance in 362 must have had those failures in mind and sought ways to rectify them. At the
close of this inscription, therefore, two new provisions were added that were not in the earlier
Theban alliances:
“Each shall have the leadership in its own territory. If it is resolved by all the cities to add
anything else, whatever is resolved shall be within their oath. The oath shall be sworn in each city
by the highest officials of the Peloponnesians, and of the Athenians by the generals and the
taxiarchs and the hipparchs and the phylarchs and the cavalry –”
ἡγεµονίαν δὲ ἔχειν ἐ]ν τῆι αὑτῶν ἑκά[στους· ἐὰν δέ τις ἄλλο δοκῆι ἁπάσαις]
[τ]αῖς πόλεσι πρ[οσθεῖναι, ὅτι ἂν δόξηι, εὔορκον εἶν]αι. ὀµόσαι δ’ [ἐν ἑκάστηι πόλει τὰ µέγιστα τέλη Πελο]ποννησίων, [τῶν δ’ Ἀθηναίων τοὺς στρατηγοὺς καὶ το]ὺς ταξιάρ[χους καὶ τοὺς ἱππάρχους καὶ τοὺς φυλάρ]χους καὶ τ[οὺς ἱππέας]

This unambiguous designation of leadership – each ally retains leadership within its territory –
was included to prevent a repeat of the confusion that the Peloponnesians had experienced in
their alliances with the Thebans due to a lack of clear leadership roles. Such a designation in this
alliance with the Athenians, however, gave a sense of order and stability that the previous
alliances lacked. Finally, there is provision for future amendment. This was not new to the
Athenians – earlier alliances (A1, A2, A3) had it – but it was new to the Peloponnesians. The
possibility of making adjustments to the alliance terms must have been regarded highly after the
difficulties arising from the Theban arrangements.
A18

The Athenians and the Thessalian League (361)
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IG II2 116
In the next year, the Athenians went even further in reversing the foreign policies of the
past decade by making an alliance with the members of the Thessalian League, traditional
enemies of Alexander of Pherae. The alliance with the tyrant (A14) had turned out to be an
embarrassment – a temporary, hollow agreement. In 361, for example, Alexander, throwing off
the shackles of his subordinating alliance with the recently defeated Thebans (T7), asserted his
power on the sea by attacking Athenian possessions in the Cyclades and the Piraeus.202 He also
intensified his usual conflict with the Thessalians, who, in response, took no thought of their
hapless Theban protectors but instead looked to the Athenians for help.203 This was natural since
both were under attack from Alexander. It is not clear who initiated the proceedings, but the two
sides came to a final agreement which included four provisions.204 Each exhibits the potential
influences of reciprocity and mutuality in governing classical Greek interstate alliances. The
features of the first two, mutual defense and the preservation of each ally’s domestic constitution,
are familiar and need not be rehashed here. In the opening lines of the inscription there is a new
provision in Athenian alliances, the mutual acceptance of each other’s existing allies:
“Concerning what is said by the envoys of the Thessalians, be it decreed by the people: Accept
the alliance, for good fortune, as the Thessalians offer; and there shall be an alliance for them
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[Dem.] 50.4-5; Diod. Sic. 15.95.1-2; Polyaenus Strat. 6.2; cf. Heskel 1997, 66-70;
Sprawski 2006, 145.
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The Thessalians remained in alliance with the Thebans as late as the Battle of
Mantinea in 362 (Xen. Hell. 7.5.4).
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Westlake 1935, 134-138; Giovannini 2007, 260-262. Lines 8 to 11 of IG II2 116 imply
that the Thessalians initiated the alliance, but lines 34 to 36 suggest that the Athenians took the
first step. Tracy 2009, 81-82 supposes, on the basis of letter shapes, that IG II² 175 refers to a
Thessalian-Athenian alliance even earlier in the fourth century.
143

with the Athenians for all time. Also all the allies of the Athenians shall be allies of the
Thessalians, and those of the Thessalians allies of the Athenians.”205
[π]ε[ρὶ] ὧν λέγουσιν οἱ π[ρ]έσβεις τῶν Θετταλῶ[ν], ἐψηφίσθα[ι] τῶι δ[ή]µωι, δέχεσθαι τὴν συµµαχίαν τύχ[η]ι ἀγαθῆι κ[α]θὰ ἐπ[α]νγέλλοντα[ι] οἱ Θετταλο[ί]. εἶναι δὲ αὐ[τ]ο[ῖ]ς τὴ[ν] συµµ[α]χίαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίος εἰς [τ]ὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον. εἶ[ν]αι δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίων συµµ[ά]χ[ο]ς ἅπαντας Θετταλῶ[ν] συµµ[ά]χος καὶ τὸς
[Θ]ετταλῶν Ἀ[θη]ναίων.

The alliance is designed not only for mutual defense against an enemy but also for the mutual
benefit of the new allies. In this particular clause, for example, there is a call for each party’s
existing allies to be held in common. Similar language shows up again in the last lines (45-46) of
the text, which praise a certain Theaetetus “for speaking best and doing whatever good he can for
the people of Athens and the Thessalians in an orderly manner [εἶναι δὲ καὶ [Θ]ε[αί]τητον τὸν
Ἐρχιέα ὡ[ς] λέγο[ν]τα [ἄρ]ι̣σ̣τα [κα]ὶ [πρ]άττοντα ὅ[τ]ι ἂν δύνηται ἀγα[θὸ]ν τῶ[ι δήµ]ω[ι] τῶι
Ἀ[θην]α[ί]ω[ν κα]ὶ Θετταλ[ο]ῖς ἐν τῶι τεταγµέ[ν]ωι].” This inhabitant of Attica had done some
unrecorded service which resulted in mutual benefit for the larger communities and presumably
played some part in bringing about this alliance. “What benefits the Thessalians, it might be
argued,” Polly Low comments on Theaetetus’ service, “necessarily benefits the Athenians too –
and vice versa [italics in original].”206 Positive reciprocity and shared objectives inspire the
administration of the alliances as well as the military provisions, in this case reaching beyond the
operations of the war to the conditions for ending a war:
“It shall not be permitted to put an end to the war against Alexander, either to the Thessalians
without the Athenians or to the Athenians without the archon and koinon of the Thessalians.”
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206

Low 2007, 143.
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τ]ὸ[ν] δὲ πόλεµον τὸν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν µὴ [ἐξεῖν]α[ι] κ[αταλ]ύσασθαι [µήτε] Θετταλοῖς [ἄ]νευ Ἀθηναί[ων µήτε] Ἀ[θην]αίοις ἄ[νευ το͂] ἄρχοντος καὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ [τοῦ Θεττ][αλῶν].

This fourth provision, a prohibition against any unilateral attempt at peace with a mutual enemy,
is also new for the Athenians. It was probably included in the Thessalians’ earlier alliance with
the Thebans in 370 (T1), but the latter made an alliance with their mutual enemy, Alexander of
Pherae, anyway (T7). Although the Thessalians probably conceded in 364 to the Theban alliance
with Alexander, as argued in Chapter V, over time they came to regret that decision. It may be
that the Thessalians expected a better result this time with the Athenians. Finally, to underscore
the identity of allies and of enemies, the inscription calls for the destruction of the stele recording
the Athenian alliance with Alexander and makes provision for a new stele to commemorate this
alliance with the Thessalians. There is no record of the two conducting a campaign against
Alexander before he was assassinated by his brothers in 358. When the Athenians made an
alliance with those same brothers during the Third Sacred War (from 356 to 346), no one voiced
a demand to destroy the stele for the Thessalian alliance.207
A19

The Athenians and Cersebleptes, Berisades, and Amadocus (357)
IG II2 126; Dem. 23.170-178
Throughout the early fourth century, the Athenians had a keen interest in making

alliances in the north, especially in Thrace: Thrasybulus’ alliances with Seuthes (A4) and
Amadocus (A5) in 390, the reinforced alliance with Hebryzelmis in 386, and many others which
were incorporated into the Second Athenian Confederacy.208 Throughout the 360s, the Athenians
had a strained relationship with Seuthes’ successor, Cotys I, and even approved of his
207

Sprawski 2011, 203-210.
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assassination.209 The resulting instability from his son Cersebleptes’ rivalry with other
Odrysians, Berisades and Amadocus, created anxiety among the Greeks in the region and among
the Athenians. After a number of failed attempts on the part of Athenian generals to reconcile the
three, Chares finally succeeded in bringing them into a joint alliance with the Athenians in
357.210 The treaty contained three principal provisions: mutual defense, revenue collection
arrangements, and a commitment to suppress any rebellion among each other’s existing allies.
The first can only be conjectured from the words βοιηθεῖν and οἱ σύµµαχοι in the
fragmentary lines (1-2) at the opening of the inscription, but such a provision would be expected
and not at all unprecedented. The majority of the inscription details the different aspects of the
revenue collection arrangements.
“Of the Greek cities which are written on the stelai as paying tribute to Berisades or Amadocus or
Cersebleptes and as being allies of the Athenians, if they do not give up to the Athenians all their
tribute, they shall be exacted by Berisades and Amadocus and Cersebleptes as far as possible; and
if anywhere they do not give to Berisades or Amadocus or Cersebleptes all their tribute, it shall be
exacted by the Athenians and the generals in charge of the force as far as possible. The Greek
cities in Thrace, paying to Berisades and Amadocus and Cersebleptes the traditional tribute and to
the Athenians the syntaxis, shall be free and autonomous, being allies of the Athenians as they
swore and of Berisades and Amadocus and Cersebleptes.”211
περὶ δὲ τ]ῶµ πόλεων ὅσ[αι ἐγράφησαν ἐν ταῖς στ][ήλαις τελοῦ]σαι Βηρισάδε[ι ἢ Ἀµαδόκωι ἢ Κερσεβλ][έπτηι τοὺς] φόρους καὶ Ἀθην[αίοις ὑποτελεῖς ὑπά][ρχουσι, ἐὰ]µ µὴ ἀποδῶσιν Ἀθη[ναίοις αἱ πόλεις τὸς]
[φόρους, πρ]άττειν Βηρισάδην [καὶ Ἀµάδοκην καὶ Κε][ρσεβλέπτ]ην κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. κ[αὶ ἐάν που Βηρισάδ]-
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[ει ἢ Ἀµαδόκ]ωι ἢ Κερσεβλέπτηι µὴ [ἀποδῶσι τοὺς φό][ρους αἱ πόλε]ς, πράττειν Ἀθηναίου[ς καὶ τῶν ἀρχόν][των τοὺς ἀεὶ ἐ]πὶ τῆι δυνάµει ὄντας [κατὰ τὸ δυνατ][όν· τὰς δὲ πόλει]ς τὰς Ἑλληνίδας τὰς ἐ[ν Χερρονήσω][ι ὑποτελούσας Β]ηρισάδει καὶ Ἀµαδόκ[ωι καὶ Κερσ][εβλέπτηι τὸµ φό]ρον τὸµ πάτριον καὶ Ἀ[θηναίοις τ][ὴν σύνταξιν, ἐλε]υθέρας εἶναι καὶ αὐτονό[µους συ][µµάχους οὔσας Ἀ]θηναίοις καθὰ ὤµοσαν κα[ὶ Βηρισ][άδει καὶ Ἀµαδόκω]ι καὶ Κερσεβλέπτηι·

In Thrasybulus’ earlier alliances in the north, there had been revenue collection arrangements in
the form of the εἰκοστή or the δεκάτη. Money was also a feature of the Athenian alliance with
Alexander of Pherae. But in this alliance with the Odrysian kings, two types of revenue are
mentioned: tribute (φόρος) and contributions (συντάξεις). The former was the major source of
revenue for the Athenians in the Delian League and the latter in the Confederacy. This treaty
reveals that there were Greek poleis in Thrace that had found themselves in the dual position of
being tributaries of the Thracian kings as well as Athenian allies. This must have been a situation
difficult for the great powers to manage, especially in times of instability. This leads Chrysoulla
Veligianni-Terzi to deny that the Greek poleis ever paid tribute to the Odrysians or that the kings
asserted any form of control over them. Louisa Loukopoulou, however, suggests that the Greeks
only had to pay taxes when trading within the Odrysian territory.212 Whatever the case may be,
for the primary allies, reconciled, the language employed in the treaty reflects a high degree of
unity; they agreed to act on each other’s behalf in exacting the tribute payments. This is a
remarkable arrangement and would have required frequent communication and interaction
between the parties for it to operate efficiently.
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According to the treaty, paying tribute or contributions is not incompatible with the free
and autonomous status of the poleis.213 But one wonders whether the Greeks in Thrace agreed.
Despite the assertion, the end of the treaty (18-21) implies that the Greek did not agree and in
fact rebelled from the oversight of the great powers. Expanding on the probable mutual defense
clause earlier in the inscription, there was a call on the Odrysians to help (βοηθεῖν) in
suppressing any revolts among the Athenians’ existing allies: “If any of the poleis defect from
the Athenians, they shall require Berisades and Amadocus and Cersebleptes to help. If . . . [ἐὰν
[δέ τις τῶν πόλεων ἀφιστῆ]ται ἀπ’ Ἀθηναίων, βο[ηθεῖν Βηρισάδην καὶ Ἀµάδοκον] καὶ
Κερσεβλέπτ[ην καθότι ἂν ἐπαγγέλλωσι Ἀθηναῖοι] ἐὰν δὲ].” This provision carries the same
connotations as a mutual defense clause or the mutual allies clause in the Athenian-Thessalian
alliance (A18) in that they all encourage a shared operation of alliances. Indeed, the final line is
incomplete (ἐὰν δὲ) but it probably expressed the same obligation for the Athenians to assist in
suppressing revolts among the kings’ allies. The defections of allies was an overriding concern at
the time for the Athenians. The Social War, a revolt of allies from the Confederacy, many of
them original charter members, had just broken out in the Aegean. This explains why this clause
was included in the treaty. It also explains why the alliance was fleeting. The alliance rested on
the discourse of a shared identity and on the management of ambitious administrative matters,
but, because of the Social War, Chares could not stay to ensure their smooth operation. At the
same time, Philip II, king of Macedon since 359, began to expand his influence into the region.
He overpowered the Odrysian allies, and the Athenians were unable to come to their defense.
Berisades died soon afterwards but his son Cetriporis made a new alliance with the Athenians in
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the next year under different conditions (A20). Amadocus continued in the alliance until Philip
overpowered him in 353.214 Cersebleptes renewed his alliance with the Athenians in 353,
allowing them at that time to establish cleruchies in the Chersonesus.215 Finally, in the peace
treaty at the end of the Third Sacred War in 346, the Athenians completely abandoned
Cersebleptes to Philip’s designs.216

Alliances against Philip of Macedon (356-338)

A20

The Athenians and the Thracians, Paeonians, and Illyrians (356)
IG II2 127; Diod. 16.22.3
In 357, Philip had made rapid advances in capturing Amphipolis, Pydna, and Potidea, and

in securing an alliance with the Chalcidians. In 356, he went further and seized Crenides (a
recent Thasian colony established with the help of the Athenian exile Callistratus) and renamed it
Philippi.217 These victories alarmed everyone in the north, especially the sons of the recently
deceased Berisades, the Paeonian king Lyppeus, and the Illyrian king Grabus, who made their
own alliance before inviting the Athenians to join as well. The latter, still fully engaged in the
Social War, were in no position to accept but they did anyway.218 The inscription for the alliance
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is somewhat turgid, filled mostly with praise and honors for individuals (1-33) and a provision
for the council to make future amendments (34-35). It closes with a transcript of the alliance oath
for the Athenians (38-47):
“I swear by Zeus and Gaia and Helios and Poseidon and Athena and Ares that I will be a friend
and an ally to Cetriporis and to the brothers of Cetriporis, and that I will wage the war with
Cetriporis against Philip without deceit and with all my strength as far as possible, and I will not
end the war against Philip without Cetriporis and his brothers; and the other places which Philip
controls I will join with Cetriporis and his brothers in subduing, and I shall join in taking
219
Crenides with Cetriporis and his brothers; and I will give back . . .”
[ὀµνύω Δία καὶ Γῆν] καὶ Ἥλιον καὶ Ποσει[δ]ῶ καὶ Ἀθηνᾶν καὶ
[Ἄρην, φίλος ἔσοµαι] Κετριπόρι καὶ τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς τοῖς Κ[ετριπόριος καὶ σ]ύµµαχος καὶ πολεµή[σ]ω µετὰ Κετριπόρ[ιος τὸν πόλεµον τ]ὸν πρὸς Φίλιππον ἀδόλως παντὶ σθένε[ι]
[κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν, κ]αὶ οὐ προκαταλύσοµαι τὸν πόλεµον ἄν[ευ Κετριπόριος κ]αὶ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τὸν πρὸς Φίλιππον κ[αὶ]
[τἆλλα χωρία ἃ κατ]έχε[ι] Φίλιππος συνκα[τ]α[σ]τρέψοµαι µ[ε][τὰ Κετριπόριος κ]αὶ τῶν ἀδελφῶν καὶ Κρηνίδ[α]ς συνε[ξ]αι[ρήσω µετὰ Κετριπ]ό[ρ]ιος κα[ὶ τ]ῶν [ἀδ]ελφῶν καὶ ἀποδώσω τὰ

The oath is directed towards six deities, the first four of which, according to Peter Rhodes and
Robin Osborne, represented the four elements – air (Zeus), earth (Gaia), fire (Helios), and water
(Poseidon). In the words of Andrew Bayliss, these four gods together make “a ‘formula’ for
covering the cosmos.”220 They are accompanied by Athena, Athens’ patron deity and a goddess
of war like Ares. Directing the vow to the six deities, the dedicatees highlight the intention of the
four allies to depict their alliance having more than just a local importance as well as a military
character. Within the oath are two conditions for the Athenians: their commitment to mutual
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defense and their promise not to make any unilateral attempt at peace with a mutual enemy
(Philip). These are familiar items. But there is also the inclusion of a specific military objective:
to retrieve Crenides from Philip. No other alliance in the fourth century expresses so precisely its
target. War aims are always left open, allowing for changed circumstances and new enemies,
both in the present and in the future. Since this alliance was more limited in its goal, there was no
need for its eternal designation (εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον) so familiar in nearly every other Athenian
alliance. The allies intended only to carry out their mission and then let the alliance rest.
Nevertheless, like the one with the three Odrysians in the previous year, the alliance came to
nothing. Diodorus says that the Macedonian king’s rapid advance surprised the other kings so
that they could not mount an effective defense. The Athenians, because of their ongoing war
with allies, were unable to perform their duty in the alliance and protect their allies.221 Thus came
to an end perhaps the shortest Athenian alliance of the fourth century.
A21

The Athenians and the Phocians (355)
Dem. 19.61-62; Aeschin. 3.118; Diod. Sic. 16.27.3-5; Paus. 3.10.3
The ease with which the northern alliances broke down did not stop the Athenians from

continuing these practices. Once the Social War came to a resolution in 355, the Athenians were
free to engage in the recent conflict in central Greece, the Third Sacred War.222 Their next
alliance, with the Phocians, was not designed originally to confront Philip but rather the
Amphictyonic League.223 Athenian interest in the alliance was multi-faceted, combining moral,

221

Diod. Sic. 16.22.3; cf. Dem. 1.13; Plut. Alex. 3.8-9.

222

The Athenians permitted the rebels to sever their alliance ties with the Confederacy
(Isoc. 8 16; Dem. 3.28; Aeschin. 2.70; Diod. Sic. 16.21.1-22.2).
223

Dem. 19.61; Aeschin. 3.118; Diod. Sic. 16.27.3-5; Paus. 3.10.3.
151

social, and political concerns. The Athenians saw an opportunity to live up to their reputation as
protectors of the weak and the wronged. Not knowing in 355 how the Phocian generals would
abuse the wealth of Delphi in their prosecution of the war, the Athenians initially considered the
Phocians to be the wronged party because the League had imposed onerous fines on them (and
the Spartans) for supposed religious violations.224 The two also had a history of friendship and
cooperation that extended back into the fifth century. Pausanias says that the Athenians agreed to
the alliance, “remembering some old service from the Phocians [ἀρχαίαν δή τινα ἐκ τῶν Φωκέων
µνηµονεύοντες εὐεργεσίαν].”225 Although Pausanias fails to mention exactly what that εὐεργεσία
was, he expresses unambiguously the important role of reciprocity in the decision to ally with the
Phocians. John Buckler, however, prefers to see the alliance only from a political standpoint. He
emphasizes how the alliance offered the Athenians the opportunity to increase their political
power at the expense of Thebes, in control of the Amphictyonic League in the 350s, and to
perhaps regain control of Oropus.226 This makes good strategic sense and must have entered into
the Athenians’ calculations. Therefore, like nearly every other example in the fourth century, the
shape of this alliance was one that included a mixture of moral, social, and political factors.
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Unfortunately, however, nothing can be said of the specific provisions for this alliance or
for any others in the next decade. The Athenians made alliances here, there, and everywhere
(Thracian Neapolis in 355, the Messenians at about the same, the Olynthians in 349, and the
Mytileneans in 346), but epigraphical and literary evidence is unable to provide any of the
contents of the official treaties.227 Over the course of the Sacred War, as Philip became more
involved in the conflict, the target of the Athenian-Phocian alliance shifted from the
Amphictyonic League to the Macedonian king. The alliances with Neapolis and the Olynthians,
too, were clearly directed against Philip, as were all of the alliances after the conclusion of the
war. In 342, Demosthenes, leading an embassy around the Peloponnesus to shore up resistance to
Philip, succeeded in renewing alliances with the Achaeans, Argives, Arcadians (Mantineans),
Megalopolitans, and Messenians.228 Very little is known of these alliances, but it is noteworthy
that all of the allies had a previous alliance with the Athenians at some point in the fourth
century. The Athenians continued to reach out to old friends and associates for their alliances.
A22

The Athenians and the Eretrians (341)
IG II2 230
The alliance with the Eretrians on the island of Euboea was another one designed to

reduce Philip’s influence in Greek affairs, and it also emerged from a long history of
interactions. The two poleis made an alliance at the beginning of the Corinthian War (A3), and
the Eretrians enrolled in the Second Athenian Confederacy in 377.229 But after Leuctra, the
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Neapolis: IG II2 128. Messenians: Dem. 16.9. Olynthians: ibid. 1-3 passim; Philoch.
FGrH 328 F49-51. Mytileneans: IG II2 213.
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IG II2 225; Dem. 9.72; Aeschin. 3.95-101; Schol. Aeschin. 3.83; cf. Cargill 1981, 94;
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Eretrians followed the rest of Euboea in joining the ascendant Thebans (T1). Their tyrant
Themiston seized Oropus from Athenian control in 366 and handed it over to the Thebans.230
Then in 357, after factional conflict erupted all across the island, the Athenians renewed their
alliances with the Eretrians and with the other major poleis of the island.231 The Athenians
maintained a tenuous hold on these alliances until Philip intervened in the island’s affairs in the
late 340s. In response, the Athenians dispatched Phocion, who removed Philip’s puppet and
restored democracy to Eretria.232 This liberation coincided with the plans of Callias of Chalcis
for the revival of an independent Euboean confederacy. Under the influence of Demosthenes, the
Athenians supported Callias’ proposals and made alliances with Chalcis and with Eretria.233 The
surviving treaty with the latter supplies just enough information to be useful. There is an
incomplete reference (2) to monetary contributions (συνετάξαντο). The recorded oath (6-11) for
the Eretrians refers to their responsibility to defend the Athenians, their territory, and their
democratic constitution.234 The Athenians effectively outmaneuvered Philip and stood as
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Dem. 18.99; Aeschin. 3.85; Diod. Sic. 15.76.1.
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IG II2 124 (Tod 153 = Harding 65 = RO 48); Aeschin. 3.85; Diod. Sic. 16.7.2. Peake
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Tritle 1993, 227-238.
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Knoepfler 1995, 346-364 discusses other contemporary Athenian treaties with the

Eretrians.
154

protectors of the new Euboean Confederacy. Their alliance proved strong enough that the
Eretrians and their fellow islanders stood with the Athenians at the Battle of Chaeronea.235
A23

The Athenians and the Thebans (339)
Dem. 18.160-251; Aeschin. 3.142-143; Hyp. Against Diondas 137r/136v; Philoch.
FGrH 328 F56b; Theopomp. FGrH 115 F328; Diod. Sic. 16.84-85; Plut. Dem. 18
Demosthenes had put in order a fair number of allies across the Peloponnesus and Euboea

to oppose Philip. But in order to bring that conflict to a head, the Athenians needed a more
powerful ally, such as the Thebans. The Athenians and Thebans had been allies in the Corinthian
War (A1) and in the 370s (A12), but their partnership was severed once the Thebans embarked
on their own attempt at hegemony in Greece (see Chapter V). That experiment failed rather
quickly and during the Third Sacred War, in order to overcome the Phocians, the Thebans made
an alliance with Philip. The Macedonian king did in fact bring an end to the war but in the
process he also replaced Thebes as the leader in central Greek affairs.236 The Thebans, finding
their continued association with Philip to be oppressive, retaliated in 340 by expelling the
Macedonian garrison from Nicaea and seizing control of Thermopylae.237 This occurred at the
same time as the outbreak of the Fourth Sacred War, during which the members of the Delphic
Amphictyony called on Philip to lead their forces against Amphissa. In late autumn of 339, the
savior of Apollo headed south, bypassing Thermopylae, and took up a position at Elateia in
Phocis, posing a direct threat to Thebes and a distant threat to Athens.
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Theban alliance with Philip: ibid. 5.20-22, 18.19, 19.321; Diod. Sic. 16.58.2-3, 59.2.
Kelly 1980, 64-83 looks at the Theban allies who joined Philip.
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Philoch. FGrH 328 F56.
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As mentioned in Chapter II, when a messenger announced Philip’s position to the
Athenians, Demosthenes recognized in this an opportunity to expand the anti-Macedonian
coalition. As the proxenos of the Thebans who had cautiously advocated a policy of cooperation
between the two poleis ever since the 350s, Demosthenes determined to bring about the third
alliance of the fourth century with the Thebans.238 Although security concerns must have
weighed heavily on the minds of the Athenians, in his speech proposing the alliance,
Demosthenes did not concentrate his argument on strategic considerations, such as BOP, but
appealed to social and moral norms. He asked the members of the assembly to set aside their
grievances with the Thebans, to recall their past experiences of collaboration, and to identify
more closely with their old friends in this hour of peril. He also expected the same from the proAthenian faction in Thebes (οἱ φρονοῦντες τὰ ὑµέτερα).239 Commenting on this speech in his
book on social memory in Athenian politics, Bernd Steinbock writes, “his account proves that
arguments based on a group’s shared image of the past, evoking their ancestor’s achievements
and the values and beliefs of their community, carried great emotional weight and were therefore
crucial factors in decision making.”240 In other words, despite the immediate crisis of Philip’s
presence on their borders, Demosthenes still stressed the “irrational” factors, the social and moral
reasons for allying with the Thebans. The assembly responded positively to these points and
authorized Demosthenes to lead the alliance embassy to Thebes.
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Demosthenes and Thebes: Trevett 1999, 184-202; Steinbock 2013, 269-271; Mack
2015, 114-117. Trevett 1999, 187-188 mentions other Athenians with Theban connections.
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Dem. 18.176-177.
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Steinbock 2013, 271; cf. Yunis 2000, 97-118.
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The Theban assembly on that occasion must have been a lively gathering with the whole
Theban citizenry engaging with the Macedonian and Athenian delegations. The Macedonian
representatives stressed the importance of reciprocity: the Thebans, still technically allied to
Philip, should show gratitude (χάριν ἀποδοῦναι) for the king’s good services and, considering
the injuries received from the Athenians in the past, join in the attack on Attica, or at least remain
neutral.241 Demosthenes’ counter-argument is unrecorded, although if the earlier speech to the
Athenian assembly is any indication, he probably emphasized reciprocity and the close historical
ties between the two poleis.242 According to Aeschines, he also agreed that the Athenians would
recognize the Thebans’ claims over Boeotia, bear all the costs of naval operations and two-thirds
of the land campaigns, and allow the Thebans full command on land and joint command on
sea.243 Upon these conditions, the Theban assembly voted to accept the alliance with the
Athenians. Soon thereafter, the Athenian military marched into Boeotia and joined up with their
new allies, ready to confront Philip.
Thus are the accounts of Demosthenes and Aeschines. But the contemporary logographer
Hyperides, whose speech Against Diondas antedates the others by a few years, presents a
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Dem. 18.213.

242

Theopomp. FGrH 115 F328 would have the reader believe the alliance was the result
of Demosthenes’ seductive oratory (Flower 1994, 143-145; contra Shrimpton 1991, 175-176).
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Aeschin. 3.142-143. In the same speech, Aeschines (3.106) criticizes the concessions
as part of “an unjust and not at all equal alliance [ἄδικον δὲ καὶ οὐδαµῶς ἴσην τὴν πρὸς
Θηβαίους συµµαχίαν].”
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different version.244 According to Hyperides, the Thebans never agreed to the alliance during the
assembly. They only did so when the Athenian military marched into Boeotia:
“You travelled from Eleusis to Thebes; and you were so well disposed and friendly towards each
other that having themselves entered they received your army into their city and their houses into
the presence of their wives and children. And you, though you had not yet received any firm
assurances from them, sent your force there while Philip was close at hand; and at that point
Philip went off, without achieving any of his goals. We and the Thebans came back and rapidly
confirmed the alliance.”245
Ἐλευσινόθεν εἰς Θήβας ἐπορεύεσθε· οὕτως δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἰκείως καὶ φιλανθρώπως
διετέθητε, ὥστ᾿ ἐκεῖνοι µὲν εἰσεληλυθότες αὐτοὶ εἰς τὴν πόλιν καὶ εἰς τὰς οἰκίας ἐπὶ παῖδας καὶ
γυναῖκας τὸ στρατόπεδον ὑµῶν ὑπεδέξαντο· ὑµεῖς δὲ οὐδέν πω παρ᾿ ἐκείνων εἰληφότες βέβαιον,
τὴν δύναµιν ἐκεῖσε Φιλίππου πλησίον ὄντ(ος) ἀπεστείλατε· καὶ τότε µὲν ὁ Φίλιππ(ος) ἀπιὼν
ὤιχετο οὐδὲν ὧν ἠβούλετο διαπραξάµενος· ἡµεῖς δὲ καὶ Θηβαῖοι ἐπανελθόντες τάχιστα τὰς
συµµαχίας ἐπεκυρώσαµεν.

Although this passage suggests some hesitation on the part of the Thebans to make a firm
resolution with the Athenians, there is no impression that they feared or distrusted them. In fact,
they welcomed the Athenians into their city walls and into their homes, a strong gesture
demonstrating trust between the two parties.246 So whether the alliance was concluded during the
assembly or later when the Athenian army reached the city, the two merged their forces into one
and worked towards defeating Philip the same way that they did against the Spartans earlier in
the century.
Demosthenes mentions two successful skirmishes against the Macedonian army over the
winter. Soon the Euboeans, Achaeans, Corinthians, Megarians, Leucadians, Corcyraeans, and a
few other small powers joined the coalition.247 By the summer of 338, the Greeks had an army
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Natalie Tchernetska (2005, 1-6) discovered the fragments in the Archimedes
palimpsest in 2002. Care et al. 2008, 1-19 give the text, translation, and commentary.
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Hyp. Against Diondas 137r 2-6. Translation from Care et al. 2008, 1-19.
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roughly comparable in size to Philip’s. The high hopes of victory, however, were shattered by
Philip’s decisive victory at the Battle of Chaeronea. The defeat silenced for a time resistance
among the Greeks to the Macedonian presence in their affairs. In the next year, Philip established
the League of Corinth, realligning all of the Athenian alliances to himself.248 The extensive
practice of alliance-making was no longer an option for the Athenians.
It is difficult to find a guiding policy in Athenian alliances between Leuctra and
Chaeronea. They alternated from pro-Theban to pro-Spartan to anti-Macedonian.Throughout this
period, Athenian alliances proliferated here, there, and everywhere. Nevertheless, even in the
final alliance with the Thebans in 339, there was still a consistent thread of building interstate
alliances upon the foundation of personal contacts between the parties. The specific military
objectives changed but the manner in which alliance selectivity and formation was conducted
remained consistent. It was not only the Athenians who built their political and military alliances
on personal relationships and contacts. The next chapter shows how the principles of
interpersonal friendship operated in Spartan interstate alliances as well.
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Chapter IV
Spartan Alliances
At the beginning of the fourth century, the Spartans were by no means unfamiliar with
the practice of making bilateral alliances, a practice which over the course of the previous two
centuries had resulted in the formation of a network of alliances known as “the Spartans and their
allies,” or the Peloponnesian League. During the Peloponnesian War, the diplomatic reach of the
Spartans expanded to embrace alliances even outside of the peninsula. After that war, under the
dynamic leadership of the general Lysander, Sparta’s geopolitical influence multiplied
exponentially in all directions, including contacts with both Greeks and non-Greeks.1 Sometime
around the turn of the century, however, the Spartan authorities, apprehensive of the amount of
individual power that Lysander was accumulating, scaled back his personal activities.
Nevertheless, they still retained a strong Spartan presence throughout the Mediterranean. As a
result, they made at least thirteen new bilateral alliances over the course of the fourth century.
Most of these were the products of the diplomatic strategy set forth by the Eurypontid kings
Agesilaus II and his son Archidamus III.
Table 4: Spartan Alliances in the Fourth Century
West
Mainland Greece
Dionysius I of Syracuse (403) Acarnanians (389)
Tarentines (346)

Amyntas of Macedon (382)
Olynthians (379)
Athenians (369)
Phocians (356)

1

East
Spithridates and Otys of
Paphlagonia (395)
Evagoras of Cyprus (late 380s)
Glos (late 380s)
Ariobarzanes (366)
Tachos of Egypt (361)

Hornblower 1983, 218 (cf. 1992, 121-123) calls the extension of Spartan influence in
the interbellum years of 403 to 395 as “almost a Weltpolitik.” Ferrario 2014, 234-240 looks at the
agency of Lysander in the development of Spartan imperialism.
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After examining the longest Spartan alliance in the fourth century, the one with
Dionysius I of Syracuse, this chapter opens with an examination of the alliances with nonGreeks, which Agesilaus framed according to the principles of Greek friendship (φιλία), an
interpersonal relationship with reciprocal obligations of promoting mutual benefit. There were
two phases to the eastern alliances – the Asian expedition of 396 to 394 and Agesilaus’
campaigns in the Hellespont and in Egypt in the 360s. None of these lasted very long. Those in
this first phase came to an end because the new operative principles of friendship were not
acceptable to Agesilaus’ conservative Spartan associates, who continued to view all of the allies
as subjects rather than as equal partners. The final eastern alliance, the one with Tachos of Egypt,
dissolved because the new alliance protocol did not translate well into an Egyptian context, so
that the Egyptian king failed to fulfill his obligations and thus frustrated Spartan expectations.
The disrepair into which the alliances in the east fell, therefore, is not due to any contempt for
interstate and intercultural collaboration but rather to cultural dissonance and confusion over the
new ideas that Agesilaus had introduced to the political and military accords.
The alliances with Greeks, on the other hand, products of long historical interactions and
social connections, lacked the potential difficulties of cross-cultural misunderstandings, and thus
were more successful. Two of the most important alliances of this period were with the Phocians
in central Greece and the Tarentines in southern Italy. Although emerging out of the same
principles of friendship, the practical basis for these alliances was the exchange of money and
manpower, which had the potential to advance the military objectives of the allies and at the
same time the political objectives of the Spartans in the Peloponnesus. This chapter argues that
because these practical advantages were predicated on the social obligations of reciprocity and
the promotion of mutual benefit, the alliances operated according to sensible policies. That the
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alliances failed to produce enduring results does not detract from their fundamental soundness in
their own historical context. Uncovering the guiding principles for Spartan alliances, however,
will be much harder than it was for the Athenian alliances because of the dearth of epigraphic
evidence and the lack of detail in the literary accounts.2 This chapter, therefore, develops its
thesis through a close investigation of the historical context and a judicious use of comparative
analysis for each alliance.
S1

The Spartans and Dionysius I of Syracuse (403)
Diod. Sic. 13.81.2, 14.10.2-3, 70.3
The Spartan alliance with Dionysius I of Syracuse is a model alliance. It was constructed

on interpersonal contacts and the exchange of services, and endured for much of the first half of
the fourth century. Cooperation with the Syracusans, however, began earlier, in 413, with the
participation of Gylippus in the successful defense of Sicily against the Athenian invasion.3 The
Syracusans repaid their protectors with a great portion of the spoils of war and contributed their
own naval support – more than twenty ships under the command of Hermocrates – for the
Spartans’ campaigns in the Aegean against their mutual enemy. Although that support was not
enough for the defeat of the Athenians and the democrats in Syracuse took advantage of that
failure to condemn Hermocrates in absentia to exile, the Spartans still continued their interest in
Sicilian affairs.4 According to Diodorus, in 406, when the Syracusans were engaged in a conflict

2

One possible exception is SEG 26.461 (an undated alliance between the Spartans and
the Aetolians and the Erxadieis). Antonetti 2012, 193-208 reviews modern opinions of its date.
3

Thuc. 6.93.2, 7.1-6, 21-24, 85-86. Caven 1990 passim looks in detail at the many
interactions between the Spartans and the Syracusans.
4

Thuc. 8.26.1, 85.3; Xen. Hell. 1.1.27; Diod. Sic. 13.34.4, 39.4.
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with the Carthaginians, they finally negotiated a formal alliance (συµµαχία) with the Spartans.5
Following his manner of only summarizing historical events, the Sicilian epitomator
unfortunately does not expand on the alliance terms. It may have been as a part of this agreement
that the Spartans dispatched Dexippus, a military expert, to defend the island and to ensure
continued support from Syracuse for the war against Athens.6
This partnership grew much closer when Dionysius, a former follower of Hermocrates,
pushed his way into power in 403. After seeing to the arrangement of postwar affairs in Greece,
the Spartans dispatched to Syracuse the prominent Aristus to strengthen their alliance, but now
with Dionysius personally. Despite their cultivated reputation as tyrant-haters, the Spartans
charged Aristus to safeguard Dionysius’ rule from domestic enemies and, accordingly, “to get
his attention because of their benefactions [ὑπήκοον ἕξειν . . . διὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας].”7 Aristus was
successful. Dionysius remained in power, and the Spartans continued their benefactions to him
into the new century. In 398, for example, they “gave him authority to recruit from them as many
soldiers as he wished [αὐτῷ συναύξοντες τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔδωκαν ἐξουσίαν ὅσους βούλοιτο παρ᾽
αὐτῶν ξενολογεῖν].”8 They had granted the same concession to Lysander’s friend Cyrus in 401
and would continue to do so with their allies throughout the fourth century, indicating that the
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Ibid. 13.81.2.

6

Ibid. 13.85.3; cf. Millender 2006, 238-239.

7

Diod. Sic. 14.10.2-3, 70.3. Sansone 1981, 202-206 is alone in rejecting Lysander’s
involvement in the formation of the alliance with Dionysius.
8

Diod. Sic. 14.44.2.
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Spartans held some sort of supervisory role over the recruitment of Peloponnesian soldiers.9
Affording this access to allies also netted the Spartans money for their own political and military
ambitions. In 396, in preparation for yet another conflict with the Carthaginians, Dionysius “sent
to the Peloponnesus recruiters with much money, commanding them to enlist the greatest amount
of soldiers without sparing any money [ἔπεµψε δὲ καὶ ξενολόγους εἰς Πελοπόννησον µετὰ
πολλῶν χρηµάτων, ἐντειλάµενος ὡς πλείστους ἀθροίζειν στρατιώτας, µὴ φειδοµένους τῶν
µισθῶν].”10 The Spartans benefitted monetarily as did Dionysius in terms of manpower. They
even allowed the dispatch of thirty ships under the command of a full Spartiate, Pharax, who
went on to defeat the Carthaginian enemy and to provide further support for Dionysius against
his domestic rivals.11 Through exporting military experts and large numbers of soldiers to
Dionysius, the Spartans received in return extra funds for their activities in the Greek east.
Dionysius, therefore, owed his rule to the Spartans, and he reciprocated like services. In
393, during the Corinthian War, he rejected an Athenian proposal, even though it was delivered
by his guest-friend (ξένος) Eunomus, for a marriage alliance with Evagoras of Cyprus, which
would have created an anti-Spartan alliance stretching across the Mediterranean.12 Although he
remained aloof from eastern Greek affairs for the next few years on account of his campaigns in
southern Italy, in 387, he came through for the Spartans by sending enough ships to the
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Millender 2006, 235-266.
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Diod. Sic. 14.58.1, 62.1. At this time, Dionysius doubled his money supply by fiat.
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Ibid. 14.63.4, 70.1-3. Isoc. 8.99 (cf. Hornblower 1992, 121-123) cites the support for
Dionysius as one of many examples of Spartan imperialistic excesses.
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Lys. 19.19-20. The Athenian assembly also passed honors for him in 394 (IG II2 18).
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Hellespont to give them a numerical superiority over the Athenians and bring an end to the
war.13 Over the course of the next twenty years, despite continued conflict in the west with
Carthage, Dionysius contributed as needed to Spartan military campaigns.14 Then in 368, the
year before his death, he finally concluded an alliance with the Athenians (A15), but it was only
after his Spartan friends agreed to their own alliance with the Athenians (A13). For nearly forty
years Dionysius and the Spartans worked in concert.15 It was the longest and most successful
Spartan alliance of the fourth century, operating on the exchange of money and manpower in
observation of the principles of reciprocity and mutual benefit.

Friendship and Spartan Alliances

The same protocol directed the alliances arranged by Agesilaus, but his alliances were
even more personal. It will be useful to review the principles of friendship that Agesilaus valued
so highly and to see how they operated in his interpersonal relationships before proceeding to
their application to his eastern alliances. Xenophon, an admirer of the Spartans and a close friend
of Agesilaus, stresses repeatedly in his Agesilaus the great interest that the king had in forming
bonds of friendship. He considered the possession of many friends more important than victories
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Xen. Hell. 5.1.26-28.
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Ibid. 6.2.33-36, 7.1.20-22, 28-32; Diod. Sic. 15.47.7, 70.1, 72.3; Plut. Ages. 33.3.
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Dionysius’ son sent twelve triremes to help the Spartans capture Sellasia in 365 (Xen.
Hell. 7.4.12), but then, because of domestic upheavals, apparently ceased his father’s Spartan
policy. The Spartans, however, continued to be involved in the complex Syracusan affairs in the
350s (Zorat 1994, 165-175; Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 14).
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in a chariot race (9.7) and the loss of friends worse than poverty (11.5). He cultivated friendships
by giving careful attention to the practical needs of his friends, even if it meant going without
necessities himself (4.3, 8.1, 11.11). His friendships, moreover, were mutually beneficial: he
supported his friends unequivocally, even when they were in the wrong (11.4) and they, in turn,
were committed to him (6.4). As a result, many sought out his friendship (1.19).16 Plutarch, too,
although less enthusiastic about the Spartan king, highlights in his own Agesilaus the importance
of his personal friendships. Agesilaus possessed an unparalleled generosity for his friends, going
so far as to share in their misdeeds in the spirit of comradeship (5.1-4, 13.3-4). In order to
increase the number of his friends, he even defended enemies in court so that they would be
attracted to him (20.4-6). Indeed, Plutarch says, with exaggeration, that he eventually had no
more domestic enemies, and that his reputation in Sparta was greater as a friend than as a king or
a general (15.6).17 Neither Xenophon nor Plutarch, however, describes friendship with a succinct
definition, preferring to illustrate it through anecdotes. Although the concept is expansive and
difficult to articulate succintly, a working definition for this chapter comes from David
Konstan’s summary of near contemporary Aristotle’s three conditions for friendship: “(1) mutual
good will; (2) consciousness that the good will is reciprocated; and (3) desiring the good for the
sake of the other.”18 In other words, as will be demonstrated further in the chapter, to Agesilaus
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Cartledge 1987, 139-159; Mitchell 1997, 73-89; Hodkinson 2000, 343-352; Azoulay
2004, 305-310.
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Shipley 1997, 32-35; Trego 2014, 47-51.
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Konstan 1998, 284 (cf. 1997, 72-78); Arist. Eth. Nic. 1155b31-1156a5.
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friendship was an interpersonal relationship with reciprocal obligations for the promotion of
mutual benefit. It is on this premise that many Spartan alliances of the fourth century operated.
With such an emphasis in the ancient sources, it is no surprise that modern scholars have
also taken notice of how friendship influenced the king’s political activities. Paul Cartledge and
Stephen Hodkinson go to great lengths to show how Agesilaus put friendship to use as an
instrument of patronage in his domestic alliances as well as in his interstate attachments in the
Peloponnesian League. David Konstan broadens this perspective and suggests that friendship
(φιλία) with non-Greeks worked in essentially the same way as guest-friendship (ξενία) with
Greeks did. Vivienne Gray looks in greater detail at the particular contacts that Agesilaus had
with eastern leaders during his 396-394 expedition, seeing his application of friendship
principles as a thematic model “of how to secure the willing obedience of new friends.”19 The
next section of this chapter builds on these perspectives by examining even more closely the role
of friendship in Agesilaus’ eastern alliances. For, as Xenophon states, the Spartan king practiced
interstate relations out of the impulse of love of friends (φιλεταιρία).20
This can be illustrated further in his friendship with Lysander, a relationship that exhibits
in microcosm the fundamental elements of the larger interstate alliances. In fact, it is entirely
possible that Agesilaus developed his friendship approach to foreign affairs by observing how
Lysander created political associations out of personal relationships. In the closing years of the
Peloponnesian War, for example, as admiral (ναύαρχος) of the Spartan fleet in the Aegean,
19

Cartledge 1987, 139-159, 242-273; Gray 1989, 46-58; Konstan 1997, 83-87;
Hodkinson 2000, 347-352, 361-365. Spartan friendships with non-Greeks in Xenophon’s
writings: Hirsch 1985; Lendon 2006, 82-98; Gray 2011, 291-329; Millender 2012, 377-426.
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Lysander developed a close friendship with Cyrus, the young Persian prince, and elicited from
him large subsidies to expand Sparta’s naval activities against their mutual Athenian enemy.
Lysander and Cyrus became so close that when the prince had to return to the Persian capital, he
appointed his Spartan friend to be his proxy in western Asia. Out of their friendship came the
exchange of services for mutual benefit: moral and monetary support from Cyrus for the war
against Athens and, in return, Spartan assistance in Cyrus’ (failed) uprising against his brother,
the new King, in 401.21
It must have been with great admiration that Agesilaus watched his mentor’s friendship
with a Persian make such an impact on international affairs. But, as Lysander began to abuse his
position of power by unilaterally imposing on many Greek poleis decarchies (boards of ten) of
his own partisans, harmosts (governors), and the burden of tribute, Agesilaus’ admiration turned
to disgust. This tyrannical manner of administration, compounded by the fact that ultimate power
resided in someone outside of the royal families, was unacceptable to the Spartan authorities.
They put an end to Lysander’s activities, but they did not reduce their general involvement in the
east.22 From 399 to 397, after Agesilaus had ascended to the throne, the Spartans authorized
expeditions to Asia under Thibron and Deryclidas to fight against the Persian satrap
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Lysander and Cyrus in 407: Xen. Hell. 1.5.1-7; Diod. Sic. 13.70.3-4; Plut. Lys. 4.1-4.
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Debord 1999, 233-236. Andrewes 1971, 206-215 considers the possible dates for the end of the
decarchies.
168

Tissaphernes, who was threatening the Asiatic Greeks.23 Neither of these generals followed the
friendship strategy of Lysander and in fact acted in an opposite manner. Cozying up to nonGreeks (medizing or “flattering barbarians [βαρβάρους κολακεύουσιν],” in the words of
Callicratidas, Lysander’s rival and successor in 406) in a close collaborative capacity was alien
to most Spartans.24 Whereas Thibron was ineffective against Tissaphernes and did more damage
to friendly states by plundering their lands, Deryclidas avoided Tissaphernes’ territory altogether
and attacked the satrapy of Pharnabazus, an important friend and ally of the Spartans.25 These
Spartans treated friends as enemies and enemies as friends. But when Agesilaus received the
appointment to be the third commander of the Asian campaign, he determined to realign the
expedition according to traditional friendship principles.
Although some sources depict his appointment to be the doing of Lysander, who had
aspirations to revive his own authority in the east, the king, no pawn of Lysander, had his own
ideas for the expedition.26 No matter the amount of resources which the Spartans could muster
for the campaign, Agesilaus recognized that he would need to win the hearts and minds of the
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The date for Agesilaus’ accession is either in 400 (Cartledge 1987, 99-115), 399
(Pascual 2012, 29-49), or 398 (Hamilton 1982c, 281-296).
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Xen. Hell. 1.6.7. Callicratidas undid all of Lysander’s work by refusing to collaborate
with Cyrus (Xen. Hell. 1.6.1-11; Diod. Sic. 13.76.2-6; Plut. Lys. 6.1-7).
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Thibron and Dercylidas: Xen. Hell. 3.1.8-9; cf. Westlake 1986, 405-426; Debord 1999,
236-242; Buckler 2003, 44-58; Hyland 2008, 16-25.
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Xen. Hell. 3.4.2 and Plut. Ages. 6.1-3 consider the appointment to be Lysander’s doing;
Xen. Ages. 1.6-8 and Nep. Ages. 2.2 (cf. Paus. 3.9.1) have the initiative coming from the king.
Trego 2014, 39-62 thinks Plutarch’s portrayal (Ages. 3.3-4.1; Lys. 22.3-6) of Agesilaus as a tool
of Lysander is due to the biographer’s interest in developing the theme of friendship.
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people of western Asia by creating alliances based on friendship.27 Lysander, one who above all
should have recognized this game plan, was a liability. When the army arrived in Ephesus,
Xenophon says that Agesilaus first restored order to the Greek cities that had been divided by
Lysander’s decarchies.28 Also, because Lysander possessed an inordinate amount of power in the
region and did not cease his practice of dispensing patronage, thus undermining the influence of
Agesilaus, the king humiliated his friend by refusing to pay attention to the requests that local
leaders made through him and demoting him to the position of the royal meat carver. Plutarch
criticizes this, suggesting that there must have been a better way to respond to Lysander’s
ambitions. But Vivienne Gray, working from Xenophon’s account in the Hellenica, interprets the
disciplinary measure as a means of “having Lysander eventually see his offence and mend his
ways.”29 Beyond the didactic elements, however, Agesilaus was justified because Lysander had
violated a social contract. He failed to treat Agesilaus as a friend, not to mention as his king, and
thus transgressed the code of friendship with its reciprocal obligations of seeking mutual benefit.
Looking forward in the campaign, if Agesilaus continued to have difficulties in his personal
friendship with Lysander, he could expect to have trouble communicating this formula to other
Spartans and in translating it to a non-Greek context so that all parties shared the same
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Seager 1977, 184 (cf. Hamilton 1991, 102-103) says Agesilaus intended to build a
“buffer zone of rebel satraps.” Kelly 1978, 97-98 considers that to be a “response to the
stagnation in the war” rather than the initial plan. Xen. Hell. 4.1.41 (cf. Plut. Ages. 15.1) says that
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Xen. Ages. 1.37; cf. Plut. Ages. 6.1.

29

Gray 1989, 46-49 (Xen. Hell. 3.4.7-9). Bearzot 2005, 31-49 examines the less
favorable representation in Plut. Ages. 7.1-8.4 and Lys. 23.
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appreciation of the alliances. Ironically, by humiliating an erring friend, he was actually
highlighting the principles of friendship in his overall strategy.

Alliances in the East (396-360)

He put this strategy into operation even before he left Greece by requesting an alliance
(συµµαχία) with the Egyptian king Nepherus (or Nepherites), who was already in revolt from
Persia. Since there was the possibility that Agesilaus might be confronted by a great number of
enemy ships during his expedition, he hoped that the Egyptians could supply him with naval
support. Although Nepherus sent a large shipment of grain and equipment for the Spartan navy –
all of which, however, Conon and the Persian fleet stationed at Rhodes intercepted – he would
not agree to a formal alliance.30 It may be that he, unlike his successor Acoris, who would make
an alliance with the Athenians and Evagoras of Cyprus in 388, was not bold enough to do more
than offer a one-time contribution to the Spartan cause.31 Anyhow, this initial setback did not
deter Agesilaus but rather encouraged him that there were indeed those willing to support in
some way his objectives.
After arriving at Ephesus, Agesilaus set about looking for opportunities to demonstrate
his devotion to the code of friendship, in order to attract allies in the region. His first opportunity
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Diod. Sic. 14.79.4-7. Ruzicka 2012, 49-50 suspects that it was because of the
possibility of a Persian attack on Egypt that Nepherus would not send a fleet and did not agree to
an alliance. Just. Epit. 6.2.1 states incorrectly that the Egyptian king sent 100 triremes.
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Athenian alliance with Acoris: Ar. Plut. 178; cf. Carrez-Maratray 2005, 50-53; Perdu
2010, 153-154.
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came with a letter from Tissaphernes proposing a temporary truce so that he might arrange a
peace between his King and the Spartans. Since his strategy did not include a direct attack on the
Persians, he agreed. But he was also under the assumption that the satrap would not honor the
truce but use it to collect military reinforcements, and thus inadvertently advance his diplomatic
strategy. Xenophon says that the king continued to observe the armistice (“his first noble
achievement [πρῶτον καλὸν . . . διαπράξασθαι]”), showing to all that he, unlike Tissaphernes,
was trustworthy. As a consequence, “he gave all, both Greeks and non-Greeks, the confidence to
make an agreement with him, if he might wish for anything [πάντας ἐποίησε καὶ Ἕλληνας καὶ
βαρβάρους θαρροῦντας συντίθεσθαι ἑαυτῷ, εἴ τι βούλοιτο].”32 In the next verse the religiously
sensitive Xenophon adds that the satrap’s treachery made even “the gods allies [συµµάχους] of
the Greeks.”33 Later the historian continues: “from all nations they were sending ambassadors
concerning friendship, and many, yearning for freedom, were revolting to his side, so that
Agesilaus was the leader of not Greeks alone but of many non-Greeks [ἀπὸ πάντων γὰρ τῶν
ἐθνῶν ἐπρεσβεύοντο περὶ φιλίας, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἀφίσταντο πρὸς αὐτόν, ὀρεγόµενοι τῆς
ἐλευθερίας, ὥστε οὐκέτι Ἑλλήνων µόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρων πολλῶν ἡγεµὼν ἦν ὁ
Ἀγησίλαος].”34 Two of the first to join Agesilaus were Spithridates and Otys.
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S2-S3 The Spartans and Spithridates and Otys (395)
Xen. Hell. 3.4.10, 4.1.3; Ages. 3.2-4
In Xenophon’s portrayal, at least, Agesilaus was paving a new path for the Spartans’
conduct of international relations. Unlike his immediate predecessors, who levelled particularly
harsh measures on foe and friend alike, Agesilaus set out to make clear his devotion to the
precepts of friendship, mutual benefit, and fidelity to oaths, qualities that made him successful in
attracting new allies. This was why, during the truce, he humiliated Lysander. Paradoxically, it
was out of this act that the first friendship alliances in Asia came about. In order to redeem
himself, Lysander went northwards to Hellespontine Phrygia where he met Spithridates, a
subordinate officer to the satrap Pharnabazus. Like Lysander, Spithridates had been dishonored
by his superior, but for a very different reason: Pharnabazus had disregarded Spithridates’
dignity by attempting to take his daughter for a concubine. Lysander, therefore, easily persuaded
his comrade-in-shame to leave Persian service and to ally with Agesilaus.35
The Spartan king naturally approved of the alliance. But there was no time to exchange
ambassadors with the distant Spartan assembly, so he concluded it on his own authority.36
Chapter I noted that allowance could be made for alliances arranged by individuals, but in this
case it was a mistake. The private nature of the alliance meant that not all around Agesilaus
recognized the guiding principles upon which it operated. For his part, Spithridates clearly
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Ibid. 3.2-3; Hell. 3.4.10; Plut. Ages. 8.3; Lys. 24.1. Hell. Oxy. 21.3-4 obscures
Lysander’s role in winning over the Persian. Spithridates in general: Weiskopf 1989, 23-25;
Briant 2002, 644.
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Ferrario 2014, 243-245 stresses the agency of Agesilaus in the Asian expedition. Beck
1999, 181-185 and Beneker 2012, 210-214 discuss the king’s attraction to Spithridates’ son
Megabates (Xen. Ages. 5.4-5; Plut. Ages. 11.1-7).
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understood the reciprocal obligations of the alliance. His gifts and services came in the form of
his and his family’s personal involvement in Agesilaus’ expedition, as well as the provision of
money (χρήµατα), 200 much needed horses, and a detailed knowledge of the region and its
inhabitants.37 In the spring of 395, he introduced Agesilaus to Otys (or Cotys), a Paphlagonian
chieftain, who had recently rejected the right hand (δεξιά) of friendship with the Persian King.
Instead, he agreed to an alliance (συµµαχία) with Agesilaus and surpassed Spithridates with a
gift of 2000 horses and 1000 peltasts.38
Agesilaus, too, was obligated to return proportionate gifts or services to the new allies.
He did this by proposing to mediate a marriage alliance between Spithridates’ daughter and the
Paphlagonian chieftain. He stressed to the latter the far reaching implications of this marriage for
international relations: “with this having been brought about, he [Spithridates] would not be
connected by marriage only to you, but so would I and the rest of the Spartans and the other
Greeks, since we are the leaders of Greece [τούτων πραχθέντων µὴ ἐκεῖνον ἄν σοι µόνον
κηδεστὴν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐµὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Λακεδαιµονίους, ἡµῶν δ᾽ ἡγουµένων τῆς
Ἑλλάδος καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα].”39 In other words, the marriage had the potential of turning
two bilateral alliances (Agesilaus with Spithridates and Otys, respectively) into a trilateral and
even a universal alliance. Vivienne Gray, viewing the proposal as a token of their friendships,
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Xen. Hell. 3.4.10; Hell. Oxy. 21.3, 6.
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Xen. Hell. 4.1.3; Ages. 3.3-4; Hell. Oxy. 22.1; Plut. Ages. 11.1-3; cf. Weiskopf 1989,
24; Debord 1999, 113. Hellespontine rulers: Briant 2002, 641-643; Maffre 2007, 126-129.
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Xen. Hell. 4.1.8; cf. Plut. Ages. 11.2. The Spartan kings were traditionally involved in
arranging marriages for unmarried Spartan women (Hdt. 6.57.4). The interchangeability of
Lacedaemonia and Sparta: Ducat 2010, 189-196.
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thinks it grew out of Agesilaus’ concern for his new allies. Lynette Mitchell agrees with this
reading but adds that the king “made assumptions for the Persian [Spithridates] based on his own
understanding of the relationship.”40 Peter Krentz, more skeptical than Gray and Mitchell, thinks
that the alliance was doomed from the start because the Spartan king strong-armed Spithridates
into agreeing to a marriage beneath his daughter’s dignity and he did not understand Otys. There
is nothing in the primary texts to support this interpretation, one that falls more in line with the
overall negative assessments of Agesilaus’ career from scholars such as Paul Cartledge, Charles
Hamilton, and John Buckler.41 Rather, the three new friends appear to have collaborated well
enough for the remaining six or so months of the year. When the alliance did break apart, the
culprit was not one of the principal agents of the alliance but a Spartan from outside of this
friendship circle.
On account of Spithridates’ valuable intelligence operations, the Greek army was able to
capture Pharnabazus’ camp and stay supplied through the winter in Phrygia. But Herippidas, one
of Agesilaus’ thirty official advisors and the overseer of distributions (ἐξεταστὴς), refused the
Persian allies their portion of the booty, an insult violating the reciprocal obligations of the
alliance.42 Although a close associate of Agesilaus, Herippidas was clearly unaware of the
programmatic principles of the alliances, and, in a domineering fashion typical of Spartans,
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Gray 1989, 49-52; Mitchell 1997, 121-122.

41

Cartledge 1987; Hamilton 1991; Krentz 1995, 203. Buckler 2003, 188: “. . . Agesilaos,
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Xen. Hell. 4.1.25-27; Plut. Ages. 11.3-4. Trundle 2004, 113 discusses the position of
ἐξεταστής. Other instances of Spartan insubordination to authority: Hdt. 9.53-57; Thuc. 5.72.1;
Xen. Hell. 4.2.22, 7.4.24-25.
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continued to treat the Persians as subjects. Consequently, Spithridates and Otys, being “wronged
and dishonored [ἀδικηθέντες καὶ ἀτιµασθέντες],” abandoned the Spartans and joined another
rebel satrap. To Agesilaus, having constructed the alliances specifically around the principles of
friendship only to see Herippidas destroy his achievement with contemptuous behavior, this loss
was said to have been the most distressing of the campaign.43
Xenophon adds that there were others entrusting themselves to Agesilaus (Ἀγησιλάῳ δὲ
αὑτοὺς ἐνεχείριζον), although he limits himself to naming only the most famous (τοὺς
ἐπιφανεστάτους αὐτῶν) – Spithridates and Otys, for example – because the actual numbers
joining the Greek army might be unbelievable to his readers.44 He entered into a guest-friendship
(ἐξενώθη) with Apollophanes of Cyzicus, who, being also a guest-friend (ξένος) of Pharnabazus,
brought the Spartan king and Persian satrap together to discuss the possibility of a friendship
alliance (φιλία).45 Pharnabazus was, after all, once a “friend and ally [φίλος καὶ σύµµαχος]” of
the Spartans during and after the Peloponnesian War.46 But on account of the recent Spartan
attacks on his territory, he was naturally resistant to the proposal. He opened the parley with a
complaint to the king: “if, therefore, I do not understand either what is sacred or what is just,
then teach me how these are the acts of men who know how to repay favors [εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ µὴ
43

Xen. Hell. 4.1.28; Plut. Ages. 11.4. Briant 2002, 696 thinks that Spithridates was
looking for a reason to abandon Agesilaus and return to Persian service, but he fails to recognize
that Spithridates joined another rebel satrap (Xen. Hell. 4.1.27). Nor does his conclusion that
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Xen. Hell. 4.1.29; Plut. Ages. 12.1.
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Thuc. 8.39.1, 80.2; Xen. Hell. 1.1.6, 24-26, 4.1.32-33. Pharnabazus and the Spartans:
Hyland 2008, 1-27.
176

γιγνώσκω µήτε τὰ ὅσια µήτε τὰ δίκαια, ὑµεῖς δὲ διδάξατέ µε ὅπως ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀνδρῶν
ἐπισταµένων χάριτας ἀποδιδόναι].”47 Agesilaus, who had advocated for alliances on the basis of
mutual benefit, was caught in flagrante delicto. The Spartans had not fulfilled their moral and
material obligations to their old ally and, even worse, done exactly the opposite by harming him;
in extending an invitation to abandon the Persian King, moreover, Agesilaus was asking
Pharnabazus to do what the Spartans have treacherously done: defect without cause. The satrap
presented a fine criticism, leaving the king with no response but prevarication:
“But I think that you, Pharnabazus, know that even in the Greek poleis, men become guestfriends of one another. And these men, when their poleis come to war, fight with their countries
even against their former friends and, if it should so happen, sometimes even kill one another.
And, therefore, we now, being at war with your king, have been compelled to consider hostile all
that is his. As for you, however, we should consider it above everything to become friends.”48
ἀλλ᾽ οἶµαι µέν σε, ὦ Φαρνάβαζε, εἰδέναι ὅτι καὶ ἐν ταῖς Ἑλληνικαῖς πόλεσι ξένοι ἀλλήλοις
γίγνονται ἄνθρωποι. οὗτοι δέ, ὅταν αἱ πόλεις πολέµιαι γένωνται, σὺν ταῖς πατρίσι καὶ τοῖς
ἐξενωµένοις πολεµοῦσι καί, ἂν οὕτω τύχωσιν, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ ἀπέκτειναν ἀλλήλους. καὶ ἡµεῖς οὖν
νῦν βασιλεῖ τῷ ὑµετέρῳ πολεµοῦντες πάντα ἠναγκάσµεθα τὰ ἐκείνου πολέµια νοµίζειν: σοί γε
µέντοι φίλοι γενέσθαι περὶ παντὸς ἂν ποιησαίµεθα.
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His argument that a polis’ wartime choices take precedence over one’s private
relationships is specious and not at all consistent with his own interstate activities.49 It must be
that Agesilaus, recognizing his countrymen’s acts of injustice and also embarrassed by the
satrap’s marked fidelity to his King, simply dissembled in order to defend himself and his
predecessors.50 Like all Greeks, he avoided at all costs the appearance of being the violator of an
alliance, even if that meant expressing a sophistic interpretation of the Spartans’ violations.
Nonetheless, Pharnabazus recognized what Agesilaus was trying to achieve by basing his
alliances on the principles of friendship and offered to join him as “both a friend and ally [καὶ
φίλος καὶ σύµµαχος]” should his King ever demote him to the position of a subject (ὑπήκους).51
But this would not be the case. Before leaving Agesilaus, he allowed his young son, apparently
under no obligation to the Persian King, to become the Spartan’s guest-friend (ξένος).52
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It should not be thought that Agesilaus’ diplomatic strategy was an abysmal failure.53 The
ancient historians highlight the defection narratives because they are dramatic and illustrate the
disregarded moral components to the agreements. Through the outcomes of the Spartans’
repeated attacks on Pharnabazus’ territory, Lysander’s failure to respect Agesilaus qua king and
friend, and Herippidas’ refusal to share spoils with Spithridates and Otys, one can recognize how
important those friendship values were. When one party discarded the reciprocal obligations, the
other was justified in abandoning the alliance. Despite the failures, Agesilaus had some
successes on which the ancient historians chose not to elaborate. In fact, he began the new
campaigning season of 394 with aplomb, attracting more rebels to his side and preparing to
continue his advance further into Persian territory.54 He could not know that it would end so
soon. Events back in Greece – the formation of an anti-Spartan alliance begun by the AthenianBoeotian alliance (A1) – demanded that he abandon the expedition and return home. There
would not be another Spartan alliance in western Asia for twenty-eight years.
S4-S6 The Spartans and the Acarnanians (389), Amyntas III of Macedon (382), and the
Olynthians (379)
Isoc. 4.126; Xen. Hell. 4.6.1-7.1, 5.3.26; Ages. 2.20; Diod. Sic. 15.19.3
During the decades when the Spartans were collaborating with Dionysius, they also made
a few alliances on the mainland with the Acarnanians in 389, King Amyntas III of Macedon in
382, and the Olynthians in 379. There is not enough evidence to reconstruct the conditions for
any of these except for the recognition that Sparta was the dominant partner. Amyntas, for
example, being on the losing end of a territorial dispute with the Olynthians, was wholly
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Xen. Hell. 4.1.41.
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dependent upon Spartan assistance and recruited forces to supplement their attack on his behalf
against Olynthus. Fully equipped, the Spartans defeated the Olynthians, enrolled them as Spartan
allies, and returned the disputed territory back to the Macedonian king.55 Both the Olynthians
and the Acarnanians in 389 swore the so-called oath of the Peloponnesian League: “to consider
the same friends and enemies as the Spartans, to follow them wherever they lead, and to be allies
[τὸν αὐτὸν µὲν ἐχθρὸν καὶ φίλον Λακεδαιµονίοις νοµίζειν, ἀκολουθεῖν δὲ ὅποι ἂν ἡγῶνται καὶ
σύµµαχοι εἶναι].”56 These alliances, however, did not last long; all three abandoned the Spartans
and joined the Athenians in the 370s.57 There were also temporary alliances in the late 380s with
Evagoras of Cyprus and a Persian naval commander named Glos, both in revolt from the Persian
King, but little can be said on the part, if any, that the Spartans actually played in these revolts
besides the expressions of support.58
The Spartans had overreached. The renewal of war throughout Greece in the 370s, which
culminated in the disastrous defeat of the Spartan army by the Thebans at the Battle of Leuctra,
reduced further their capability to stand as a first-rate hegemonic power. Because of the
invasions of the Peloponnesus by the Theban victors in 370 and 369, the Spartans found
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themselves in the unfamiliar position of being only a local power. This new geopolitical reality
forced the Spartans to revise their alliance strategy. In order for them to ward off the threats
encircling their city and to renew their presence as a leader in the region, they would need the
regular support of more powerful and wealthier allies than they previously had. This became
obvious in 368 when Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, defeated a combined attack of Arcadians
and Argives largely on account of the military contribution from Dionysius I of Syracuse and the
financial contribution from the Persian satrap Ariobarzanes.59 Plutarch comments that the
victory, far from showing Sparta’s strength, “most of all proved the weakness of the polis [αὕτη
µάλιστα τήν ἀσθένειαν ἤλεγξεν ἡ νίκη τῆς πόλεως].”60 In other words, it was clear that any hope
for a Spartan revival without new allies was fanciful.
Even outsiders recognized this. The Athenian Isocrates, for example, wrote a speech for
Archidamus set in the context of the dissolution of the once-mighty Peloponnesian League in
366. Isocrates’ young prince cautions the Spartans against despair, advocating that they could
regain their lost position with a little help from their friends outside of the Peloponnesus (τῶν
ἔξωθεν βοηθειῶν):
“For I know, in the first place, that the Athenians, even though they are not with us in everything,
would do anything for our preservation. . . . Moreover, the tyrant Dionysius and the Egyptian
king and other dynasts in Asia, according to how much each is able, would willingly come to our
aid. Besides, there are those of the Greeks who have wealth and are the first in reputation and
desire the best of political affairs, even if they have not yet joined us are with us in goodwill.
61
Upon them we are reasonable in our great hopes for what is to come.”
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ἐπίσταµαι γὰρ πρῶτον µὲν Ἀθηναίους, εἰ καὶ µὴ πάντα µεθ᾽ ἡµῶν εἰσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπέρ γε τῆς
σωτηρίας τῆς ἡµετέρας ὁτιοῦν ἂν ποιήσοντας: . . . ἔτι δὲ Διονύσιον τὸν τύραννον καὶ τὸν
Αἰγυπτίων βασιλέα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν δυνάστας, καθ᾽ ὅσον ἕκαστοι δύνανται,
προθύµως ἂν ἡµῖν ἐπικουρήσοντας: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοὺς ταῖς οὐσίαις
προέχοντας καὶ ταῖς δόξαις πρωτεύοντας καὶ βελτίστων πραγµάτων ἐπιθυµοῦντας, εἰ καὶ µήπω
συνεστήκασιν, ἀλλὰ ταῖς γ᾽ εὐνοίαις µεθ᾽ ἡµῶν ὄντας, ἐν οἷς περὶ τῶν µελλόντων εἰκότως ἂν
µεγάλας ἐλπίδας ἔχοιµεν.

Isocrates mentions five allies or groups of allies: the Athenians, Dionysius II, the Egyptian king
Nectanebo I, rebel satraps, and wealthy and reputable Greeks. It is true that these are the words
of an Athenian, but the evidence presented throughout this chapter confirms that the Spartans did
in fact believe that through cooperation with wealthy and powerful allies outside of the
Peloponnesus they could find the moral and material support necessary to make a return to
geopolitical prominence.62 The first two alliances (A13, S1) have already been discussed. The
remaining three are the subjects of the rest of this chapter, beginning with the closest in time to
the dramatic context of the Archidamus, the alliance with the Persian satrap Ariobarzanes.
S7

The Spartans and Ariobarzanes (366)
Xen. Ages. 2.25-26
Writing about the nadir of Spartan geopolitical influence in the mid-360s, Xenophon

writes that Agesilaus
“was noticing that the state was in need of money if it intended to have an ally, so he set himself
to procuring these things. . . . He did not hesitate to pursue what was advantageous; he was not
ashamed go out as an ambassador instead of a general, if it would help the polis.”63
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Isoc. 6.62-63. Harding 1973, 137-149 and Moysey 1982, 118-127 debate whether
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χρηµάτων δὲ ἑώρα τὴν πόλιν δεοµένην, εἰ µέλλοι σύµµαχόν τινα ἕξειν, ἐπὶ τὸ πορίζειν ταῦτα
ἑαυτὸν ἔταξε. . . ἃ δὲ καιρὸς ἦν οὐκ ὤκνει µετιέναι, οὐδ᾽ ᾐσχύνετο, εἰ µέλλοι τὴν πόλιν
ὠφελήσειν, πρεσβευτὴς ἐκπορευόµενος ἀντὶ στρατηγοῦ.

In the next verse Xenophon explains that this refers to an alliance in 366 with the satrap
Ariobarzanes, an old friend of the Spartans and a relative of Pharnabazus.64 As mentioned
earlier, in 368, Ariobarzanes contributed much money for the Spartans to collect a large army to
fight the Arcadians and Argives.65 There is some debate over the motivation behind this
contribution. Eduard Rung views the money as a proleptic means “to establish the basis of an
alliance with the Spartans and the Athenians prior to his revolt against the King.”66 Of course, it
is very difficult to determine with certainty the satrap’s motivations, but the long history of
interactions which he and his predecessors had with the Spartans makes it likely that he
understood the Greek conception of reciprocity. His contribution indebted the Spartans to return
gifts and services in the future, perhaps in the form of an alliance. The use of money as an item
of exchange for services, moreover, is consistent with this period. In the Peloponnesian-Theban
alliance in 370 (T2), for example, Elis contributed ten talents to support the Boeotian army. In
368, Alexander of Pherae presented Athens with a great amount of money in return for military
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Ibid. 2.26. In the role of guest-friend (ξένος) of the Spartan Antalcidas, he supplied
ships to the Spartans in 387, contributing to the defeat of the Athenians (Xen. Hell. 5.1.28-29).
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Ibid. 7.1.27. Diod. Sic. 15.70.2 numbers this army at 2,000 soldiers, so if the rough
estimate that one talent supported 200 soldiers for a month stands true (cf. Trundle 2004, 91-98),
he contributed approximately ten talents a month for as long as the campaign lasted. Philiscus of
Abydus, a subordinate of Ariobarzanes with his own contacts with the Greeks, brought the
money to the Spartans (Heskel 1997, 114-117, 123-125; Ruzicka 2012, 125; Rung 2013, 35-50).
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Rung 2013, 37-39 describes the various positions of modern scholars. Proleptic giftgiving in the mid-fourth century: Gygax 2009, 163; contra Deene 2012, 171-175.
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assistance (A14). This becomes standard practice for the Spartans in later alliances. The
implication of such arrangements was that they operated on terms of mutual benefit rather than
mutual defense. The donor did not contribute any armed forces; the money was for the receiving
ally to recruit an army. Ariobarzanes, therefore, although he did not directly support the Spartans
militarily, in like spirit, he supported them monetarily.
It was the obligation of the Spartans to defend Ariobarzanes. In 366, when the satrap
finally revolted and he was immediately confronted by a Persian attack on his cities in the
Hellespont, he naturally reached out to his Spartan (and Athenian) friends and reminded them of
his earlier benefaction. The Spartans repaid that service by entering into an alliance with him and
assigning Agesilaus, aged yet capable, to the Hellespont, where he immediately removed the
threats to the new ally.67 Nothing more is known about the practicalities of the alliance. Nor did
it last very long: in the next year or two, Ariobarzanes’ own son betrayed him to the King, and
there was nothing the Spartans, having already returned home, could do for him.68 Nevertheless,
despite its brevity, because everyone understood the principles on which the alliance rested, this
was the most successful alliance the Spartans made with an eastern power in the fourth century.
S8

The Spartans and Tachos of Egypt (361)
Xen. Ages. 2.28-31; Diod. Sic. 15.92.2-93.6; Plut. Ages. 36-40
While in the Hellespont, Agesilaus struck up an acquaintance with King Tachos (or Teos)

of Egypt, who provided him with a transport home and money to support more military forces in
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Xen. Ages. 2.26 (cf. Kovacs 2011, 752-753); Nep. Tim. 1.3. Ariobarzanes’ revolt:
Weiskopf 1989, 37-49; Heskel 1997, 71-72, 110-111, 131-132; Debord 1999, 296-297.
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the Peloponnesus (e.g., at the Battle of Mantinea in 362).69 Tachos, impressed by the Spartan’s
recent accomplishments on behalf of Ariobarzanes, also seems to have supplied these gifts in
anticipation of future repayment. With the recent outbreak of the so-called “satraps’ revolt” in
western Asia, the Egyptian king had plans of his own to take the offensive against the Persians in
Phoenicia, and probably expected results from Agesilaus similar to those recently accomplished
in the Hellespont. Unlike Ariobarzanes, however, Tachos did not possess strong contacts with
the Spartans, so he was unfamiliar with the fine points of detail in the Greek conception of
reciprocity. He contributed money as an attempt to purchase Agesilaus’s assistance rather than to
receive a return from a friend.
Sometime at the end of the decade, after making extensive preparations for the invasion
of Phoenicia, Tachos dispatched ambassadors to the Spartans to remind them of his past gifts and
to call for an alliance. Xenophon says that Agesilaus was happy to hear of the appeal because he
had moral objectives of his own for the campaign: the repayment of the earlier gifts, the
liberation of the Asiatic Greeks (a bizarre ambition for an expedition to Phoenicia), and revenge
against the Persian King for supporting Messenian independence.70 He may also have been
excited for one last opportunity in his long life to establish a friendship alliance. Because the
Egyptian ambassadors made the proposal in Sparta, it was not Agesilaus alone but the assembly
that would have negotiated the alliance. No record survives of the proceedings, but a few specific
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Xen. Ages. 2.27. Ruzicka 2003, 104 (reiterated in 2012, 136-137) supposes that an
Egyptian embassy to Athens (IG II2 119) carried Agesilaus home.
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Xen. Ages. 2.29. Stylianou 1998, 526-527 and Ruzicka 2012, 137 consider what is
meant by Tachos’ earlier services to Sparta. Agesilaus’ Panhellenism: Cawkwell 1976a, 66-71
(reprinted in 2011, 247-255); Cartledge 1987, 180-202; Harman 2012, 427-453.
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provisions can be teased out of the ancient historians.71 Plutarch suggests that there was an
agreement that Tachos would contribute money (χρήµατα) so that the Spartans could recruit
Peloponnesian soldiers (µισθοφόρους).72 Xenophon and Diodorus indicate that there was an
expectation of a monetary reward at the end of the campaign for successful service.73 And
Xenophon and Plutarch both agree that Agesilaus was promised the overall command of the
Phoenician expedition.74 Under these conditions the assembly agreed to the alliance and assigned
thirty advisors to accompany Agesilaus to Egypt.
But the excitement wore off before they ever reached Phoenicia. This time the problem
was not because of a misconception on the part of Agesilaus’ countrymen – they were involved
in the negotiations and understood the conditions – but a cross-cultural misunderstanding.
Indeed, early in the campaign an acute observer could have recognized this and predicted the
rapid dissolution of the alliance. Theopompus says that as soon as (εὐθύς) the Greek army
arrived on the Egyptian coast, those in the welcoming party were shocked by the sight of the
octogenarian king – short, lame, and unadorned – and began to laugh at him. But they were still
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Xen. Ages. 2.28-31; Diod. Sic. 15.92.2-93.6; Plut. Ages. 36-40. Kelly 1981, 47-61
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72

Plut. Ages. 36.2-3. After the Battle of Mantinea in 362, there were so few funds
available to the government that Agesilaus called for loans from citizens (Plut. Ages. 35.3).
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Xen. Ages. 2.31; Diod. Sic. 15.93.6.
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Xen. Ages. 2.28 says hegemony (ἡγεµονία) and Plut. Ages. 37.1 commander of all the
powers (ἁπάσης στρατηγὸς . . . τῆς δυνάµεως), but Diod. Sic. 15.92.2 only hegemony of the
mercenaries (τῶν µὲν µισθοφόρων τὴν ἡγεµονίαν).
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more (ἔτι . . . µᾶλλον) surprised at Agesilaus’ eccentricity (ἀτοπία), in particular that he
personally accepted only their simple gifts but passed the luxuries on to the helots.75 With the
Egyptian conception of kingship as an elevated position above that of the rest of society,
Agesilaus’ appearance and behavior did not instill confidence. If he had imagined that he could
translate the Greek friendship values of reciprocity and mutual benefit into the Egyptian context,
this opening contact did not bode well for the overall success of that project.
Agesilaus was then surprised himself to hear that he would be the commander of only
those he brought with him.76 In clear violation of the alliance terms, Tachos named himself the
supreme commander. This was a personal injury to Agesilaus, who had never held anything but
the chief command, because by assigning to him a position lower than the one promised, Tachos
deemed him as less than an ally, a dishonor similar to that meted out earlier by the Spartans to
Pharnabazus and Spithridates. Although the Egyptians and Spartans had numerous economic,
military, and diplomatic contacts over the centuries, the two sides still persisted in divergent
views on the nature of leadership.77 For the Egyptian king, in a society that was hierarchical and
perpetuated social inequality, there was nothing reprehensible in demoting the foreign king.78
Although he originally agreed to assign the chief leadership to Agesilaus, in his interpretation of
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Theopomp. FGrH 115 F106a-108 (cf. Nep. Ages. 8.2-7).

76

Xen. Ages. 2.30; Diod. Sic. 15.92.2; Plut. Ages. 37.1.
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The tradition of divine kingship in Egypt made impossible any sense of balanced
reciprocity (Morris 2010, 207-213). Egyptian values of reciprocity and exchange with Greeks
have not been studied as extensively as those of the Persians (Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1989, 135139; Mitchell 1997, 111-114; Briant 2002, 316-323; Iancu 2014, 53-70).
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the alliance he also reserved the right to subordinate the Spartan king, a matter of treachery to the
Greeks but a matter of course to the Egyptians.
Although confined in an illegitimate alliance, Agesilaus, wary of giving any impression
at all that he was the violator of the alliance, remained in the Egyptian’s service and proceeded to
lead the Greek army to Phoenicia.79 In the meantime, a revolt broke out in the Egyptian ranks led
by Nectanebo, a relative of Tachos, who invited Agesilaus to join him.80 Xenophon describes his
anxiety in trying to discern which of the two Egyptians would be more successful in the contest
for leadership, provide money (µισθὸν) for the Greeks, and be a philhellene (φιλέλλην).81
Plutarch says that although he had thirty advisors with him, he sent for further instructions from
the authorities in Sparta, who gave him permission to join Nectanebo if he thought that was best
for the state’s prospects (τὸ τῇ Σπάρτῃ συµφέρον). Plutarch adds that, in his opinion, Agesilaus’
decision to join Nectanebo was an act of betrayal (προδοσία), and many modern scholars follow
him in this interpretation.82 Stephen Ruzicka, however, argues rightly that Agesilaus was able to
abandon Tachos with impunity because the Egyptian’s promises of material reward went
unfulfilled.83 In addition to this monetary aspect, one can add the moral offense of denying an
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Plut. Ages. 37.2 says the alliance went against his dignity and nature (παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν
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ally a promised position. In other words, to the Spartans it was Tachos who betrayed Agesilaus
rather than the other way around.
The alliance did not fall apart because Agesilaus, an alleged mercurial mercenary leader,
betrayed Tachos for a wealthier employer. Nor was it due to an intentional violation on the part
of Tachos. The problem was that both parties held different interpretations of the terms and the
guiding principles of the alliance. Contrary to Agesilaus’ expectations, his Egyptian friend did
not show himself to be one who valued mutual benefit, and, as a result, the Spartans lost an ally.
It was a different case from the earlier alliances in Asia, in which the allies defected because the
Spartans refused to honor the principles of friendship. Spithridates, Otys, and Pharnabazus, the
injured parties, were free and just to abandon their alliances with Sparta, just as Agesilaus was in
leaving Tachos. In the end, Agesilaus made Nectanebo a “friend to the Spartans” (φίλον . . . τῇ
Λακεδαίµονι), helped him overcome yet another rival in Egypt, and then, in spite of the pleas of
his new ally to stay, he left Egypt with a reward of over 200 talents.84 But he died en route, in
Cyrene, leaving the challenges of reviving Sparta’s influence in Greece through the construction
of new alliances to his son.

Alliances with Greeks (355-338)

S9

The Spartans and the Phocians (355)
Theopomp. FGrH 115 F312; Diod. Sic. 16.27.3-5; Paus. 3.10.3
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Nectanebo gave Agesilaus much money (χρήµατα πολλὰ) (Xen. Ages. 2.31), either 220
(Nep. Ages. 8.7) or 230 talents (Plut. Ages. 40.1); cf. Shipley 1997, 398.
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Archidamus ascended the Eurypontid throne in 360, but his first opportunity to make an
interstate alliance did not come until 355, at the beginning of the Third Sacred War, with the
Phocians against the members of the Delphic Amphictyony.85 The alliance came about largely
due to the fact that the two shared the same predicament. Both were recently fined enormous
sums by the Amphictyony, now under Theban leadership, for past violations – 500 talents (and
then doubled to 1000 talents) against the Spartans for occupying the Theban Cadmeia in 382 and
many talents (πολλά τάλαντα) against the Phocians for cultivating sacred land.86 The response of
the Phocians was to elect for their general (στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ) a man named Philomelus,
who put into motion a plan to reassert an ancient claim to guardianship of Delphi.
After he accomplished that and annulled the Amphictyonic judgments, he dispatched
ambassadors to Sparta and Athens promising to act as the proper steward of Apollo’s treasures
and asking for alliances.87 As for the Spartans, there were many reasons to accept the proposal.
They had an old concern for the affairs of Delphi, and the removal of the monetary penalties and
the religious shame were naturally powerful incentives. They were also traditional friends of the
Phocians, collaborating often throughout the classical period. Theopompus believes that
friendship (φιλία) was only a pretext (πρόφασις); in his opinion (ἐµοὶ δοκεῖν), hatred of Thebes
was the real reason for the alliance. Pausanias says the same but replaces friendship with some
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old service (ἀρχαίαν εὐεργεσίαν) as the pretext.88 But there is no reason to isolate the hatred
motive from the others. The Spartans had gone to the defense of the Phocians on numerous
occasions even when Thebes was not involved. Furthermore, the Spartans probably recognized
the strategic logic of the alliance: support for the Phocian struggle against Thebes in central
Greece hindered any further Theban interference in Spartan designs in the Peloponnesus.
Archidamus, the primary advocate of the alliance in Sparta, also took into consideration
the same practical considerations as those of previous alliances, the exchange of money and
manpower. In this case, there is intriguing numismatic evidence. With the wealth from Delphi all
of the Phocian generals minted gold and silver coins. They contained the traditional Phocian
bull’s head on the obverse but a new image on the reverse, the head of Apollo, representing the
Phocians’ guardianship of Delphi. Many of these issues carried on the reverse the names of the
generals. Whenever the Peloponnesian soldiers who received these coins as pay saw the imagery
and the legends, they reminded them of their military leaders and the larger alliance, and
connected them more closely to each other and to the cause.89
When Phocis’ enemies grew to include the Locrians and the Boeotians, as well as the
Amphictyonic League, the Phocian generals began to exploit the wealth of Delphi in order to
increase the pay of the soldiers. Despite the sacrilege, however, the Spartans continued to honor
the alliance and benefitted monetarily as a result – Diodorus states that they “received pay out of
proportion to the number of soldiers they sent out [οὐ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐκπεµποµένων
88
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στρατιωτῶν τοὺς µισθοὺς λαβόντες].”90 At first the Phocians kept the Thebans occupied in
central Greece, giving the Spartans a brief window of opportunity to reassert their dominance in
the south.91 But then Philip II of Macedon intervened in the war, frustrating Phocis’ plans for
Delphi and Sparta’s for the Peloponnesus.92 Finally, in 346, fearing Philip’s continued advances,
the Phocian authorities deposed Phalaecus, the latest Phocian general. But he reacted by making
a private agreement with the Macedonian king which granted him safe passage through
Thermopylae.93 Philip liberated Delphi, reduced Phocis, and obstructed further contact between
the allies. But in reality Phalaecus’ treacherous unilateral peace with a mutual enemy had already
violated the Spartan-Phocian alliance. Although the alliance began as a promising enterprise and
for nine years it operated with a small measure of success, in the end it was a failure. At this
nadir envoys from southern Italy approached Sparta.
S10

The Spartans and the Tarentines (346)
Diod. Sic. 16.62.4
The last Spartan alliance of the classical period was with Tarentum, a late eighth-century

Spartan colony in southern Italy. From its earliest years, Tarentum had difficulties with its native
Italian neighbors, but it had not sought out help from its metropolis. Instead, it survived through
collaboration with other western Greeks, such as those in the Italiote League.94 In the early
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fourth century, Dionysius I of Syracuse intervened in Italian affairs and captured many of the
Greek cities, but he spared Tarentum on account of his friendship with the Pythagorean
statesman Archytas.95 By midcentury, while the native Italians banded together into larger
confederations, expanding and intensifying their attacks on the Greeks, Tarentum, at the head of
an exhausted Italiote League, could expect little support from its local allies.96 As for the strength
of the Tarentines, despite the Roman geographer Strabo’s moralistic reproof that they were
governed poorly on account of enervating luxury (τρυφὴ) and thus hired foreign generals (τὸ
ξενικοῖς στρατηγοῖς χρῆσθαι) to do their fighting for them, other accounts indicate that all
branches of their military remained at a considerable level.97 Rather than noxious pleasures, the
problems facing Tarentum were external: increased cooperation among their enemies and the
inability of its traditional allies to provide support. In 346, therefore, even though contacts with
the metropolis had been sporadic since the colony’s foundation, Tarentum dispatched
ambassadors to Sparta to seek help in surmounting these overwhelming difficulties.98
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Before examining the alliance, there is a need to address briefly the misconception that
by the middle of the fourth century, Sparta was a non-entity in wider Greek affairs.99 Helen
Roche has recently challenged the implicit teleological assumptions in modern scholarship which
argue that since Sparta eventually faded into geopolitical insignificance, then it must have been
nothing more than a paper tiger after Leuctra. She reminds us that Sparta’s ultimate demise is
clear in retrospect but not so much to contemporaries.100 It can be added to her argument that the
numerous alliance proposals to the Spartans in the 360s and 350s work against the representation
of their political and military impotence. Decline does not mean death, and in 346 the Tarentines
did not consider their prospective ally to be an expired power. This also warns against putting
any credence in the negative assessments of Archidamus for his participation in this alliance.
Theopompus, for example, characterizes him as intemperate (ἀκρασία), disgusted with Sparta’s
traditional customs (τῆς πατρίου διαίτης), and anxious to live elsewhere (ἔξω διατρίβειν). This
character defamation, however, is formulaic, typical of Theopomous, and need not be taken
seriously. In his career Archidamus consistently emerges as a responsible and patriotic leader,
not at all fitting the wanderlust of Theopompus’ depiction.101 Even Isocrates held up Archidamus
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as a capable candidate to lead his cherished crusade against Persia.102 The Tarentines, too, took
notice of his qualifications and deliberately sought out the Spartans for an alliance.
Ephorus of Cyme (via Diodorus) gives the most complete account of the initiation of the
Tarentine-Spartan alliance:
“When the Tarentines were carrying on the war against the Lucanians and sent to the Spartans,
being descendants of their ancestors, envoys for help, the Spartans, being eager to make an
alliance with them because of their kinship, quickly mustered an army and navy and assigned
King Archidamus as general.”103
Ταραντίνων διαπολεµούντων πρὸς Λευκανοὺς καὶ πρὸς Λακεδαιµονίους, ὄντας προγόνους
ἑαυτῶν, πεµψάντων πρέσβεις περὶ βοηθείας οἱ µὲν Σπαρτιᾶται διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν προθύµως
ἔχοντες συµµαχῆσαι ταχέως δύναµιν ἤθροιζον πεζικήν τε καὶ ναυτικὴν καὶ ταύτης στρατηγὸν
ἀπέδειξαν Ἀρχίδαµον τὸν βασιλέα.

Like many other Greek embassies during the fourth century, the Tarentine ambassadors engaged
in kinship diplomacy. There were, however, at least two conflicting foundation accounts for
Tarentum. The fifth-century historian Antiochus of Syracuse highlights the hostility with which
the colonists (Partheniae), children of cowardly Spartan soldiers, viewed their progenitors. Not
allowed any political rights in Spartan society, the Partheniae made an unsuccessful attack
against Sparta, after which they left the Peloponnesus and founded Tarentum.104 It seems
unlikely that the Tarentine ambassadors in 346 raised this account of their shared origins. But,
like the Chian ambassadors to Athens in 384, who had in the writings of the poet Ion a modified
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FGrH 555 F13; Strabo 6.3.2. Ogden 1997, 73-80 considers the legal and physical
inferiority of the Partheniae to the Spartans. Fragoulaki 2013, 180-183 notes Thucydides’
silence on Tarentum’s Spartan origins.
195

foundation legend of Chios that reflected contemporary conditions, the Tarentines could also
point to a more recent account in the writings of the historian Ephorus. The Cymean historian
emphasizes closer ties of blood and sentiment between colony and metropolis. His Partheniae
were born to widowed Spartan women and young, energetic Spartiate men. But, being
illegitimate, they still had no hope of inheritance in the city, so the benevolent Spartans
instructed them to make a better life in Italy. This is more likely what the Tarentine ambassadors
had in mind when they called for an alliance with their Spartan ancestors.105
After stating that the Spartans agreed to the alliance because of their kinship, Ephorus,
dismissing the charge that Spartan power was moribund, says the Spartans quickly (ταχέως)
mustered an army and navy. Although they had continued to experience a gradual decline in the
number of their elite soldiers (ὀλιγανθρωπία), they still had a great advantage in their access to
an available fighting population in the Peloponnesus.106 Over the course of the fourth century,
due to persistent social and economic crises throughout the Greek world, more and more
dispossessed and destitute men, with little more than military skills to offer, came to the
peninsula to find employment and a new life.107 Modern scholars have recognized that many of
105
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the unemployed gathered at Taenarum, the southern port of Laconia, although as JeanChristophe Couvenhes has recently cautioned, the area should not be considered in the
anachronistic terms of a huge mercenary market or a central processing center.108 Rather, the
experience of finding employment at Taenarum was less formal, with military groups forming
through word-of-mouth, friendship contacts, and the reputation of commanders.109
The Tarentines, whose forefathers in the eighth century had made religious dedications at
the port before departing for Italy, would have recognized the practical and social value of this
area. Both the Tarentines and the soldiers at Taenarum could find common ground in their shared
worship of Poseidon.110 At about this time the Tarentines first minted a gold stater depicting on
the reverse a boy (perhaps Taras, Poseidon’s son and mythical founder of Tarentum) in
supplication to Poseidon. If it is true, as is commonly accepted, that this image symbolizes the
appeal of Tarentum (Taras) to Sparta (Poseidon), the coins would have had symbolic as well as
monetary value to all parties involved. The coins served as a method of payment and a
commemoration of the alliance between the two poleis, creating a sense of group solidarity and
shared goals. Just as the principal allies were materially invested, the soldiers would be
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psychologically invested in the expedition and would forge a new identity through their
involvement in it.111
Not every soldier had the same experience, of course, yet it is important, nevertheless, to
see the soldiers serving in this alliance in a relational rather than only a commercial
(“mercenary”) function. In fact, if a contemporary account survived outside of a later epitome, it
would likely employ more intimate terminology, such as ἐπίκουρος (one fighting alongside),
φίλος (friend), or ξένος (foreigner) rather than the banal µισθόφορος (wage-earner), as Diodorus
does centuries later.112 Anyhow, through the experience of recruitment at Taenarum and
participation in the campaign, the soldiers came to play a significant social function in the
alliance. Matthew Trundle supports this in his description of foreign soldiers serving as
intermediaries between states, tying them together in much the same way that gifts and services
did in traditional friendships.113 In other words, they were a tool to fulfill reciprocal obligations
and made it possible for there to be mutual benefit for the two allies. The Tarentines, advantaged
to have a source of wealth at their disposal, could provide money to support Spartan designs in
the Peloponnesus; in exchange, the Spartans could supply an army to protect Tarentum. By
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means of this quid pro quo arrangement, the alliance had the potential of restoring harmony in
southern Italy and of renewing Spartan hegemony in the Peloponnesus.
The two parties came to agreement on the alliance terms in an unrecorded session of the
Spartan assembly. Then the Tarentine ambassadors gave enough money for the Spartans to
assemble an army and a navy at Taenarum.114 After a brief detour at Crete, this large force
finally arrived in Italy. There must have been some early activity but the sources contain a
mysterious gap until 338, when the Spartan-led army confronted the Lucanians at the Battle of
Manduria. Archidamus died fighting in that battle and even though the Tarentines offered a great
amount of money, the enemy refused to hand over his body for burial.115 Instead, the Tarentines
erected marble statues of Archidamus at Olympia and at Delphi, commemorating his
achievements on their behalf and the alliance in perpetuity.116
The situation in southern Italy remained critical, and the Tarentines continued for the next
sixty years to enlist the aid of foreign generals – Alexander of Epirus, Cleonymus of Sparta,
Agathocles of Syracuse, and, most famously, Pyrrhus of Epirus – until their final defeat by the
Romans. These later generals, driven by policies of “micro-imperialism,” fought to extend their
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own power into the west, and it would be a mistake to include Archidamus among their ilk.117
Archidamus operated along the lines of constructing alliances according to the aspects of
traditional Greek friendship. That he died without realizing his goals does not diminish the
significance of that strategy. The same can be said for the earlier Spartan alliances of the fourth
century. Many of them, it is true, failed to endure and even came to ignoble ends, but this chapter
has eschewed the teleological approach of evaluating the alliances by their unfavorable
outcomes. Instead, the programmatic principles of the alliances, rooted in the conventional Greek
respect for reciprocity, held out great promise for the Spartans and for their allies. In the
perceptions of contemporaries, at least, who continued to seek out alliances with the Spartans,
the policy was fundamentally sound.
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Chapter V
Theban Alliances in the 360s

In the fourth century, the third Greek power to create an extensive alliance network was
Thebes. By following in the path of their Athenian and Spartan predecessors, the Thebans used
their alliances to support their claim to Panhellenic leadership; yet, in the end, the so-called
Theban hegemony was a poor imitation, lasting less than a decade (371 to 362).1 Through their
earlier experiences as leaders of the Boeotian League and their collaboration with the
Peloponnesian League, the Corinthian War alliance, and the Second Athenian Confederacy, the
Thebans became familiar with the formal and informal institutions of interstate affairs.2 Yet,
once they stepped out of the shadow of others and extended their own alliance arrangements into
the Peloponnesus and central and northern Greece, they did not follow these precedents in all
particulars. They preferred to conclude alliances based solely on temporary politico-military
objectives and neglected the cultivation of social ties with the new allies.
There are seven alliances or groups of alliances: the central and northern Greeks (370),
Arcadia, Elis, and Argos (370), Sicyon and Pellene (369), Alexander II of Macedon (369),
Ptolemy of Macedon (368), the Achaean League (366), and Alexander of Pherae (364). Nearly
every alliance was made with a former or existing ally of the Spartans or the Athenians. Being
newcomers to the world of Panhellenic leadership, the Thebans could only reach their political

1

Buckler 1980b, vii-viii discusses the (mis)application of “hegemony” to Thebes.
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objectives by pilfering the allies of others. Without the deep, historical ties with the new allies,
therefore, many of the Theban alliances, and thus the hegemonic experiment, collapsed within a
few years of their inception.
This chapter looks at this rapid rise and fall of the Thebans’ interstate alliance activities.
The first section addresses the alliances arranged under the auspices of Epaminondas, the
mastermind of Leuctra, who was obsessed with reducing the power of Sparta and revising the
geopolitical status quo in Thebes’ favor. To that end, he arranged alliances with various
Peloponnesians from 370 to 366. The next section explores Pelopidas’ alliances with northern
dynasts. Unlike the Peloponnesian alliances, these were unequal alliances that placed the other
parties in a definite position of subordination to the Thebans as subject-allies. Finally, the chapter
concludes with explanations for why the Thebans, unlike the Athenians and the Spartans, did not
enjoy a more lasting success with their alliances.

Alliances in Central Greece and the Peloponnesus (370-369)

No one could have predicted at the end of the Corinthian War in 386, with the Spartans
executing the King’s Peace and presiding over the dissolution of the Boeotian League, that
within two decades it would be the Spartans who would watch their Peloponnesian League
disintegrate, while the Thebans occupied a position of supreme leadership in Greece.3 This
scenario would have appeared even less likely in 382, when the Spartans, with the cooperation of
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Xen. Hell. 5.1.32-33. Isoc. 14.27 and Plut. Pel. 4.4-5 (cf. Paus. 9.13.1) claim that after
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Leontiades, the prominent pro-Spartan politician in Thebes, occupied the Theban Cadmeia. The
anti-Spartan leader Ismenias was taken in chains to Sparta and executed on charges of medism;
his followers fled to Athens for refuge.4 Thebes appeared destined to be under Spartan control
for some time to come. In the winter of 379, however, the Theban exiles in Athens were able to
dislodge the occupiers of their city and regain control. Subsequently, the new Theban
government made an official alliance with their Athenian benefactors (A12), and became charter
members of the Second Athenian Confederacy.5 Their liberation from Spartan control and their
alliance with the Athenians set the Thebans on a path towards their own series of interstate
alliances and a bid for hegemony in Greece.
The two principal proponents for this greater role interstate affairs were Pelopidas and
Epaminondas.6 The former was aligned politically with Ismenias and was a close friend of his
son, but, despite his time in exile in Athens, unlike Ismenias, he does not seem to have acquired
any social ties with the Athenians.7 Nor did Epaminondas, who, because of his reputation as a
Pythagorean philosopher posing no threat to the establishment, was allowed to remain in Thebes
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during the Spartan occupation.8 Although both men were instrumental in the immediate revival
of democracy in Thebes and the subsequent restoration of the Boeotian League, it is not recorded
to what extent they were involved in the restoration of alliance ties with the Athenians or in
Thebes’ enrollment in the Second Athenian Confederacy.9 Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine
that they were unaware of the ins and outs of the mechanics of interstate alliances. Epaminondas,
at least, participated in the 375 and 371 common peace conferences, fiercely contesting for but
ultimately failing to see the inclusion of Thebes into the wider hegemonic arrangements set down
by the Athenian Callistratus and the Spartan Agesilaus (see Chapter III). The latter’s stubborn
refusal to placate the Thebans resulted in the Battle of Leuctra, where the Thebans destroyed the
Spartan army.10
The aftermath of Leuctra changed the composition and reach of Theban alliances. On the
negative side of the ledger, the important alliance with the Athenians came to an end. Over the
370s, Theban commitment to Athens and the Confederacy had wavered, and Theban belligerence
against the Boeotians concerned the Athenians, who gradually turned away from Thebes to
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Diod. Sic. 15.39.2; Nep. Epam. 2.1-2; Plut. Pel. 5.3; Paus. 9.13.1. Pythagorean
influence on Epaminondas’ later military innovations: Vidal-Naquet 1986, 61-82; Stern 2012,
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support the pro-Spartan policy of Callistratus (see Chapter III-b).11 After the Theban victory over
the Spartans, the Athenians offered no hospitality (ξένια) or reply to the Theban herald who
brought the news of the battle. The Athens peace conference, when the Athenians and their allies
offered military assistance to the Spartans, marks the effective end of their alliance with
Thebes.12 From then on, the Thebans had to re-work the positive side of the alliance ledger.
T1

The Thebans and Central and Northern Greeks (370)
Xen. Hell. 6.5.23; Ages. 2.24; Diod. Sic. 15.62.4
It seems that Epaminondas, had he his way, would have invaded the Peloponnesus and

taken the fight into Spartan territory immediately after Leuctra.13 The Theban authorities,
however, chose instead to use their victory to finish their consolidation of the Boeotian League
and make alliances in central Greece.14 One of the first was with the Phocians, traditional friends
of the Spartans.15 On the basis of their hostile relationship, it may seem that the Thebans must
have forced the Phocians into alliance. Even though the treaty for the alliance does not survive,
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however, there is still evidence that it was not asymmetrical; it was, in fact, a standard fourthcentury defensive alliance. Xenophon reports that the Phocians did not follow (οὐκ ἠκολούθουν)
Epaminondas on his fourth invasion of the Peloponnesus in 362 because “their agreement said
that, if anyone went against Thebes, they would help, but to march against others was not in the
agreement [ὅτι συνθῆκαι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς εἶεν, εἴ τις ἐπὶ Θήβας ἴοι, βοηθεῖν: ἐπ᾽ ἄλλους δὲ
στρατεύειν οὐκ εἶναι ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις.].”16 In other words, the Phocians did not agree to an
offensive alliance. But if it is a defense alliance, it is surprising, then, to see them on
Epaminondas’ first invasion of the Peloponnesus in the winter of 370. No explanation is given
for this; perhaps there was some incentive to join at this time. Of course, the Phocians in 362 did
not say there was a prohibition in the original treaty against voluntary participation in offensive
campaigns.17 Whatever the case, this defensive alliance is probably representative of the other
alliances concluded in central and northern Greece. Xenophon says that many of the Euboeans,
both Locrian peoples, Aenianians, Acarnanians, Heracleots, Malians, and Thessalians allied with
Thebes and joined the first expedition into the Peloponnesus.18 These alliances also lacked a
clause obligating participation in offensive campaigns. The Thebans, therefore, had effectively
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expanded their alliances in central Greece, but extending them into the Peloponnesus was a new
prospect for which they were not wholly prepared.
T2

The Thebans and the Arcadians, Eleans, and Argives (370)
Dem. 16.12, 19; Diod. Sic. 15.62.3; Paus. 8.6.2, 9.14.4
The Theban-Peloponnesian alliance of 370 was the inspiration of the Arcadians, Eleans,

and Argives, although the Thebans were not their first choice. Once the consequences of Leuctra
became clear, the Mantineans undid the dioecism (break-up) which the Spartans imposed on their
city in 385 and re-synoecised (re-established) themselves into a unified democratic state.
Lycomedes, a prominent Mantinean, went further and brought others in the region into an
Arcadian Confederation.19 The Arcadians then turned to the Eleans and the Argives, two
confirmed enemies of Sparta, and made a trilateral alliance directed against their mutual enemy.
Their combined strength, however, was still insufficient to match that of the Spartans, so the
three made a joint appeal to the Athenians, but the pro-Spartan leaders in Athens rejected the
proposal.20
As an alternative, the Peloponnesians extended the same proposition to the Thebans.21 It
appears that there was some reluctance to it from Epaminondas’ domestic rivals. Among the
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Arcadians, too, such as Lycomedes, a devout defender of Arcadian sovereignty, there were
voices of dissent. Still the proponents for the alliance, in particular Epaminondas, prevailed and
secured its safe passage. Since the Peloponnesians invited the Thebans to help them fight off
their Spartan attackers, the alliance was probably a standard defensive alliance, such as the recent
ones with the Phocians and others.22 The official treaty for the alliance is not extant, but it is
possible to reconstruct at least two other terms by looking closely at allusions to the alliance in
Xenophon’s record. First, the allies agreed not to make a unilateral peace agreement with a
common enemy. This is clear from an episode in 363, when the Mantineans made peace with
their erstwhile allies, the Eleans. Epaminondas complained to the Arcadians: “for although we
came into the war [i.e., in 370] on your account, you made peace without our knowledge. How
would it not be just for someone to charge you with treason for this [τὸ γὰρ ἡµῶν δι᾽ ὑµᾶς εἰς
πόλεµον καταστάντων ὑµᾶς ἄνευ τῆς ἡµετέρας γνώµης εἰρήνην ποιεῖσθαι πῶς οὐκ ἂν δικαίως
προδοσίαν τις ὑµῶν τοῦτο κατηγοροίη]?”23 Although the common enemy here is Elis, in 370,
when the Thebans entered the war, it was Sparta. Evidently, the treaty did not specify the identity
of the enemy with whom they were not to make a unilateral peace agreement. There was also an
exiles clause. The allies agreed that the extradition of exiles from one city was applicable to all
within the alliance, and likewise the return of exiles required the approval of all. This is
mentioned by the assassin of Euphron of Sicyon during his trial in 366:
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“remember also that you indeed voted that the exiles are to be led away from all of those in the
alliance. But when any exile returns without a general resolution of the allies, is anyone able to
24
say how it is not just for him to be put to death?”
ἀναµνήσθητε ὅτι καὶ ἐψηφίσασθε δήπου τοὺς φυγάδας ἀγωγίµους εἶναι ἐκ πασῶν τῶν
συµµαχίδων. ὅστις δὲ ἄνευ κοινοῦ τῶν συµµάχων δόγµατος κατέρχεται φυγάς, τοῦτον ἔχοι τις ἂν
εἰπεῖν ὅπως οὐ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀποθνῄσκειν

The alliance with Sicyon did not occur until 369, but the Sicyonian assassin indicates that an
exiles clause was a part of all the alliances in the Peloponnesus, including this one with the
Arcadians, Eleans, and Argives. Since there was this provision about political undesirables, there
may also have been mention about the preservation of each ally’s domestic constitution, as will
be the case in later alliances.25
There was no clause defining leadership roles. It was only on the basis of charismatic
leadership, not legal authority, that the Thebans commanded the allied army. Plutarch writes that
“the reputation of the men [i.e., Epaminondas and Pelopidas], without a general resolution or
decree, made all of the allies follow their leadership in silence [ἀλλ᾽ ἡ δόξα τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἄνευ
δόγµατος κοινοῦ καὶ ψηφίσµατος ἐποίει τοὺς συµµάχους ἕπεσθαι σιωπῇ πάντας ἡγουµένοις
ἐκείνοις].”26 It is incredible to think that there was no opposition, but the main point here is that
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Lycomedes in the summer of 369: “Now if you [i.e., the Arcadians] follow Thebes heedlessly
and do not think it fit to lead by turns, perhaps you will soon find them to be another Sparta [νῦν
δὲ ἂν Θηβαίοις εἰκῇ ἀκολουθῆτε καὶ µὴ κατὰ µέρος ἡγεῖσθαι ἀξιῶτε, ἴσως τάχα τούτους ἄλλους
Λακεδαιµονίους εὑρήσετε]” (Xen. Hell. 7.1.24).
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the Thebans occupied the position of leadership in the alliance without any official sanction in
the treaty. Later this ambiguity would be a cause for the breakdown of the alliance.
It was not until December of 370 that Epaminondas led the allied troops from central and
northern Greece through the Isthmus and into Arcadia, only to find that the Spartans had already
retired. The purpose of the defensive alliance, therefore, was technically fulfilled, and the
Thebans could return home just before the term of the generals expired at the end of the year.27
But they did not. Despite the illegality of extending the command of the generals and the
harshness of winter, it was decided that the army would continue into Laconia and attack Sparta
itself. Xenophon claims the Peloponnesians made this decision. Diodorus says it was the Theban
leaders. But Plutarch and Pausanias credit it to Epaminondas. Cornelius Nepos adds that
Epaminondas was forced to continue the expedition or else he would lose the army, indicating
how loose the attachments between the new allies were. Epaminondas, obsessed with destroying
Sparta’s power, must have been involved in this decision to continue.28 He was blind, though, to
the futility of luring the Spartans out of their city for battle against his large army. After a failed
attack on Sparta, he permitted the allies to plunder the rest of Laconia, which encouraged a few
other small powers in the region to join the allied army. Finally, as a war measure, he liberated
the Messenians and founded Messene, thus destroying the economic base of Spartan society.29
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There was no provision for prorogation, so if the Theban generals did not return in time
to lay down their commands, they would be prosecuted (Plut. Pel. 24.2; cf. Hanson 2010, 98-99).
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Xen. Hell. 6.5.23-25; Ages. 2.24; Diod. Sic. 15.62.4-5; Plut. Pel. 24.2; Paus. 9.14.5;
Nep. Epam. 7.3-5. The first invasion of the Peloponnesus: Fortina 1958, 39-56; Buckler 1980b,
70-90; Shipley 1997, 336-349; Stylianou 1998, 423-444; Hanson 2010, 93-117.
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Notwithstanding this climactic success, when he returned home in the spring of 369, his political
rivals, dissatisfied with the expedition from the start, brought him up on the expected charge of
refusing to surrender his command at the end of the year. Epaminondas, however, no mean
public speaker, defended himself by pointing to his recent achievements, which were sufficient
for the court to dismiss the charges.30
T3

The Thebans and Sicyon and Pellene (369)
Xen. Hell. 7.2.2-3.3.2; Diod. 15.69.1
Epaminondas’ acquittal gave him a mandate to continue his Peloponnesian policy.

According to Diodorus, he led another invasion of the Peloponnesus in the summer of 369 in
response to another appeal from the Peloponnesian allies.31 This time he succeeded in securing
alliances with Sicyon and Pellene. More information is available for the former. Diodorus says
that Epaminondas bullied (καταπληξάµενος) the Sicyonians into an alliance. Xenophon,
however, in his record of a speech by Euphron of Sicyon, says they held a vote (ψῆφος).32 It may
be that a vote followed the bullying. Whatever the case, in the alliance Epaminondas assured the
Sicyonians that the Thebans would respect their constitutional government. Unlike the earlier
alliances, however, Epaminondas also installed a governor (ἄρχων) on the Sicyonian
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Xen. Hell. 6.5.27-32; Diod. Sic. 15.64.1-67.1; Plut. Pel. 24.5; Paus. 4.26.5-27.10,
9.14.5. Luraghi 2008, 209-248 looks at the creation of the Messenian state in the context of the
formation of Messenian identity.
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Nep. Epam. 8.1-5 (cf. Stern 2012, 178-183); Plut. Pel. 25.1-2; Mor. 194a-b, 540d-e (cf.
Buckler 1978b, 36-42); Paus. 9.14.7; Polyaenus Strat. 2.3.5.
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Xen. Hell. 7.1.18; Diod. Sic. 15.68.1; Paus. 9.15.4. The second invasion of the
Peloponnesus: Fortina 1958, 59-62; Buckler 1980b, 90-102; Stylianou 1998, 457-461.
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Xen. Hell. 7.3.2; Diod. 15.69.1. The Sicyonian alliance in general: Roy 1971, 574-575
(cf. 1994, 191-192); Buckler 1980b, 98-99; Griffin 1982, 68; Lolos 2011, 68-69. Pellene: Xen.
Hell. 7.2.2-3.
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Acropolis.33 But this was a necessary wartime measure, not an attempt to create a satellite or to
forcibly impose a Theban-style democracy on the Sicyonians. Even the subsequent (c. 367)
constitutional changes by Euphron were not considered a violation of the alliance.34
Epamindonas’ approach to interstate relations was a pragmatic one. Since the primary objective
was the reduction of Sparta, the political ideology of an ally meant little to him as long as the
alliance contributed to that goal. In addition to the guarantee to respect each other’s constitution,
there was an exiles clause. As the Sicyonian assassin of Euphron mentioned during his trial in
Thebes in 366, there was a prohibition against the return of an exile “without a general resolution
of the allies [ἄνευ κοινοῦ τῶν συµµάχων δόγµατος].”35 The control of exiles added to the
stability of the existing government, which in turn supported the alliance and put pressure on the
common enemy. There is no evidence for other stipulations in the alliances with Sicyon and
Pellene, though one might suspect that there was a prohibition against any independent peace
efforts with an enemy, as was the case in the 370 alliances.
Overall, however, the success of the second expedition was negligible. There was no
attempt on the city of Sparta. Xenophon says that a failed Theban attack on Corinth even revived
the spirits of the Spartans and their allies.36 Nor were the Thebans able to deter the new
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Ibid. 7.2.11, 3.4.
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Ibid. 7.1.44. The Theban governor remained in Sicyon until 366 (ibid. 7.2.11, 15, 3.4,
9). Griffin 1982, 72-73 thinks the Theban garrison was temporarily removed during Euphron’s
coup. Lewis 2004, 65-74 disputes the characterization of Euphron as a typical tyrannt. Robinson
2011, 51-53 argues that Euphron’s government was a true democracy not a tyranny.
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Xen. Hell. 7.3.11.
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Ibid. 7.1.19.
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Athenian-Spartan alliance (A13). Instead of finding Sparta further isolated, the allies watched as
their enemy secured new sources of support from Athens, Dionysius I of Syracuse, and
Ariobarzanes of Phrygia.37 So this time when Epaminondas returned home, his opponents found
it easier to secure a guilty verdict against him on the charge of treason (προδοσία) for not
destroying Sparta. He was blocked from the generalship for the next year and would not return to
the Peloponnesus until 366.38

Alliances in Northern Greece (368-364)

During Epaminondas’ second invasion of the Peloponnesus, Pelopidas was in the north.
The new tyrant of Pherae, Alexander, had recently occupied a number of key Thessalian cities.39
The victims sent ambassadors to Thebes appealing to their previous year’s defensive alliance.
Plutarch says that Pelopidas volunteered for the northern assignment because he no longer
wished to play second fiddle to Epaminondas. Diodorus adds that the Theban authorities handed
Pelopidas the vague instructions to “manage affairs in Thessaly in the interest of the Boeotians
[εἰς τὸ συµφέρον τῶν Βοιωτῶν διοικῆσαι τὰ κατὰ τὴν Θετταλίαν].”40 Whatever this may have
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Ibid. 7.1.1-14 (Athens), 20-22 (Dionysius), 27 (Ariobarzanes).
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Diod. Sic. 15.72.2; cf. Cawkwell 1972, 267 (reprinted in 2011, 318-319); Buckler
1980b, 142-145. The Thebans maintained their garrison at Sicyon after 369 (Xen. Hell. 7.2.1115; Diod. Sic. 15.75.3).
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Xen. Hell. 6.4.29-35; Diod. Sic. 15.60.5, 61.2; cf. Sprawski 2006, 139-140.
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Diod. Sic. 15.67.3; Plut. Pel. 26.1; Nep. Pel. 4.3 (cf. Stern 2012, 190-192). This may
refer to the security of Thebes’ northern borders. The Athenians were also a threat: they had
recently made an alliance with Amyntas of Macedon, who supported their claims to Amphipolis.
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meant, the Thebans were obligated, according to the terms of their defensive alliance, to respond
positively to the Thessalian appeal. Their alliance probably contained another clause prohibiting
the unilateral conclusion of peace or other arrangement with a common enemy. This would
explain why Pelopidas, after liberating Larissa from Alexander, refused the tyrant’s offer of
alliance. Plutarch, the only source for this proposal, says that although Alexander begged
(δεόµενον) him, Pelopidas refused to make an alliance with one so “incurably savage and all
cruelty [ἀνήκεστος καὶ θηριώδης καὶ πολλὴ µὲν ὠµότης].”41 It is a moralizing and melodramatic
explanation typical of Plutarch. Pelopidas may have had some personal aversion to Alexander’s
behavior and attitude, but it is more likely that he was prevented from entering into a binding
relationship with the Pheraean by the terms of his alliance with the Thessalians. He, therefore,
continued the military solution until the area was secure for his allies.
T4

The Thebans and Alexander II of Macedon (369)
Diod. Sic. 15.67.4; Plut. Pel. 26.4; Just. Epit. 7.5.1
News of Pelopidas’ success in Thessaly reached neighboring Macedonia, where a rivalry

had erupted between King Alexander II and his brother-in-law Ptolemy Alorus. The adversaries
invited Pelopidas to arbitrate. He decided in favor of the king and made an alliance with him.
Alexander’s father, Amyntas, had an alliance with the Athenians, made Iphicrates his adopted
son, and supported Athenian claims to Amphipolis; yet Alexander, by making the alliance with

Buckler 1980b, 111 and 2003, 320 suggest that Pelopidas may also have been concerned for the
safety of his friend Jason’s family (Plut. Pel. 28.4). Pelopidas’ first northern mission: Buckler
1980b, 110-119; Georgiadou 1997, 191-196; Stylianou 1998, 455-457; Buckler 2003, 320-323.
41

Plut. Pel. 26.2. Xen. Hell. 6.4.35 and Diod. Sic. 15.61.2 also speak of Alexander’s
violent nature, but see Sprawski 2006, 135-138. Diod. Sic. 15.67.4 states incorrectly that Larissa
was under the occupation of Alexander II of Macedon.
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Pelopidas, turned from that policy. Diodorus only mentions briefly the alliance (συµµαχία).
Plutarch, though, goes into slightly more detail:
“After he came, put an end to their differences, and recalled the exiles, he received as hostage
Philip, the king's brother, and thirty other sons of the most distinguished men, and brought them
to Thebes, thus showing to the Greeks how far the affairs of the Thebans extended in the glory of
its power and in the confidence in its justice.”42
ἐλθὼν δὲ καὶ διαλύσας τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ καταγαγὼν τοὺς φεύγοντας, ὅµηρον ἔλαβε τὸν ἀδελφὸν
τοῦ βασιλέως Φίλιππον καὶ τριάκοντα παῖδας ἄλλους τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων, καὶ κατέστησεν εἰς
Θήβας, ἐπιδειξάµενος τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὡς πόρρω διήκει τὰ Θηβαίων πράγµατα τῇ δόξῃ τῆς
δυνάµεως καὶ τῇ πίστει τῆς δικαιοσύνης.

It was dissimilar to the alliances with the southern Greeks and contained none of their clauses,
except for a possible clause – indicated by καταγαγὼν τοὺς φεύγοντας – calling for the return of
the exiles from the recent dispute with Ptolemy. A new condition was the demand for hostages.
Plutarch points out that this demonstrated Theban power, as it surely did, but it was also a tool of
alliance maintenance: possessing hostages ensured Alexander’s continued compliance with the
terms of the alliance.43 The Macedonian king must have been in no position to refuse and handed
over the hostages, including one of his younger brothers, Philip, the future king of Macedonia.44
T5

The Thebans and Ptolemy Alorus of Macedon (368)
Plut. Pel. 27.3
But the arrangements in Macedonia proved temporary. In the next year, Ptolemy

murdered Alexander and set himself up as king, thus nullifying the alliance with Thebes. The
situation became even more complex when the Athenians sent Iphicrates, the adopted brother of
42

Ibid.; Plut. Pel. 26.4; Just. Epit. 7.5.1. The alliance with Alexander in general: Buckler
1980b, 117-118; Hatzopoulos 1985, 252-253.
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Perdiccas, another younger brother of the murdered king, to advance Athenian interests in the
north.45 To counter these developments, Pelopidas, already en route to Thessaly at the head of a
diplomatic mission to Alexander of Pherae, raised an army of Thessalians and marched on
Macedonia.46 According to Plutarch, Ptolemy, although he had bribed the Thessalians away from
Pelopidas, immediately made an alliance with the Theban:
“Since Ptolemy feared the very name and reputation of Pelopidas, he approached him as the
stronger, and after welcoming him and asking for his favor, he agreed to be regent for the
brothers of the dead king, and to have the same friends and enemies as the Thebans; moreover, to
confirm this, he gave him his son Philoxenus and fifty of his companions.”47
τοῦ δὲ Πελοπίδου τὴν δόξαν αὐτὴν καὶ τοὔνοµα δεδοικώς ἀπήντησεν ὡς κρείσσονι, καὶ
δεξιωσάµενος καὶ δεηθεὶς ὡµολόγησε τὴν µὲν ἀρχὴν τοῖς τοῦ τεθνηκότος ἀδελφοῖς διαφυλάξειν,
Θηβαίοις δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐχθρὸν ἕξειν καὶ φίλον ὁµήρους δ᾽ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν υἱὸν Φιλόξενον ἔδωκε
καὶ πεντήκοντα τῶν ἑταίρων

Ptolemy was placed in a clear position of subordination to the Thebans. Plutarch expresses the
alliance with an hegemonic oath formula in imitation of earlier Spartan and Athenian alliances:
“to have the same friends and enemies as the Thebans.” This was not a part of the previous
alliance with Alexander. Ptolemy had disrupted Pelopidas’ political arrangements in Macedonia,
and if the Theban did not respond to this provocation, it might have negative repercussions for
all of his northern settlements. The fifth-century Athenians imposed new oaths on subdued rebel
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states. The Spartans continued to impose this same oath on their allies in the fourth century (the
Athenians in 404 and the Olynthians in 379).48 By adopting this particular oath, therefore,
Pelopidas punished the Macedonian usurper by forcing him to place his foreign policy under the
authority of Thebes.49
Plutarch reinforces this control aspect of the alliance, a fortiori, by mentioning two
practical conditions imposed on Ptolemy. He was to offer up hostages, more than was required of
Alexander, a means of guaranteeing the Macedonian’s loyalty to the new compact.50 Ptolemy,
furthermore, was not permitted to take the throne in his own right. He would be only the regent
for young Perdiccas. But in the larger scheme of interstate relations, he had to adhere to Theban
wishes. The agreement kept Ptolemy out of Thessalian (and by extension Theban) affairs, and
continued to obstruct contact between the Macedonians and the Athenians.51 For all of its
potential, this alliance, too, turned out to last little longer than the one with Alexander did. In
365, young Perdiccas murdered his regent and collaborated briefly with the Athenians.52 But that
was three years in the future.
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T7

The Thebans and Alexander of Pherae (364)
Diod. Sic. 15.80.6; Plut. Pel. 35.1-2
After the settlement with Ptolemy, Pelopidas returned to unfinished business in Thessaly,

but as soon as he arrived at Pharsalus, Alexander of Pherae placed him in prison.53 The Thebans
quickly authorized a rescue mission. Before it arrived, however, Alexander made an alliance
with the Athenians, who dispatched significant military support under the command of Autocles
(A14). Reinforced, Alexander defeated the Thebans and imprisoned Pelopidas. In the next year,
Epaminondas, re-elected to the generalship, took command of the army in Thessaly and
confronted Alexander. The tyrant quickly offered to discard his alliance with the Athenians and
asked for peace and friendship (εἰρήνην καὶ φιλίαν) with the Thebans. Like Pelopidas in 369,
however, Epaminondas refused to enter into any binding relationship with Alexander, probably
on account of its prohibition in the Theban-Thessalian alliance. All he agreed to was a truce and
the release of Pelopidas.54
It would not be until 364, after Pelopidas died fighting against Alexander, that the
Thebans made an official alliance with the tyrant. Of course, to make this alliance required that
Alexander terminate his alliance with the Athenians. This new one, however, was asymmetrical.
Diodorus and Plutarch say that the Pheraean was forced – both use a form of ἀναγκάζω – to give
back to the Thessalians their cities, submit Magnesia and Phthiotic Achaea for inclusion into the
Boeotian League, and become an ally of Thebes. In describing the latter condition, Plutarch adds
that Alexander swore an oath “to follow against whomever the Thebans may lead and bid [ἐφ᾽
οὓς ἂν ἡγῶνται Θηβαῖοι καὶ κελεύσωσιν ἀκολουθήσειν],” another oath formula borrowed from
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Polyb. 8.35.6-9; Diod. Sic. 15.71.2; Nep. Pel. 5.1; Plut. Pel. 27.4-6; Paus. 9.15.1.
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Diod. Sic. 15.75.2; Plut. Pel. 29.6; Paus. 9.15.1-2.
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Spartan alliances.55 It also appears in Epaminondas’ alliance with the Achaeans in 366 (see more
below). This oath imposed an offensive alliance on Alexander. He was required to contribute to
Theban campaigns, as he did in 362 at the Battle of Mantinea. But why did the Thessalians
permit the new Theban alliance with their mutual enemy? It must be because it restricted
Alexander’s military activities. The tyrant agreed to submit his military to Theban control, and
he could not summon the Thebans in any attack on the Thessalians. Alexander was in effect
more of a subject than an ally of Thebes. At the time the Thessalians must have been delighted in
this outcome.

The Breakup of Theban Alliances (367-362)

Immediately after his release from imprisonment, Pelopidas shifted his attention towards
gaining Persian support for Thebes. In 367, he convinced the Persian King to endorse a new
settlement for Greece, which included an independent Messenia, the demobilization of the
Athenian fleet, and a recognition of Theban hegemony (ἡγεµονία) over Greece. The King also
decided in favor of the Eleans in their dispute with the Arcadians over Triphylia, a verdict with
repercussions for the Theban-Peloponnesian alliance.56 But when Pelopidas announced the
settlement at a congress in Thebes, the Greeks refused to accept it. Lycomedes of Mantinea,
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1980b, 181-182; Stylianou 1998, 499-500. The oath of the Peloponnesian League: Bolmarcich
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Plut. Pel. 30; cf. Jehne 1994, 82-90; Georgiadou 1997, 205-211; Bearzot 2011, 21-37.
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dissatisfied generally with Theban claims to hegemony and specifically with the decision on
Triphylia, led the opposition to the peace. In response, the Thebans angrily claimed that
Lycomedes was destroying the alliance (τὸ συµµαχικόν). That was true: following the
Mantinean’s example, the other Greek representatives rejected the peace. “In this way,”
concludes Xenophon, “came to an end this attempt of Pelopidas and the Thebans for the
leadership [καὶ αὕτη µὲν ἡ Πελοπίδου καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων τῆς ἀρχῆς περιβολὴ οὕτω διελύθη].”57
But it was really only the beginning of the end. In 366, according to Diodorus, the Greeks
accepted a modified version of the peace, which included a general acknowledgement of Theban
leadership in Greece.58 But it was a tenuous acceptance, as events would soon bear out.
T6

The Thebans and the Achaeans (366)
Xen. Hell. 7.1.41-42; Diod. Sic. 15.75.2
Epaminondas interpreted the passage of the peace as license to enforce Theban leadership

and to promote more alliances in the Peloponnesus. The specific goal of the third expedition was
the addition of the Achaeans, who probably remained aligned with the Spartans in the years after
Leuctra, giving Epaminondas a pretext to invade.59 The expedition, moreover, had the effect of
uniting the existing Peloponnesian allies under Theban authority. Because there had not been any
specific designation of leadership roles, cracks had begun to form in the Theban-Peloponnesian
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Xen. Hell. 7.1.39-40. Sterling 2004, 456-458 and Buckler and Beck 2008, 130-133
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Polyb. 2.39.8-10 (cf. Strabo 8.7.1) claims the Achaeans served as arbiters between
Thebes and Sparta after Leuctra. Buckler 1978a, 85-96 and Freitag 2009, 22-23 dismiss this as
Achaean tradition; Mackil 2013, 71 n. 75 expresses more confidence in Polybius’ account.
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alliance. But this new campaign united the allies once again under Epaminondas’ charismatic
leadership. The campaign was initially successful. The allied army attacked Dyme, Naupactus,
and Calydon, until the Achaean oligarchs agreed to an alliance. Xenophon records its conditions:
“With the oligarchs of Achaea making appeals to him, Epaminondas saw to it by his own power
that no one exile them or change their constitution, but after he received pledges in good faith
from the Achaeans that they would indeed be allies and would follow wherever the Thebans
lead.”60
προσπεσόντων δ᾽ αὐτῷ τῶν βελτίστων ἐκ τῆς Ἀχαΐας, ἐνδυναστεύει ὁ Ἐπαµεινώνδας ὥστε µὴ
φυγαδεῦσαι τοὺς κρατίστους µηδὲ πολιτείαν µεταστῆσαι, ἀλλὰ πιστὰ λαβὼν παρὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἦ
µὴν συµµάχους ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀκολουθήσειν ὅποι ἂν Θηβαῖοι ἡγῶνται,

There are three conditions: a prohibition against the exile of the oligarchs, the preservation of
their oligarchic constitution, and their promise to “follow the Thebans wherever they lead.”
Forms of the first two appeared in the Peloponnesian alliances of 370 and 369; the third is a new
one for Epaminondas. The oath “to follow x wherever they lead” is recognizable from Spartan
alliances, and by swearing the oath, the new allies promised that in practice they would
subordinate their military policies to those of the Spartans.61 It was in essence an offensive
alliance, or Epaminondas’ response to the problems of late with the Arcadians and the issue of
leadership. The insertion of the hegemonic oath into the alliance with the Achaeans made that
unquestionably clear.
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Since Epaminondas was on campaign, he concluded this alliance on his own authority
(ἐνδυναστεύει), intending to submit it later to the home authorities for official ratification, but it
never got that far.62 For the arrangements with the Achaean oligarchs alienated the Arcadian (and
Achaean) democrats, who complained to Epaminondas’ rivals in Thebes. The Thebans decided
in their favor, overruling their general; expelled the Achaean oligarchs; and propped up the
Achaean democrats.63 But that solution failed as well. The oligarchs quickly regained power and
renewed their allegiance not to Epaminondas but to the Spartans. Pellene followed suit and
returned to the Spartans.64 Then the Arcadians (Mantineans), exasperated by the Thebans’
blunders in Achaea, secured an alliance with the Athenians (A16). The Theban alliance network
in the Peloponnesus was insecure.
Instead of addressing these schisms, in 364, Epaminondas turned his attention to a new
theater, the Aegean, to recruit new allies.65 The primary targets – Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium
– were all charter members of the Second Athenian Confederacy, so winning their allegiance
would put Thebes in the position of leadership in the region previously held exclusively by
Athens. The grandiose mission, however, failed to meet expectations: of the three major islands,
only Byzantium gave him anything more than a warm welcome. Elsewhere, at Cnidus, the
islanders passed a proxeny decree granting him free passage. The island of Ceos revolted from
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Athens at this time, but it is not certain to what extent it had anything to do with the Theban
presence in the Aegean. Even so, he failed to make any official alliances.66
To his credit, Epaminondas recognized the futility of continuing the venture.67 There
were also troubles on the mainland that required immediate attention. In 364, after Pelopidas
died fighting Alexander of Pherae, the Thebans sent northwards another large army of 7,000
soldiers. They brought the troublesome tyrant into an alliance, as mentioned above, but it was an
unexpectedly expensive investment. In 363, the Amphictyonic League exiled certain Delphians
on an unknown charge, creating a disturbance in central Greece.68 Of course, there were the
continuing and growing tensions among the Peloponnesian allies.
Sometime after 366, when the modified peace reversed the judgment on Triphylia in
favor of the Arcadians, the Eleans abandoned the Theban-Peloponnesian alliance, made a new
alliance with the Spartans, and attacked the Arcadians.69 Among the Arcadians, who had
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retaliated by seizing Olympia and its treasures from Elean control, only Mantinea counselled
caution and passed a resolution to make peace with Elis. The attempt at making peace without
consulting Thebes was a violation of the 370 alliance, so Epaminondas charged the Mantineans
with treason (προδοσία) and called a fourth invasion of the Peloponnesus to settle the disputes.70
He was accompanied by his remaining allies from Boeotia, Euboea, Thessaly, Argos, Messene,
and Arcadia (Tegea, Megalopolis, Asea, and Pallantion).71 On the other side, the Mantineans,
Eleans, and Achaeans found support from the Athenians and the Spartans. In the culminating
battle at Mantinea, Epaminondas defeated his enemies but lost his life. His final words,
according to Diodorus, were “I leave behind two daughters, Leuctra and Mantineia, my
victories.”72
It is fitting that he would point to his military victories over any diplomatic achievements.
Admittedly, the former were exceptional feats for the age; on the other hand, to Epaminondas,
the act of making alliances was more like an uncomfortable learning exercise in the school of
diplomacy. His track record bears this out. The alliances with the Peloponnesian states in 370
and 369 were made with the only purpose being collective resistance to Sparta. Without specific
details of leadership roles, the maintenance of the alliances was a troublesome affair. It is true
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that the alliance with the Achaeans included a clear stipulation for Thebes to be the leading
partner, but in this case Epaminondas did not take into account the domestic politics of the
Achaeans (or even of his own city). The expedition in the Aegean was too ambitious and failed
to secure any alliances at all. Pelopidas did not fare any better in the north. After two years of
effort, all he achieved were two brief alliances with Macedonian rulers – both of which were
nullified after each ruler’s assassination – and a precarious imprisonment in Thessaly. It was not
until 364 that a posthumous alliance was made with Alexander of Pherae.
Epaminondas and Pelopidas were not senseless and in many respects they were
exceptional leaders.73 Moreover, they were familiar with the previous Athenian and Spartan
alliance experiences. What, then, was wrong? Why were they unable to establish more enduring
alliances? Modern scholarship focuses on three related problems. The first is the failure to codify
leadership roles.74 This glaring omission particularly applies to the early Peloponnesian alliances.
With this aspect left ambiguous, Epaminondas could only rely on his charismatic authority to
direct the allies. But since his leadership lacked a solid legal footing, there was always the
possibility of a challenger, such as Lycomedes. It is not that the Thebans were unaware of the
necessity of making this unquestionably clear; they took notice of how Athenian and Spartan
alliances operated. At the same time as the Theban-Peloponnesian alliance, the Athenians and
Spartans expended much energy on determining who would be in charge of military affairs in
their alliance (A13). Epaminondas, however, was more concerned with a quick attack on Sparta
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than negotiating leadership clauses. Nevertheless, this is not a comprehensive answer to Thebes’
alliance problems. Even without such a clause, other Arcadians and the Argives continued to
defer to Theban leadership. Then there is the case of the Achaean alliance, which made Theban
leadership abundantly clear but still fell apart quickly.
The second problem is the absence of any formal organization of the new allies. Nearly
every scholar today believes that the operation of Theban alliances was ad hoc and informal;
there was no sort of overarching political institution that served as an umbrella for the many
Theban allies.75 D.M. Lewis and P.J. Stylianou, however, are lone exponents of an official
council (συνέδριον) for the allies running on the model of the Second Athenian Confederacy.
They rest this on two pieces of evidence: the remark of the Sicyonian assassin to a κοινὸν τῶν
συµµάχων δόγµα and a reference in a Theban inscription from the mid-350s to Byzantine
σύνεδροι attending a συνέδριον in Thebes.76 But few are convinced by these points. John
Buckler, for example, calling attention to the wide range of meanings for δόγµα, disputes that it
must indicate a formal political institution. He does the same with σύνεδρος, showing that it can
refer to casual gatherers for conversation, envoys, or other sorts of representatives, not always to
council representatives.77 The evidence for a Theban council, therefore, stands on weak ground.
The allies were joined to Thebes by ties no more formal than their individual treaties and by their
shared anti-Spartan aims. Again, it is not that the Thebans were unaware of such arrangements,
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having observed and participated in the institutional practices of Athenian and Spartan alliances;
yet, they failed to establish specific fiscal, military, and political institutions to manage the
alliances beyond their short-term objectives. This was due largely to the fact that the alliances
relied so much on the personal goals of individual leaders that they ignored any need for
structural institutions that would survive the passing of those individuals. Nevertheless, this, too,
does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the failure of Theban alliances. The existence of
an allied council in the Second Athenian Confederacy, after all, did not preclude the troubles that
Athens faced from its allies in the 350s.
The third problem that scholars put forth is the sheer scale of what the Thebans were
trying to achieve in comparison with their available means. Enacting and maintaining alliances
on multiple fronts outside of Boeotia was a project for which the Thebans were unprepared in
terms of manpower, finances, and experience. “Epaminondas’ policies,” George Cawkwell
comments, “would in the long run have proved to have overstretched his country’s resources.”78
For example, when Epaminondas took the allied army into the Peloponnesus in the summer of
369, he left Pelopidas without any local troops during his second expedition to the north, so the
latter was forced to hire Thessalian troops. Furthermore, there is no record of the Thebans ever
including provision for financial contributions from the new allies to defray expenses. In 370,
Elis lent (δεδανεῖσθαι) 10 talents to the Thebans but this was an inconsequential sum (compare
Ariobarzanes’ contribution of 10 talents per month to the Spartans in 368 [S7] or Nectanebo’s
220 talents to Agesilaus in 362 [S8]).79 Although the addition of a financial contribution clause
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to the alliances or the establishment of a revenue collection agency under the supervision of an
allied council would certainly have provided more support, closer attention to resources may not
have completely solved the problems facing the Thebans and their alliances. Even the wellorganized Athenians, who inserted financial details into many of their alliances, and the
Spartans, who received great amounts of money from their wealthy allies, had fiscal problems
during this period.
There is one final problem that has not received enough attention in modern discussions
of this topic: the Thebans’ failure to cultivate social connections with the new allies. Coming late
to the practice of constructing extensive alliance networks, in many instances the Thebans lacked
historical ties with the new allies in the first place. On the other hand, their obsession with
matters of Realpolitik blinded them to recognizing the necessity of forming new relationships
that would transcend and outlast the temporary objectives. The Athenian orator Isocrates, in a
speech in 346, hints at this deficiency in the Theban alliance strategy:
“But surely the matters concerning the Thebans have not escaped you. For having prevailed in the
most splendid battle [i.e., at Leuctra] and from it possessing the greatest honor, because they did
not use their success well, they are now managing no better than the defeated and unlucky. For no
sooner had they conquered their foes than, more than everything else, they were disturbing the
cities in the Peloponnese; they tried to enslave Thessaly; they were a threat to their Megarian
neighbors; they robbed our city of a portion of its territory [i.e., Oropus]; they plundered Euboea;
80
they sent triremes to Byzantium, in order to rule both land and sea [italics supplied].”
ἀλλὰ µὴν τὰ περὶ Θηβαίους οὐδὲ σὲ λέληθεν. καλλίστην γὰρ µάχην νικήσαντες, καὶ δόξαν ἐξ
αὐτῆς µεγίστην λαβόντες, διὰ τὸ µὴ καλῶς χρῆσθαι ταῖς εὐτυχίαις οὐδὲν βέλτιον πράττουσι τῶν
ἡττηθέντων καὶ δυστυχησάντων. οὐ γὰρ ἔφθασαν τῶν ἐχθρῶν κρατήσαντες, καὶ πάντων
ἠνώχλουν µὲν ταῖς πόλεσι ταῖς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ, Θετταλίαν δ᾽ ἐτόλµων καταδουλοῦσθαι,
Μεγαρεῦσι δ᾽ ὁµόροις οὖσιν ἠπείλουν, τὴν δ᾽ ἡµετέραν πόλιν µέρος τι τῆς χώρας ἀπεστέρουν,
Εὔβοιαν δ᾽ ἐπόρθουν, εἰς Βυζάντιον δὲ τριήρεις ἐξέπεµπον ὡς καὶ γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἄρξοντες.
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Despite some exaggeration in the closing lines, overall Isocrates makes much of the fact that
although there was great potential in the Thebans’ military victories, they did not capitalize on
them and create a more lasting legacy. He alludes to a reason for this with καὶ πάντων (“more
than everything else”), a genitive of comparison, which can be taken to mean that the Thebans
neglected things not associated with military affairs.81 Although Isocrates does not indicate what
exactly they overlooked, one can easily see that the Thebans, unlike their Spartan and Athenian
counterparts, neglected the interpersonal aspects of alliance management. For example, there is
epigraphical evidence for a handful of proxeny decrees passed by the Boeotian League (not
Thebes) during the 360s or soon after for a Carthaginian, a Byzantine, a Macedonian, and a
Spartan exile (perhaps) – but none for citizens of the new allies.82 Nor is there mention in the
ancient historians of personal relationships between the Theban leaders of this time and the new
allies, such as those of Thrasybulus and Ismenias, and Agesilaus and Callistratus, to ensure the
continued maintenance of the alliance. “It is a sign of Epaminondas’ political failure,” writes
Simon Hornblower, “. . . that his Peloponnesian allies fought to reject Sparta rather than because
of the positive attractions of Thebes.”83 In short, Theban alliances were less matters of creating
bonds of community and rather more narrowly pragmatic accords, designed for temporary goals,
and thus not stable and enduring.
Predictably, then, the alliances were bound not to last long. After the Battle of Mantinea,
the Mantinean-led faction of the Arcadians, Achaeans, Eleans, and Phliasians made a joint
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alliance with the Athenians (A17). In the next year, Alexander of Pherae complicated matters by
attacking Athenian allies and the Piraeus, which resulted in bringing the Athenians and
Thessalians into an alliance (A18) and in nullifying the latter’s alliance with Thebes.84 The
Thebans held on to their alliances with Argos, Messene, Tegea, and Megalopolis, and continued
to campaign in Arcadia well into the next decade.85 Even the unequal alliance with Pherae
continued under Tisiphonus, Alexander’s assassin and successor, until the Third Sacred War.86
Finally, it was during that war that one after another of these remaining allies abandoned Thebes
and joined Philip II of Macedon.87 It cannot be known for certain, but one might suspect that had
the Thebans imitated their Spartan and Athenian predecessors more closely by enumerating
leadership roles, developing formal administrative institutions, finding ways to increase their
resources, and, most importantly, cultivating strong social relationships with the new allies, their
one attempt at Greek hegemony may have lasted longer than it did.
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PART III:

CONCLUSIONS

231

Having explored the process of alliance formation in Part I and the principal case studies
in Part II, this concluding chapter turns to the subject of the dissolution of alliances. The previous
two chapters anticipated this with a multitude of examples of failed alliances. Spartan alliances
failed because of confusion in translating the principles of Greek friendship into a cross-cultural
context. Theban alliances failed because of the absence of any strong socio-cultural ties with the
new allies. But, of course, the Athenians also had their share of unsuccessful and fleeting
alliances. This concluding chapter returns to the Athenian context and seeks to uncover what a
failed alliance may have meant to them. It first reexamines the approaches of modern scholarship
to alliance dissolution before presenting alternative interpretations for this final stage of the
alliance life-cycle. The Athenians, it is argued, did not construct alliances in the anticipation that
they would dissolve quickly. Nor, if an ally violated the terms of the agreement, did they
instantly purge the offender’s name from the rolls. In fact, even broken alliances remained intact
in their commemorative stelai on the Acropolis. The chapter ends with a review of the major
conclusions of this study as a whole and some final thoughts on their significance for the wider
academic community.

The End of Athenian Alliances

All Athenian alliances in the fourth century came to an end. Some dissolved rather
quickly. Others endured for decades. But all ended at some point. The questions this chapter
seeks to answer are, after all of the positive work put into the creation and the maintenance of the
alliances, how did the Athenians consider and how does one today interpet their abrogation? As
might be expected from the discussion in Chapter I, modern scholarship views this topic through
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the lens of Realism. The following passage from F.E. Adcock and D.J. Mosley’s Diplomacy in
Ancient Greece summarizes the various explanations for the end of alliances from a Realist
perspective.
“Even where treaties were concluded for a limited term they regularly failed to last the full course
for which they were designed. They and the perpetual treaties tended to lapse into obsolescence
or to be superseded by fresh arrangements either made between the parties or dictated to them by
an outside party. Some treaties were formally abrogated. The clearest method of signifying an
unequivocal abrogation was to tear down the pillar on which it was inscribed.”1

Besides the rather obvious explanation of a conquering power enforcing the dissolution of
alliances, the authors make reference to three other explanations for the end of alliances: the
balance of power (BOP), the failure of one ally (or both) to observe alliance obligations, and the
nullification of an old alliance because of a conflict with a new one.
As Chapter I explained, the BOP theory claims that two states create an alliance in order
to obstruct the advance of a mutual enemy. Alliances, therefore, are negative agreements,
defined by their opposition to a threat, and thus no longer necessary once the principal war aims
are fulfilled. In this “mission accomplished” explanation, alliances are designed to have an end
point. The social ties between the parties are insignificant in light of the more immediate military
concerns. “Balance-of-power considerations,” Peter Hunt comments, “often required shifts of
alignment even at the expense of treaty obligations and the friendships they often formalized.”2
Although BOP has an obvious attraction for explaining interstate behavior, the Greeks did not
recognize this structural influence, as Chapter I concluded, so it is not germane to a discussion of
the reasons which the Greeks themselves held for discarding an alliance.
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Hunt’s quote above alludes to the second explanation, the failure to observe alliance
obligations. Realist proponents hold that the self-centered nature of the polis hindered the
prospect of enduring cooperation. It was expected that at some point one party would violate the
terms of the agreement. Knowing this was a distinct possibility, allies distrusted one another.
Even in the negotiations for an alliance, each would seek to insert specifically worded clauses
that might permit later non-observance. “The anti-deceit clauses we find in Greek treaties,”
writes Edward Wheeler on the frequent appearance of ἀδόλως (without guile) in alliance oaths,
“were occasioned by real and immediate concern about deception and especially sophistic
interpretation.”3 Sarah Bolmarcich responds that this does not harmonize with the traditional
respect for sacred oaths. She argues that the appearance of ἀδόλως does not indicate an interest
in establishing a loophole for noncompliance but expresses a flexibility in alliance treaties, “so
that a city-state that found herself in circumstances that made it difficult to fulfill an oath would
not find herself compelled to do so by an ally against her interest.”4 Either way – the noxious
form of actively working against an ally’s interests or the innocuous form of failing to uphold
one’s end of the bargain – these explanations indicate that any failure to observe alliance
obligations led directly to their dissolution. This was not always the case, however. The Thebans
withheld support for Athenian expeditions throughout the 370s and yet there was not a clean
break between them for many years.5 In the 360s, the Athenians supported Messenian
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independence yet their alliance with the Spartans remained on the books. To take an example
from the Spartans, when they failed to protect their Achaean allies from the Acarnanians, the
wronged did not cast off the alliance, rejoicing to have found a reason to discard it, but rather
demanded that the Spartans uphold their alliance responsibilities, which they then did.6 In other
words, it was not always the case that an infraction led to the immediate suspension of alliance
ties.
The third major explanation – that the proliferation of alliances led to a conflict of
interests, which meant that the older alliances must be cast aside – is exaggerated. In fact, in
most cases the Athenians avoided conflicting alliances. For example, new members of the
Second Athenian Confederacy were required to destroy any stelai from previous alliances that
might interfere with the new organization.7 The Athenians refused to ally with the Arcadians in
366 (A16) unless there was a guarantee that it would not be at odds with their Spartan alliance
(A13).8 Even if there was a new alliance that might appear to be in conflict with an old – e.g., the
Athenians’ alliance with the four Peloponnesians in 362 (A17) after their Spartan alliance (A13)
– they did not necessarily discard the old one.9 In 353, when ambassadors from Megalopolis
came to Athens seeking an alliance against the Spartans, Demosthenes reminded them that it
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would mean the abrogation of any conflicting alliance: “They must take down the stelai for the
alliance with the Thebans, if they are to be our resolute allies [δεῖ τὰς στήλας καθελεῖν αὐτοὺς
τὰς πρὸς Θηβαίους, εἴπερ ἡµέτεροι βεβαίως ἔσονται σύµµαχοι].”10 The Megalopolitans,
however, were unwilling to do this, and the Athenians were no more willing to discard their
alliance with the Spartans to help them. Then there is the case of the Athenian-Thessalian
alliance (A18). In 368, the Athenians had allied with Alexander of Pherae, traditional enemy of
the Thessalian League, and supported him in his conflict with the Thessalians and their Theban
allies. In 364, however, the Thebans overcame Alexander and made him an ally of Thebes (T7).
The tyrant repudiated his alliance with the Athenians; yet, in Athens, the alliance stele remained
standing on the Acropolis. Not until three years later, during negotiations for an alliance with the
Thessalians (A18), would they destroy it in compliance with the wishes of their new allies. But
this is not an example of “directly contrary or apparently incompatible” alliances.11 Alexander
had already abandoned the alliance; it was only the stele that remained to be destroyed.
These examples of stele destruction have led scholars to assume that this was done
routinely as a damnatio memoriae. Rosalind Thomas calls it “the widespread practice of
obliterating documents.” P. J. Rhodes characterizes it as a “standard practice.”12 But these
pronouncements are made on the basis of only a few instances. It was not as prevalent a practice
as they claim. Just as the Athenians were hesitant to declare the end of an alliance agreement, so
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they were reluctant to destroy the stelai. Against the communis opinio, Sarah Bolmarcich has
recently suggested that “only under very specific circumstances was a treaty-stela removed or
altered.” She begins her article with the famous example of the stele which commemorated the
alliance of Athens, Elis, Argos, and Mantinea in 420. Even though the alliance was designated to
last for 100 years, it only lasted a short time, but the stele continued to stand at Olympia five
centuries later when Pausanias visited the site.13 Proceeding through the few examples in the
fourth century of the obliteration of a stele or just the erasure of a name from a stele, she
concludes that these are only extraordinary cases and that the Athenian impulse was rather
towards their preservation, even of those for lapsed alliances. Furthermore, the fact that so many
stelai have survived in their original location (i.e., the Acropolis) suggests that this is indeed the
case.14
As Chapter II made clear, the stone documents, sacred objects, placed under the watchful
eyes of the gods, possessed a strong religious and symbolic character. Even when it was decided
to destroy the one for the alliance with Alexander of Pherae, it was the religious authorities, the
Treasurers of Athena (ταµίαι τῆς θεο͂), who were assigned that responsibility.15 But while the
stones stood, the Athenians continued to imagine that the alliances, even those that had been
violated, also persisted. Demosthenes confirms this in his speech for the preservation of honors
awarded to the Spartocid ruler Leucon. He claims that the Athenian relationship with the Black
Sea rulers would last as long as the stele which recorded those honors also stood.16 It seems that
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the notions of the Athenians designing terminal alliances and then casually disregarding their
stone records needs to be revised.
Of course, alliances did lapse after a mission was accomplished or fail to endure because
of a breach of the alliance terms. But the socio-cultural perspective of this study suggests that the
end of alliances may not always have been so expected or so dismal. Indeed, it would be odd for
the Athenians to have expended so much energy constructing their alliances if they intended
them to end in short order. The language employed in the treaties and the rituals performed after
the negotiations work against the theory that alliances were designed to end. No Athenian
alliance in the fourth century had a specific time limit; nearly all were designated to last forever.
The ones with dynasts continued, at least in theory, with their descendants. If, during the
negotiations for an alliance, there was any sense that it might not endure as is, that future
circumstances might have a negative impact on its persistence, the Greeks did not have an escape
clause (clausula rebus sic stantibus); instead, they could include a provision for future
amendment (A1, A2, A3, A17, and A20). Moreover, this study demonstrated that there were
closer ties between the allies than just the temporary military affairs, which made it possible,
though not inevitable, that their relationships could endure through future contingencies.
The religious rituals which accompanied the alliance negotiations, too, indicate that the
signatories hoped for an enduring alliance. These ceremonies generated positive and negative
emotions. Chapter II showed how the language of the oaths provided metaphors of unity and the
performative aspects of the rituals activated a sense of solidarity. They also drew attention to the
role of the gods and impressed upon the participants the weighty solemnity of the agreements.

16

Dem. 20.37: “to those wishing to speak evil against the city, they are a sign that they
speak truth [αὗται γὰρ οὑτωσὶ τοῖς βουλοµένοις κατὰ τῆς πόλεως βλασφηµεῖν τεκµήριον ὡς
ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν ἑστήξουσιν].”
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“The ritual sacrifice, the libations, the curse, the invoking of divine witnesses,” writes Andrew
Bayliss on the role of religious ceremonies in interstate treaties, “was all clearly designed to
generate not only trust, but also fear of the gods who had the power to punish those who broke
their oaths.”17 The oaths, with both blessings for faithful observance and curses for nonobservance, animated the commitment to a lasting alliance. The annual commemorative festivals,
moreover, kept the alliance alive in the minds of all the participants. To contemporary Athenians,
therefore, there was a hope that alliances, seen in social and religious in addition to political and
military terms, would not end.
Nor did the Athenians accept the end of an alliance so easily when it actually happened.
As mentioned above, they might hold on to an alliance even after the terms had been violated.
Sometimes, however, two poleis chose to renew their vows, as it were. The Athenian-Boeotian
alliance (A1) endured through the pressures of the Corinthian War and, according to Lysias,
continued beyond the dissolution of the Boeotian League at the end of the war. It came to an end
only when an Athenian attempted to orchestrate a revolution in Thebes, which “deprived us of
that alliance [τῆς συµµαχίας ἡµᾶς ταύτης ἀπεστέρησεν].”18 Nevertheless, the alliance stele
continued to stand on the Acropolis. In 378, the two parties renewed their alliance relationship
(A12) and the Thebans became a part of the Second Athenian Confederacy in 377. Even though
the Thebans eventually seceded from the Confederacy, the stele for the bilateral alliance
remained standing and their names were not erased from the Aristotles Decree. Finally, in 339,
when faced by the mutual threat posed by Philip, the two overlooked their past grievances,

17

In Sommerstein and Bayliss 2013, 167; cf. Bolmarchich 2007a, 26-38; Low 2007, 118126; Hunt 2010, 188-189.
18

Lys. 26.23.
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recalled their past collaboration, and reunited in yet another alliance (A23). The Athenians and
the Eretrians also had a checkered history in the fourth century, but each time they renewed
friendly relations they also renewed their alliances (A3 and A22, for example).
At other times, alliances may have simply lapsed over time without any breach of the
agreement, but the parties still decided periodically to renew their relationship. The Chians, for
example, allied with Thrasybulus in the 390-389 campaign and renewed their alliance in 384
(A8), in 378, and in 377, as a part of the push towards Confederacy.19 The Mytileneans made
alliances with the Athenians in 389 (A7), in 378, and in 377.20 The Byzantines (A10) and
Methymnaeans (A11), too, made alliances with the Athenians in the 380s before reaffirming
them under the umbrella of the Confederacy.21 Sometimes when renewing an alliance an ally
might bring others to form a joint alliance. The Mantineans (Arcadians) made a defensive
alliance with the Athenians in 366 (A16) and then a larger alliance in 362 which included three
other Peloponnesian groups (A17). They also renewed their alliance with the Athenians in 342 as
a part of the anti-Philip coalition. The Athenians clearly did not consider their alliance
relationships to be terminal.
While one should not be misled into thinking that alliance relationships were ideal, the
examples presented in this conclusion remind that the alliance process was not such a negative
and uninspiring ordeal as modern scholars assert. The Athenians constructed their alliances on

19

Diod. Sic. 14.94.3 (390-389); IG II2 35 (378); 43, line 79 (377).

20

IG II2 40 (378); 43, line 80 (377).

21

IG II2 43, lines 81 (Methymna) and 83 (Byzantium).
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the basis of historical interactions and socio-cultural elements. When they finally negotiated the
actual treaty, they did so in the hopes that the arrangements would endure. Many of the alliances
continued beyond the military objectives for which they were directed. On a number of
occasions one party violated the terms of the agreement. Others simply lapsed over time.
Nevertheless, the Athenians continued to act as though the alliances were still active. They often
renewed the relationships and erected yet another stele on the Acropolis for it. And even after the
classical period came to an end and the Athenian alliance network was irrevocably severed, the
stelai continued to stand in commemoration of those alliances.

Project Summary

This study began with the confident yet unconventional declaration that the practice of
constructing formal interstate alliances in the fourth-century Greek world was a social activity.
Chapter I explored how this topic is generally approached today in modern scholarship. Rather
than a positive process that created shared goals, ideas, even identities, most scholars view
alliances through the interpretive lens of Realism and BOP. This model, however, conceived in
the early modern European context and then enhanced in the twentieth century, fails to find
substantiation in the ancient Greek record. Other scholars today pose alternative theories, such as
Liberalism and Constructivism, but, again, these paradigms would be foreign to the ancient
Greeks. This study, therefore, sought to uncover the principles of alliance activity from the
historical record, uncovering how the ancient Greeks themselves might have interpreted their
interstate alliances. The brief philological overview of alliance terminology demonstrated that
they considered their alliances, albeit ostensibly politico-military accords, to be socially defined.
Although the first alliances in the historical record were labelled friendship (φιλότης, φιλία) or
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oath (ὅρκος), by the fourth century, nearly every alliance was a συµµαχία; nevertheless, the nonpolitical and non-military features remained, embedded, giving a much deeper sense of the
alliance as a social activity.
Chapter II outlined the general procedures of the alliance process: the proposal, the
negotiation and the articulation of the alliance conditions, and the public display of the
agreements. The legislative activity necessary to authorize alliances incorporated the
participation of the whole community, not just one political faction, and made it a communal
effort. In addition to bringing the whole polis together, since this was an interstate activity, it also
brought two poleis together into a closer union. The joint performance of religious ceremonies,
moreover, transformed the ostensibly political activity into a much more solemn occasion. The
chapter concluded with the practice of inscribing the words of the alliance treaty on stone and
erecting them for all to see at prominent, sacred locations. Through the legislative, religious, and
military activities, the two parties strengthened old ties and developed new ones to advance their
alliance relationship.
Part II transitioned away from the theoretical and procedural aspects to specific case
studies. Chapter III examined Athenian alliances. The first part, concerning alliances from the
first one with the Boeotians in 395 (A1) to those which formed the nucleus of the Second
Athenian Confederacy, made the case that these alliances were not tools of Athenian imperialism
but rather manifestations of deep socio-cultural ties between the Athenians and their allies. The
interstate alliances sprang from social, religious, and economic connections on an interpersonal
level. The second part of this chapter, however, traced both a proliferation of Athenian alliances
and a gradual decline in their effectiveness. A little less than a decade after the creation of the
Confederacy, the Athenians shocked the Greek world by making an alliance with the Spartans.
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But then a little less than a decade after that, they entered into new alliances with their
Peloponnesian rivals. From the mid-350s to the last alliance in 339, Athenian foreign policy
became increasingly defined by opposition to Philip II of Macedon. While he proved a
formidable foe, the Athenians overextended their diplomatic reach, until their whole alliance
edifice collapsed with their defeat at Chaeronea and their inclusion into Philip’s League of
Corinth. Yet, even in these final years, the Athenians followed the same pattern as before in
resting their formal alliances on their historical relationships and interpersonal interactions with
their allies.
Chapter IV demonstrated that these practices existed just as much, if not more, in fourthcentury Sparta. Kings Agesilaus and Archidamus framed their alliances with Greeks and with
non-Greeks according to the principles of reciprocity inherent in interpersonal friendships. Their
alliances with other Greeks operated rather smoothly because everyone understood the guiding
principles. Through the exchange of money and manpower, the alliances had the potential to
advance the military objectives of the allies as well as the political objectives of the Spartans in
the Peloponnesus. The alliances with non-Greeks, on the other hand, were utter failures, lasting
no more than a few months, but this chapter argued that this was because of cross-cultural
misunderstandings about friendship and reciprocity. Whether successes or failures, the Spartans,
like the Athenians, saw their alliances in socio-cultural terms.
Chapter V also covered failed alliances, those under Theban direction from 371 to 362,
which stand as counterexamples to Chapter IV. Unlike the Spartan experiences, Theban alliances
failed because there was no attempt to cultivate socio-cultural ties with the new allies. Although
modern scholars are right to stress the problems extending from the absensce of clearly defined
leadership roles and well-established administrative institutions to support the hegemonic
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endeavor, this chapter posed the additional problem of the lack of social connections between the
Thebans and their allies. Their obsession with temporary politico-military objectives blinded
them to the need for forming relationships that would persist beyond the immediate campaigns.
The negative example of Theban alliances, therefore, reinforces the importance of the sociocultural elements in fourth-century alliances; without them, the alliances were even more likely
to dissolve.

Significance of the Work for the Academic Community

In the closing lines of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, an implicit
critique of Karl Marx’s approach to history by tracing the potential religious influences on the
development of modern economic practices, Max Weber wrote,
“it cannot, of course, be our purpose to replace a one-sided ‘materialist’ causal interpretation of
culture and history with an equally one-sided spiritual one. Both are equally possible, but neither
will serve historical truth if they claim to be the conclusion of the investigation rather than merely
the preliminary work for it.”22

This dissertation has followed this Weberian prescription for its own methodological approach to
interstate alliances in the fourth-century Greek world. Although it consistently viewed the
alliances through a socio-cultural lens, it did not seek to substitute a completely socialized
account in place of the traditional Realist model. The latter has great value for understanding
international behavior – indeed, its staying power as the dominant IR model attests to that – but it
is incomplete; it needs to devote more attention to the non-political and non-military
determinants. This dissertation showed how this can be done for the fourth-century Greek world
and promotes its application to other historical contexts.
22

Reprinted in Weber 2002, 122.
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In focusing its attention on the socio-cultural features, this study revealed a more
optimistic perspective of interstate alliances. The current theoretical IR models cast a negative
shadow over the whole alliance life-cycle, from the anxious proposal from one state to the
reluctant acceptance by another to the calamitous dissolution of the compact. This scenario
derives from the “one-sided ‘Realist (or BOP)’ causal interpretation” which views alliances,
defined by pragmatism and self-interest, only in political and military terms and takes no thought
for ideological or moral considerations in their development. The perspective of this project,
however, challenged this power politics only narrative and broadened the interpretive horizon to
include the social, religious, moral, and otherwise non-political features that gave the alliances
their deep meaning. There was no intention to deny that political and military concerns existed in
the formation of alliances, but it showed that the socio-cultural determinants were just as potent,
if not more so. As political institutions the Greek poleis had a great interest in the conduct of
political activity; yet, the chapters in this work showed how important it is to recognize that the
ancient Greeks did not disassociate these activities from those in the social, cultural, or religious
spheres. Ancient Greek IR was a very personal affair with formal alliances springing up out of
interpersonal relationships, shared ideas, the observance of moral norms, and historical contacts,
which, in fact, were what defined and reified the political and military decisions. The
conventional models make a hermeneutical mistake by ignoring these socio-cultural aspects.
This project, therefore, adds a fresh perspective and has the potential to generate further
discussion on the nature of interstate relations in antiquity.
This perspective is unique for interstate alliances in the fourth century, but it is not, of
course, unique in academia at large. For some time now there have been scholars who have
followed a parallel path from those in the Realist camp. They have engaged with the literary and
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anthropological turns in academia – with their questioning of the relationship between language
and reality, and their emphasis on the gap between modern and primitive – and have sought to
reexamine the historical record in its own context. Those with this scholarly bent have already
made great advances in elucidating the conceptual framework within which the Greek poleis
interacted with one other. Surprisingly, however, there has not yet been a study from this
perspective that is specifically directed at classical Greek alliances. As mentioned in Chapter I,
for these scholars the larger theoretical issues of IR take precedence over the details of alliance
formation. This project fills that void and hopes to raise awareness of the importance of alliance
studies for this strand of scholarship.
Finally, being an interdisciplinary endeavor, this study encourages historians, classicists,
and IR scholars to collaborate more directly in their research. Although it attempted to uncover
contemporary perceptions in the primary literary and epigraphic record and eschewed the strict
imposition of anachronistic models, its conclusions still engaged with the current debates in the
various disciplines. It is important for scholars in the three disciplines to engage more closely
with one another’s work in order to recognize the biases and assumptions that have crept into
these studies and have become axiomatic. “Most Classicists,” J.E. Lendon admits in what can
equally apply to historians, “are happily oblivious to this [i.e., IR] theoretical work, but we are
all unaware realists by upbringing, taught to view relations between states in terms of power and
security.”23 At the same time, IR scholars, looking for supporting evidence for their generalized
theoretical models but also lacking a full understanding of the historical context, often impose
logical but anachronistic interpretations onto the ancient world. A closer engagement with each
other’s work – a scholarly alliance, if you will – can only be constructive.

23

Lendon 2002, 376.
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Appendix A

Athens

Allies
Boeotia

Date
395

A2
A3
A4

Locris
Eretria
Seuthes

395
394
390

A5

Amadocus

390

A6
A7

Thasos
Mytilene

390
389

A8
A9
A10
A11

Chios
Olynthus
Byzantium
Methymna

384
383
380s
380s

ü

ü

ü

Offensive alliance

Hostages

Suppression of rebellion among allies

Mutual acceptance of allies

Prohibition of unilateral peace with a
mutual enemy

Exiles clause

Preservation of domestic constitutions

Promise of mutual non-aggression

ü

ü
ü
ü

Territorial defense clause

ü
ü

Exchange of money and manpower

ü
ü

Specification of leadership roles

ü

Revenue collection arrangements

ü

Instructions for swearing oaths

Provision for amendments
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No.
A1

Mutual Defense

Athenian, Spartan, and Theban Alliances (403-338)

Source(s)
IG II² 14; Xen. Hell. 3.5.716
IG II² 15
IG II² 16
IG II2 21; Xen. Hell. 4.8.26;
Diod. Sic. 14.94.2
IG II2 22; Xen. Hell. 4.8.26;
Diod. Sic. 14.94.2
IG II² 24; Dem. 20.59
Xen. Hell. 4.8.28-30; Diod.
Sic. 14.94.3-4
IG II2 34
IG II2 36; Xen. Hell. 5.2.15
IG II2 41
IG II2 42

Athens

Allies
Thebes
Sparta
Alexander
of Pherae

Date
378
369
368

A15

Dionysius I
of Syracuse
Arcadian
League
Arcadia,
Achaea,
Elis, Phlius
Thessalian
League
Thracian kings

368

ü

366

ü

362

ü

361

ü

357

ü

Northern
kings

356

ü

A16
A17
A18
A19
A20

Offensive alliance
Source(s)
IG II2 40; Plut. Pel. 14.1.
Xen. Hell. 7.1.1-14
IG II² 116, lines 39-40;
Dem. 23.120; Diod. Sic.
15.71.3; Plut. Pel. 31.4;
Mor. 193d
IG II2 105

ü
ü

ü

Hostages

Suppression of rebellion among allies

Mutual acceptance of allies

Prohibition of unilateral peace with a
mutual enemy

Exiles clause

Preservation of domestic constitutions

Promise of mutual non-aggression

Territorial defense clause

Exchange of money and manpower

Specification of leadership roles

Revenue collection arrangements

Instructions for swearing oaths

Provision for amendments

Mutual Defense
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No.
A12
A13
A14

ü

Xen. Hel. 7.4.2-3, 6

ü

ü

ü
ü

IG II2 112

ü
ü

ü
ü

IG II2 116

ü
ü

ü

IG II2 126; Dem. 23.170178
IG II2 127; Diod. 16.22.3
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Athens
No.
A21
Allies
Phocis
Date
355

A22
A23
Eretria
Thebes
341
339

ü
ü
ü
ü
ü
Source(s)
Dem. 19.61-62; Aeschin.
3.118; Diod. Sic. 16.27.3-5;
Paus. 3.10.3
IG II2 230
Dem. 18.160-251; Aeschin.
3.142-143; Hyp. Against
Diondas 137r/136v; Philoch.
FGrH 328 F56b; Theopomp.
FGrH 115 F328; Diod. Sic.
16.84-85; Plut. Dem. 18

Offensive alliance

Hostages

Suppression of rebellion among allies

Mutual acceptance of allies

Prohibition of unilateral peace with a
mutual enemy

Exiles clause

Preservation of domestic constitutions

Promise of mutual non-aggression

Territorial defense clause

Exchange of money and manpower

Specification of leadership roles

Revenue collection arrangements

Instructions for swearing oaths

Provision for amendments

Mutual Defense

S1

Allies

Date

Offensive alliance

Hostages

Suppression of rebellion among allies

Mutual acceptance of allies

Prohibition of unilateral peace with a
mutual enemy

Exiles clause

Preservation of domestic constitutions

Promise of mutual non-aggression

Source(s)
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ü

Sparta

403

S2

Dionysius I
of Syracuse
Spithridates

S3

Otys

395

S4

Acarnanians

389

S5

382

S6
S7
S8

Amyntas III
of Macedon
Olynthus
Ariobarzanes
Tachos

S9

Phocis

356

ü

S10

Tarentum

346

ü

395

379
366
361

Territorial defense clause

Exchange of money and manpower

Specification of leadership roles

Revenue collection arrangements

Instructions for swearing oaths

Provision for amendments

Mutual Defense
No.

ü

ü
ü

Diod. Sic. 13.81.2,
14.10.2-3, 70.3
Xen. Hell. 3.4.10;
Ages. 3.2-3
Xen. Hell. 4.1.3; Ages.
3.3-4
ü Xen. Hell. 4.6.1-7.1;
Ages. 2.20
Isoc. 4.126; Diod. Sic.
15.19.3
ü Xen. Hell. 5.3.26
Xen. Ages. 2.25-26
Xen. Ages. 2.28-31;
Diod. Sic. 15.92-93;
Plut. Ages. 36-40
Theopomp. FGrH 115
F 312; Diod. Sic.
16.27.3-5; Paus. 3.10.3
Diod. Sic. 16.62.4

Date
370

ü

370

ü

T3

Sicyon/Pellene

369

T4

Alexander II
of Macedon
Ptolemy Alorus
of Macedon
Achaean
League
Alexander of
Pherae

369
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Allies
Central and
Northern
Greeks
Arcadia, Elis,
Argos

T2

Thebes

T5
T6
T7

ü

ü

ü

ü
ü

ü

ü
ü

ü

ü

Offensive alliance

Hostages

Suppression of rebellion among allies

Mutual acceptance of allies

ü

368
366

Prohibition of unilateral peace with a
mutual enemy

Exiles clause

Preservation of domestic constitutions

Promise of mutual non-aggression

Territorial defense clause

Exchange of money and manpower

Specification of leadership roles

Revenue collection arrangements

Instructions for swearing oaths

Provision for amendments

Mutual Defense
No.
T1

Source(s)
Xen. Hell. 6.5.23;
Ages. 2.24; Diod. Sic.
15.62.4
Dem. 16.12, 19; Diod.
Sic. 15.62.3; Paus.
8.6.2, 9.14.4
Xen. Hell. 7.2.2-3.3.2;
Diod. 15.69.1
Diod. Sic. 15.67.4;
Plut. Pel. 26.4
ü Plut. Pel. 27.3

ü Xen. Hell. 7.1.41-42;
Diod. Sic. 15.75.2

364

ü Diod. Sic. 15.80.6;
Plut. Pel. 35.1-2

Appendix B
Interstate Alliances in SdA (403-338)
συνθήκη καὶ συµµαχία
231 Amyntas III of Macedon and Chalcidian League (393?)
307 Grabus the Illyrian and the Chalcidian League (357)
311 Athens and Locris (356?)
340 Athens and Eretria (341)
συνθήκη
233 Thebes and Alexander II of Macedon (369)
253 Sparta and Olynthus (379)
255 Athens and Thebes (377)
271 Thebes and Phocis (370)
φιλία καὶ συµµαχία
238 Athens and Odrysian king (390)
328 Athens and Mytilene (346)
333 Philip II of Macedon and Artaxerxes III (343?)
εἰρήνη καὶ φιλία
281 Boeotians and Alexander of Pherae (367)
φιλία
298 Athens and Philip II of Macedon (359)
συµµαχία
217 Sparta and Elis (400)
221 Sparta and Egyptian King Nepherites I (396)
223 Athens and Boeotians (395)
224 Athens and Locris (395)
225 Corinthian (anti-Spartan) alliance (395)
229 Athens and Eretria (394)
230 Italiote League (393)
234 Athens and Evagoras of Cyprus (390)
236 Athens and Egyptian King Acoris (389)
237 Egyptian King Acoris, Evagoras of Cyprus, and Pisidians (390?)
243 Sparta and Thebes (386)
244 Sparta and Corinth (386)
248 Athens and Chios (384)
249 Sparta and Acanthus, Apollonia, and Amytnas III of Macedon (383)
250 Athens and Olynthus (383)
254 Athens and Thebes (379)
256 Athens and Byzantium (378)
257 Decree of Aristoteles (377)
258 Athens and Methymna (377)
252

259
262
263
264
267
273
274
275
276
277
280
283
284
288
290
291
293
298
300
303
304
305
308
309
310
312
315
318
323
327
332
337
339
345

Athens and Chalcis (377)
Athens and Corcyra, Acarnanians, and Cephallenia (375)
Athens and Corcyra (375)
Athens and Amyntas III of Macedon (375/373)
Athens and Cephallenia (372?)
Boeotians and Arcadian League (370)
Athens and Sparta (369)
Boeotians and Alexander II of Macedon (369)
Athens and Alexander of Pherae (368)
Thebes and Ptolemy Alorus of Macedon (368)
Athens and Dionysius I of Syracuse (367)
Boeotians and Achaeans (367)
Athens and the Arcadian League (366)
Boeotians and Alexander of Pherae (363)
Athens and the Arcadians, Achaeans, Elis, and Phlius (362)
Mantinea and Sparta (362)
Athens and the Thessalian League (361)
Athens and Philip II of Macedon (359)
Philip II of Macedon and Potidaea (359)
Athens and Berisades, Amadocus and Cersobleptes (357)
Athens and Euboeans (357)
Social War (anti-Athens) alliance (357)
Philip II of Macedon and Chalcidian League (357)
Athens and Thracians, Paeonians, Illyrians (356)
Athens and Phocis (356)
Athens and Neapolis (355)
Philip II and the Thessalian League (353)
Philip II of Macedon and Byzantium (352)
Athens and Olynthus (349)
Philip II of Macedon and Boeotians (347?)
Athens and Megara (343)
Athens and Peloponnesian states (342)
Athens and Chalcis (341)
Athens and Thebes (339)
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